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# Current History

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JANUARY, 1978

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## Coming Next Month

### LATIN AMERICA, 1978

How have the policies of the new administration of President Jimmy Carter affected the nations of Latin America? In our February, 1978, issue, seven specialists evaluate recent developments in the nations south of our border. Articles will deal with:

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#### The Panama Canal

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#### Chile

by SALVATORE BIZZARRO, University of Colorado

#### Jamaica

by K. NYAMAYARO MUFUKA, Lander College

## In This Issue

The articles in this issue provide valuable background information on the nations of the Middle East and the conflicting policies of the Great Powers in that area. The Egyptian-Israeli détente took place after these manuscripts were first prepared, and the editors are grateful to all the contributors for their help in updating their material as plans for a Cairo conference go forward.

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# Current History

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*In the light of the Egyptian-Israeli rapprochement of November, 1977, what are the prospects for peace in the Middle East? How stable is the military power balance? What role is played by the superpowers there? In this issue, seven specialists explore these and other questions. As for the United States, as our introductory article points out, "In the Middle East the United States is more than a diplomatic mediator; it is also a political scapegoat, a military supplier, and a trade and aid partner."*

## United States Policy in the Middle East

BY ANN T. SCHULZ

*Associate Professor of Government and International Relations, Clark University*

**I**N the 30 years since the war in 1948, the United States has become increasingly involved in the Middle East confrontation—as negotiator, arms supplier, business partner and military overseer. Given all the leverage held by the United States as a result of these diverse roles, some critics argue that the United States should be able to bring the opponents to the negotiating table. And, in fact, the United States has publicly accepted that responsibility—first with Secretary of State William Rogers' proposals in 1969 and, later, with the "shuttle diplomacy" begun by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger after the 1973 war and continued by the administration of President Jimmy Carter.

The fundamental issues are Israeli security and Palestinian statehood. During the presidency of John F. Kennedy, the United States began to supply arms to Israel and became a major element in Israel's security system. Then, after the 1973 war, the United States added Palestinian statehood to its diplomatic portfolio. Prior to the war, Palestinian demands had been advanced by the Arab governments and the Soviet Union. After the war, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the United States carried on direct negotiations. Subsequently, the United States officially declared that the Palestinian "question" and, later, Palestinian "rights" were basic to the resolution of the conflict. In short, after the 1973 war, the United States placed itself firmly on both sides of the fence.

A position of neutrality should be an advantage to a successful mediator, but the United States position in the Arab-Israel conflict reflects intense involvement

rather than neutrality. United States security interests are so intertwined with the interests of opposing parties in the conflict that United States policy has been very nearly immobilized and the initiatives it can propose are limited to a fairly narrow spectrum. In effect, the United States has tried to coax the opposing parties to negotiate their heretofore non-negotiable demands, without severe sanctions applied by the United States to either side. Such sanctions, it is feared, would only isolate the United States without narrowing the gap between the Israeli and the PLO Palestinian leadership. Progress in 1977 (setting up new Geneva talks and/or preliminary discussions among the foreign ministers i.e., the Sadat-Vance proposal of July, 1977) could be attributed as much to the security interests of the respective states as to the indirect talks of American diplomats.

Saudi Arabian leaders, for example, were actively engaged in 1977 in an anti-Soviet, anti-revolutionary offensive in the Middle East and North Africa that spilled over into their attitudes toward the Arab-Israel conflict. The Saudi Arabian treasury supplemented Syrian, Jordanian, Egyptian and PLO revenues, for example, while Saudi officials strongly encouraged the recipients of their aid to be receptive to United States diplomatic overtures.

This Saudi policy was part of a broader effort to encourage conservative, anti-Communist governments in the immediate vicinity of Saudi Arabia, thereby protecting the monarchy against radical politics. In addition to Egypt, Saudi financial resources have been directed to Somalia, to the reconstituted Eritrean



Liberation Front, and to President Gaafar Nimeiry's regime in Sudan—all former Soviet supporters. The Saudi policy was multifaceted—it meant encouraging Egyptian President Anwar Sadat to open his economy to Western investors and underwriting the Egyptian balance of payments deficit by some \$2 billion.

As long as Saudi Arabian and United States interests overlap, United States influence in the Arab world will carry additional weight. But this influence is not independent but contingent, acquired indirectly through Saudi Arabia. It is also dependent on the balance of power among the Arab states. In the past, when the balance of power among those states has shifted, their stance in the Arab-Israeli conflict has also changed.

### BASIC U.S. INTERESTS

The fundamental national interests of the United States in the Middle East have been identified in much the same way year after year since World War II. United States foreign policies have been structured consistently around three central axes: (1) the containment of the U.S.S.R., (2) the protection of strategic oil supplies and (3) the security of Israel. Accordingly, United States policymakers have been particularly attentive to United States relations with Iran, Saudi Arabia and Israel—the first two because their regimes are anti-Soviet and they are major oil producers; the last, Israel, because she has a unique place in the United States security system.

These basic interests are the “given” agenda of the new administration. What caused the apparent uneven tempo of United States policy in 1977 was the administration's fear that these linchpins of United States policy might be slipping from its influence.

First, Saudi Arabian leaders will eventually want some substantive political reward for the support they have given the United States in the Arab/Israel negotiations. They have been buying the United States out with Syria, Egypt, and others, and have been holding a moderate line on oil prices at a time when the oil-poor European allies are reeling from severe inflation and political instability. The last is a particularly central issue for the United States, with NATO\* security perhaps threatened by the strength of Communist parties in the Italian and French parliamentary elections. An Arab/Israeli settlement that responded to the Palestinian demands for statehood would be such a reward for the Saudi leaders. Pressure on Saudi Arabia, as an Arab Muslim state, to support the Palestinians has conflicted with the regime's anti-Soviet stance for many years. A satisfactory resolution of Palestinian demands would free the Saudis from that contradiction and would allow Saudi leaders to play an even more vigorous role in Arab politics.

Second, a settlement in the Arab/Israeli arena would reduce United States dependence on Iran. There are numerous signs in Congress and in the State Department that policymakers are increasingly uneasy about support for Iran's Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlavi. Nonetheless, it was the Shah's government that objected to Soviet overflights to resupply the Arab states in 1973. And, it is the Shah who keeps oil flowing to Israel despite the opposition of Muslim religious leaders in Iran.

By dampening the Arab/Israeli conflict, United States policymakers hoped to reduce United States dependence on specific states and specific regimes. A satisfactory settlement would allow Israel greater flexibility in attaining security—in the form of oil and/or arms—from countries other than Iran and the United States.

Finally, the Carter administration had to work with a new Israeli government. Prime Minister Menachem Begin was an unknown quantity, and the administration's anxieties were not eased as Begin made himself known. As the summer of 1977 waned, the Israeli government approved new settlements on the West Bank, which seemed to be more than a symbolic denial of the American assumption that the Israelis must make substantial territorial concessions. And when the United States seized the opportunity in early October to gain additional leverage through the joint United States-Soviet declaration that included a reference to Palestinian rights, the President and his adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, were sharply criticized by United States supporters of Israel. Israel was indeed part of the United States' security system, but that fact in no way guaranteed that Israeli and American strategic interests were compatible.

Each of the three axes of the United States security system described above involves Middle East regional politics. Containment of the Soviet Union is a good example. The settlement of the Arab/Israeli conflict is important to the United States because that conflict has been regarded as a stimulus to continuing Soviet influence in the region. Thus, United States strategies have had a double-edged purpose—to reduce the likelihood of another armed conflict and to counter the Soviet Union's presence. Occasionally, the two aims have yielded apparently contradictory policies. Contradictions usually arise when United States policies toward the confrontation states overlap with policies in the broader region—the Horn of Africa, the Persian Gulf, and the Indian Ocean generally.

In the Middle East, the United States has tried to strengthen the military capabilities of the conservative anti-Soviet states so that they can counter threats from domestic and foreign opponents. Saudi Arabia, Iran and, more recently, Egypt are the main targets of this policy. United States weapons, many highly sophisticated, have been sold to Saudi Arabia and Iran at a

\*North Atlantic Treaty Organization

total cost exceeding \$10 billion. Following the steps of Gerald Ford's administration toward rebuilding United States-Egyptian relations, the Carter administration has also approved the sale of \$250 million in "non-lethal" military equipment to Egypt.

Disagreement on the role of the United States as a major arms supplier to these states centers around several concerns. In the case of Saudi Arabia and Egypt, critics contend that the weapons are more likely to be used against Israel than against the Soviet Union or its clients. Not only may Egypt again declare war against Israel, but the Saudis may again transfer arms to the Arab confrontation states, as they did during the 1973 war.

### ARMS FOR IRAN

As far as Iran is concerned, the United States commitment to continue as the arms supplier to the Shah's regime has raised questions about the extent of the United States involvement in (1) the stability of that regime and/or (2) in any future Iranian regional military objectives. If, for example, instability in the sheikhdoms across the Gulf draws Iranian troops there—as it did in Oman during the early 1970's—what would be the implications for the United States? Saudi Arabia also is a major United States ally and the Saudis regard the Gulf states as within their sphere of influence. Iran's intentions are regarded, therefore, with some concern by Saudi leaders. Gulf politics links the United States to two potential antagonists through its position as arms supplier to both.

In an attempt to defuse these potential conflicts, the United States has supported Saudi moves to create a sphere of influence to the west—across the Red Sea on the Horn of Africa—leaving Iran as the predominant Gulf power. Both these states are guardians of critical sea lanes. Saudi hegemony predominates at the entrance to the Suez Canal and to Israel's southern port of Elath; Iran oversees the oil route through the Straits of Hormuz into the Indian Ocean. It is the intention of the "Pax Americana" to protect crucial oil routes by supporting Saudi Arabia and Iran, both of which have vested interests in keeping the oil flowing to the United States, West Europe, and Japan.

Neither Saudi Arabia nor Iran can realistically hope to acquire sufficient military capability to offer meaningful deterrence to the Soviet Union. But the costs of Soviet intervention would be high—politically, if the Soviet Union directly confronted a smaller power, or militarily, if a regional client of the Soviet Union (like Iraq) threatened Saudi or Iranian security.

Arming and otherwise supporting regional states so that those states can defend United States security interests has advantages and disadvantages. These states must protect their own interests, possibly using United States resources. The contradictions of United States security objectives when they are translated into con-

crete regional policies have driven successive United States administrations to increasing involvement in the Arab/Israel conflict.

As one United States diplomat put it, "negotiations are carried on to pass the time until military or political conflict resolves the issues 'on the ground.'" Then negotiations can formally approve or condemn what has in fact occurred. The "Saudi connection" in United States Middle East policy emphasizes the significance of on-the-ground power to the success or failure of United States diplomacy. Saudi Arabia's multiplying oil revenues have given the Saudis greater leverage in regional politics than they enjoyed in previous years. Current Arab-Israeli negotiations are taking place in the context of Saudi Arabia's recently acquired economic power and the willingness of Saudi Arabian leaders to use that power to pursue a diplomatic settlement.

Negotiated solutions cannot be divorced from the realities of power if they are to enjoy a measure of permanence. Americans learned that in Vietnam. Nonetheless, the United States has not been indifferent to the progress of negotiations. The administration is so anxious to achieve a negotiated settlement that it dropped two of Henry Kissinger's standing principles: a refusal to negotiate with Soviet leaders and an insistence on a step-by-step consideration of separate issues. Thus, in October, 1977, the United States-Soviet joint declaration affirmed Israel's right to exist and Palestinian rights—both comprehensive issues—and brought the Soviet Union back into the negotiating process.

### U.S. OBJECTIVES

The United States would like to see a settlement on the ground and a recognition of that settlement in negotiations among the opponents. At the negotiating table, the critical question will be whether the parties involved will conclude that the current power realities are permanent and that those realities should therefore be acknowledged in a formal settlement.

Any settlement, of course, must be in accord with the regional balance of power, including the United States influence on the regional balance of power. In the Middle East, the United States is more than a diplomatic mediator; it also is a political scapegoat, a military supplier, and a trade and aid partner. It was the United States, for example, that helped to rebuild Israel's armed forces so rapidly during and after the 1973 war.

The military balance is still heavily in Israel's favor. According to most assessments, the Israeli military capability is approximately 30 percent higher than it was in 1973. On the other side, Egypt's disagreements with the Soviet Union over the latter's failure to resupply the Egyptian armed forces have been well pub-

licized. Soviet supplies to Syria have not been reliable either. In addition, Syria's military resources have been drained even more by her occupation of Lebanon since the civil war there.

The supply of new weapons to Israel has continued during both Republican and Democratic administrations. All the United States' signals to the Arab states have indicated that this country has no intention of leaving Israel in a militarily insecure position. In recognition of the financial costs of keeping Israel's economy on a wartime footing, United States support for Israel also has included approximately \$2 billion in aid annually.

At the same time, the rapprochement between Egypt and the United States since 1973 presaged the beginnings of military links between the two countries. President Carter continued his predecessor's initiatives by promising financial and technical support for weapon improvements. By 1977, United States, British and French arms manufacturers were all involved in reconditioning Soviet weapons systems with non-Soviet parts.

An American-British-French agreement in 1950 not to upset the arms balance among the confrontation states eventually gave way to a policy of not denying arms to any state.

In the United States, however, Congress has become increasingly interested in exercising its influence over all transfers of advanced weapons systems. The administration's arms transfer policies have aroused congressional opposition. Congressional opponents of unregulated transfers have voiced their concern that more extensive United States military commitments to recipient governments will follow the weapons trade and that the weapons will be used against Israel.

### IS THERE A U.S. POLICY?

The extent and kind of constraints placed by Congress on United States arms transfers to the Middle East depend on political competition within the United States foreign policy establishment—the Defense Department, the State Department, the Treasury, the National Security Council, and Congress. Substantive policy issues are often subordinate to the question of control of foreign policy. The Defense Department and, to a lesser degree, the State Department have been strong proponents of arms transfers, on the assumption that arms suppliers acquire leverage and can wield political influence. Officials in both these agencies, for example, have urged the transfer of United States arms to Egypt to encourage President Anwar Sadat to maintain his moderate position in the Arab-Israel negotiations. Treasury officials often support this position because the arms transfers help to meet balance of payments deficits.

The leverage and balance of payments arguments have not always found a receptive audience in Congress. In 1975, when Congress provided grants-in-aid to Egypt and Syria as a reward for the interim troop separation agreements, Middle East experts in the State Department were pleased but surprised. In view of previous congressional actions, they expected that it would be difficult to persuade Congress to approve even minimal overtures to Egypt and Syria. Once the principle of limited financial support for these two governments received congressional approval, then an arms supplier relationship with the two countries was pursued. In case congressional approval of this initiative is withheld, the administration has been seeking ways of bypassing Congress, perhaps supplying "non-lethal" military assistance, as it did in Zaire.

The bureaucratic jockeying on the issue of arms supplies indicates that bureaucratic politics often accounts for major disagreements in Washington about United States policy. The State Department, for example, has a reputation in Congress and in the press for advocating "pro-Arab" solutions. That interpretation contains a measure of insight, but the reality of State Department policy is more complex. The State Department position (or more accurately positions) results from its bureaucratic structure. What appears to be a "pro-Arab" stance, in the case of the State Department's Arab desks, is actually each desk officer's tendency to advocate policies that he believes will enhance close relations between "his" country and the United States.

What emerges as State Department policy in department statements and at congressional hearings at a later stage in the policymaking process is a composite of these recommendations of specific country desk officers. State Department policy recommendations tend to be collections of requests; rarely do they recommend sanctioning or denying the requests of specific governments. State Department policy is ameliorative and additive. Because the policy is additive and because the Arab states outnumber Israel, the views of the Arab states are reflected more often in State Department recommendations. In contrast, Congress need not respond to the "client country dynamic."

However, Congress is not likely to impose major limitations on arms transfers, because Congress has a political stake in the transfers even without the client country dynamic. In the first place, the balance of payments implications are serious. Second, the over-

(Continued on page 37)

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**Ann T. Schulz** is the author of articles and essays on Iranian politics, the Middle East, and comparative legislative studies. She is coeditor of *Nuclear Proliferation and the Near-Nuclear Countries* (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1975) and editor of *The Middle East and North Africa in Regional and International Politics: An Annotated Bibliography* (Detroit: Gale Research, 1977.)

<sup>1</sup> *Christian Science Monitor*, August 3, 1977.

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*"It is . . . unlikely that meaningful peace can be established in the Middle East without Soviet cooperation—the mere availability of a superpower hostile to the peace settlement will prove an almost irresistible temptation to those Arabs who, for whatever reason, believe that their interests are not being adequately considered."*

## Soviet Policy in the Middle East

BY O. M. SMOLANSKY

*Professor of International Relations, Lehigh University*

IT is now widely accepted that, in the 1970's, the Soviet Union suffered a number of serious reverses in the Middle East and northeast Africa. There has been a sharp deterioration in Soviet relations with Egypt and Sudan. Syria and Iraq, while maintaining an outwardly friendly attitude toward the Kremlin, have also moved away from what was formerly a rather close association. Syrian disenchantment received a powerful impetus when the Soviet Union opposed Syrian intervention in the Lebanese civil war. In Iraq, the 1975 defeat of the Kurdish nationalists diminished Baghdad's heavy reliance on the U.S.S.R.

In an apparent effort to offset some of these losses and to stem the gradual erosion of Soviet influence in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) and the Somali Democratic Republic (Somalia), where Saudi money and pressure have been used to drive a wedge between their "Marxist-Leninist" regimes and Moscow, the Soviet Union has tried to strengthen its ties with Libya and, more recently, with Ethiopia. In both instances, however, Soviet leaders have encountered serious problems, magnified by their failure to assert themselves forcefully in the Arab-Israeli dispute.

### THE HORN OF AFRICA

Because of its strategic position at the entrance to the Red Sea and its geographic proximity to the Middle East as well as to East Africa, Washington and Moscow regard the Horn region as an important arena of superpower competition.\* Developments in the Horn are also viewed closely by Israel, concerned with freedom of navigation in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aqaba, and by such adjoining states as Egypt, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, the PDRY, Somalia and Ethiopia.

Until the mid-1970's, the political alignments of the

Horn area were reasonably clearly defined. By means of extensive military, political and economic contacts, the U.S.S.R. was maintaining an important presence in Somalia and, to a lesser extent, in the PDRY, while the United States was backing Ethiopia. Arab leaders sympathized with the Eritrean rebels, who had been fighting Christian Addis Ababa since the territory's incorporation into the Ethiopian state in the early 1960's, and with the Western Somali Liberation Front, determined to detach from Ethiopia the eastern province of Ogaden.

For some 25 years, until 1974, when the regime of Emperor Haile Selassie was overthrown by a revolutionary junta, Ethiopia had been regarded as one of Washington's staunchest allies in black Africa. The United States maintained its largest military assistance group in Africa there, and sales of American weapons to the Ethiopian armed forces ran into hundreds of millions of dollars a year.

The situation changed abruptly in late 1975-early 1976 as a result of two parallel but unrelated events: the efforts of Saudi Arabia to wrest Somalia from the Soviet orbit and the accession to power in Ethiopia in 1977 of a self-styled "Marxist-Leninist" leadership headed by Lieutenant Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam. In quick succession, Addis Ababa closed United States military facilities in its territory and initiated a far-flung campaign to revamp drastically the socioeconomic structure of the country. The administration of United States President Jimmy Carter reacted in February, 1977, by terminating grants of military assistance to Ethiopia, and the enraged Addis Ababa regime retaliated in April by terminating all military agreements between the two countries. Since the break with the United States came at a time when the domestic situation was rapidly disintegrating, it stands to reason that by early 1977 (if not sooner) Addis Ababa had already assured itself of Soviet military and economic assistance. In view of the magnitude of the threat faced by Men-

\*Editor's note: See the article by Feraidoon Shams B., "Conflict in the African Horn," *Current History*, December, 1977, pp. 199ff.



gistu's government, the Soviet decision to intervene was momentous and far-reaching.

Not surprisingly, there has been no unanimity among Western observers with regard to Moscow's motives. Unquestionably, the most puzzling aspect of the situation has been the seeming willingness of the Soviet Union to jeopardize its politically and strategically important position in Somalia. Somalia was the first black African nation to sign a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the U.S.S.R. (1974), and the Soviets, in exchange for large-scale military and economic assistance, have been granted important naval and air facilities there supporting Soviet naval operations in the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean.

One possible explanation for the Soviet behavior is that when Mengistu approached the Kremlin in his capacity as a "Marxist-Leninist" leader of a major African country with requests for Soviet support, the temptation to dislodge the West from what had previously appeared an unassailable position proved too strong to resist. Aware of Somalia's dependence on Soviet military, economic and organizational backing, the Kremlin leaders might have hoped that Mogadishu would not dare break with the U.S.S.R. no matter what the provocation. In other words, the Soviets might have expected that the leverage they established in both Ethiopia and Somalia would enable them to effect a reconciliation between these two ancient rivals. Finally, it may also have occurred to the U.S.S.R. that, if all efforts at mediation failed, Ethiopia (even if it were deprived of Eritrea and Ogaden) would still remain the second most populous state in sub-Saharan Africa. Given her rich soil, if blessed with sufficient rainfall Ethiopia can become a wealthy nation. Reequipped with Soviet weapons, she might, in time, develop into a major factor in Soviet regional and African policies.

Whatever Soviet motives, it is obvious, however, that, at least in the short run, Moscow lost more than it gained in the Horn. Not only have the fiercely nationalistic Somalis refused to compromise with Addis Ababa, but they also actually staged a full-fledged invasion of Ogaden in July, 1977. Moreover, as Ethiopia turned to the U.S.S.R. for political and military support, Somalia retaliated by seeking assistance from the Western powers and by strengthening her ties with a number of Arab states, among them the staunchly anti-Soviet Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Sudan, as well as the nominally pro-Soviet Syria and Iraq. Finally, in November, 1977, Somalia unilaterally abrogated her friendship treaty with the Soviet Union. This meant the expulsion of thousands of Russian military and civilian advisers and the denial of the use of Somali air and naval facilities to the Soviet armed forces.

Another country which, because of her geographic location, is deeply involved in the politics of the Horn and Red Sea areas is Sudan. Favoring a policy of close cooperation with the Soviet Union in the late 1960's,

President Gaafar al-Nimeiry abruptly changed his attitude in 1971, when the pro-Moscow Sudan Communist party attempted to overthrow his government. Another abortive coup was staged in July, 1976, and the authorities accused the U.S.S.R. and Libya of instigating it. From then on, Khartoum adopted an openly anti-Soviet stand, and relations between the two countries deteriorated steadily. In May, 1977, Sudan expelled all Soviet military experts serving with her armed forces and attempted to secure weapons from the Western powers and the Chinese People's Republic. Nimeiry's efforts have been crowned with some success: in June and July, 1977, respectively, Peking and Washington promised Sudan military assistance.

In retrospect, Sudan's open break with the U.S.S.R. and her appeals for Western (and Chinese) military support were probably caused, in part, by Nimeiry's growing concern over the continuing hostility of his heavily armed neighbor, Libya, and the rapid buildup of Soviet military and political strength in Ethiopia. The extent of his anxiety is reflected in the strong friendship which Khartoum has established with the staunchly anti-Soviet and anti-Communist regimes of Egypt and Saudi Arabia. It is also evident in Sudan's efforts to support the anti-Addis Ababa forces in Ethiopia and in a bitter propaganda campaign designed to discredit Soviet policies in Africa. A Tass statement of June 5 warned Sudan and her backers—"imperialist and other reactionary forces"—to desist from their "provocative actions," but the war of nerves continued during the summer and fall of 1977. Relations between Khartoum and Moscow have never been worse.

## NORTH AFRICA

In North Africa, Moscow's attention has once again focused on its association with Egypt and Libya. Not surprisingly, relations with Egypt have continued to deteriorate in the wake of President Anwar Sadat's abrogation, in March, 1976, of the 1972 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.

On January 18-19, 1977, Egypt was rocked by a series of riots provoked by the government's decision to increase food prices. Led by workers and students, the incensed Lumpenproletariat clashed with the police and army units. Casualties and material damage were heavy. In the aftermath, Sadat blamed four leftist organizations, including the Egyptian Communist party, for instigating the riots. The Soviet media gleefully presented the outburst as a direct outgrowth of Cairo's "regressive" domestic and foreign policies. Their attitude was duly noted by Sadat.

In February, it was Moscow's turn to be upset. The occasion was provided by the publication in a Cairo periodical of Sadat's "memoirs," which denigrated the previous Soviet support of Egypt. On February 19, *Pravda* described the memoirs as a pack of "lies, slander, and falsifications" and a "blow to Soviet-



Egyptian friendship." Two days later, *Al-Ahram* explained the Kremlin's hostility in terms of Sadat's refusal "to become an agent of Moscow."

The dispute took another turn for the worse in the spring, when Sadat and Nimeiry spoke of "Soviet-inspired encirclement" of their countries by Libya and Ethiopia. Moscow countered by accusing Egypt of preparing for a military attack on Libya. The charge was contained in an unusually strongly worded verbal note, delivered to three Arab governments (but not to Cairo) in late April, 1977. In his May Day speech, Sadat described the Soviet note as "impertinent" and demanded a public retraction. None was forthcoming.

No improvement in relations occurred during the summer, despite Egyptian Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmy's visit to Moscow. Undertaken in early June on Soviet initiative, the trip produced no tangible results. According to Sadat's July 16 speech to the central committee of the Arab Socialist Union, the Kremlin leaders confronted Fahmy with a "hard-line policy." Specifically, they cancelled all military contracts between the two states and suggested that the problems of arms and of the Egyptian debt be settled at a summit meeting, at which Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev and Sadat would sign a "new political agreement" defining the foundations of Soviet-Egyptian relations.

In addition, the Kremlin presented Cairo with "two ultimatums." Egypt should not exclude the U.S.S.R. from any efforts to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict and should discontinue its "anti-Soviet policy in Africa." Until these demands were met, Sadat continued, Moscow would not consider Egyptian requests for new deliveries of war material or for a rescheduling of Cairo's debt.

President Sadat struck back at the U.S.S.R. by accusing it of "involvement" in the Egyptian-Libyan fighting (see below) and by severely limiting Soviet-Egyptian trade. In September, Cairo renounced some of its trade agreements with Russia and threatened a ten-year suspension of its debts to Moscow. The Kremlin retaliated by canceling Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko's scheduled September visit to Egypt.

While it is difficult to exaggerate the significance of Moscow's latest troubles in Egypt, it is noteworthy that, even in these turbulent times, neither side has proved willing to cut off all lines of communications. There were meetings between Fahmy and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in Sofia (November, 1976) and Moscow (June, 1977). Formal contacts were maintained on lower levels as well. Moreover, in March, 1977, the two states signed a trade protocol for the current year, envisaging a 14 percent increase over the commercial exchanges of 1976. Last but not least, and Sadat's disclaimers notwithstanding, some Soviet-made weapons and spare parts have been reaching Egypt, although deliveries were channeled through Moscow's East European satellites, above all Czechoslovakia.

The reasons for the Kremlin's reluctance to effect a total break with Cairo are not difficult to discern. The U.S.S.R. cannot disregard the fact that Egypt, in spite of her desperate economic position, remains a key Arab power that plays a unique role in Middle East politics. This uniqueness was highlighted by President Sadat's November, 1977, trip to Israel, undertaken despite considerable Arab opposition.

Having detached herself from Moscow, Egypt is dependent on the United States and the oil-rich, conservative regimes in the Persian Gulf for both economic survival and a favorable settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. As long as there is a chance for a peaceful resolution of that dispute and for a revival of the Egyptian economy through a massive infusion of foreign capital, Sadat can do without Soviet weapons and other assistance. At the same time, he is well aware of the vulnerability of his position. Should his calculations prove wrong, Egypt, once again, may find herself driven toward another military confrontation with Israel. In such an eventuality, Sadat will have to seek the resumption of large-scale Soviet arms deliveries. For this reason alone, Sadat has not burned all his bridges to the U.S.S.R.

In the meantime, one of the few "bright spots" for the Soviet Union in the Middle East (if, indeed, association with Libyan Prime Minister Colonel Muammar Qaddafi merits such designation) was the growing intimacy in relations between the Soviet Union and Libya. While basic differences continue to separate the two governments on the Arab-Israeli conflict (whose peaceful resolution the Libyan President has consistently opposed), there can be no doubt that Moscow and Tripoli have steadily strengthened their ties over the past five years.

During his December, 1976, visit to Russia, Qaddafi emphasized the "full strategic dimension" of Soviet-Libyan relations—a phrase denoting the existence of serious political differences—but proceeded to sign a number of accords in the spheres of technical, scientific, economic, commercial and cultural cooperation. A new agreement for the supply to Libya of additional Soviet military equipment was also reached. However, while Qaddafi's visit and the ensuing agreements signified improved relations, the surfacing of a basic discord on the Arab-Israeli conflict indicated that both partners regarded their association as a "marriage of convenience." Specifically, Qaddafi needed great power support in view of Libya's steadily deteriorating relations with Egypt and of her relative isolation in the Arab world. The Soviet leaders, on the other hand, relied on Tripoli to demonstrate to both Washington and Cairo that the U.S.S.R. had other options available in the Arab world.

In the summer of 1977, in addition to the strain of the Ethiopian-Somali conflict, Moscow was confronted with the outbreak of relatively large-scale hostilities

between Egypt and Libya. Rooted in the turbulent recent history of Cairo-Tripoli relations, the fighting also reflected deep political and personal animosity between Sadat and Qaddafi. According to "sources in Cairo" (quoted in *The New York Times* on July 26), the Egyptian President had initially decided to attack Libya in April, 1977. He changed his mind, however, after the Soviets became aware of his intention and issued a strong warning by means of a verbal note.

The large-scale attacks that the Egyptian Air Force staged on Libyan military installations on July 19 were preceded, according to "Libyan sources" (quoted in *The New York Times* on July 25), by "relatively minor border clashes" undertaken on Tripoli's initiative. Their alleged purpose was to dislodge the Egyptians from contested border areas, and the Libyans were said to have been surprised by the magnitude of Cairo's retaliation. Egypt's response appears, in retrospect, to have been prompted by two related considerations. Sadat seems to have hoped that Egyptian military pressure might lead to Qaddafi's overthrow by the more moderate elements in the Libyan leadership. Even if this objective were not reached, the attack could be counted on to humiliate Qaddafi as well as the U.S.S.R. which, by then, had emerged as Libya's patron.

The fighting came to an abrupt end on July 24 as a result of mediation by Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) chairman Yasir Arafat, Algerian President Houari Boumedienne, and the foreign ministers of Syria and Kuwait. Before that happened, however, a few Soviet-manned radar stations were bombed and a number of Soviet technicians were reportedly killed. In explaining his decision to attack the communications installations, Sadat said that he regarded them as a threat to Egypt's security.

The strongest Soviet statement on the six day war was issued not by the government but by the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, a semi-official organization that is occasionally used to express the views of the Kremlin. Made public on July 25—one day after Sadat had announced the cessation of hostilities—it announced that "the Soviet people call on Egypt to halt immediately the armed actions on the Egyptian-Libyan border." Another authoritative comment appeared in *Pravda* on July 29. It deplored the fighting that had "aroused serious anxiety both in the Arab world and far beyond its borders" and expressed "amazement" at Cairo's efforts "to distort" the position of the U.S.S.R., which regarded all inter-Arab conflicts as "inspired from abroad."

Referring to both the Egyptian-Libyan and the concurrent Ethiopian-Somali conflicts, the commentary concluded that

imperialism has become intensely active in the Middle East, seeking to restore its positions and weaken, and perhaps overthrow, those governments that carry through an anti-imperialist policy.

Thus, although the Kremlin clearly wanted to avoid becoming directly involved in either conflict, its sympathies were clearly on the side of Tripoli and Addis Ababa. Moscow's hesitation, as already mentioned, was no doubt caused by its unwillingness to sever all ties to Cairo and Mogadishu. At the same time, the events of the summer of 1977 provided another example of Soviet inability to exercise decisive influence on events in the Middle East and northeastern Africa.

## THE ARAB-ISRAELI SECTOR

In 1975-1976, relations between the U.S.S.R. and Syria deteriorated sharply as a result of Moscow's disapproval of some fundamental aspects of President Hafez al-Assad's Middle Eastern policy. The latter is based on two major, related assumptions. First, Assad is convinced that the problem of the Golan Heights cannot be resolved in isolation from the other issues separating Israel and the Arab states. Rather, concessions can be extracted from Jerusalem only when it is confronted by a unified Arab front. For this reason, Assad attempted to join forces with Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Palestine Liberation Organization and opposed Washington's stage-by-stage efforts to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. After Cairo signed the second disengagement agreement with Jerusalem, Assad emerged as the leading Arab opponent of the United States and Egypt and set out to establish his own "front," consisting of Jordan, Lebanon and the PLO, led by Syria.

Second, Assad differed significantly from Sadat in his insistence that, in addition to the United States—whose cooperation was deemed essential to bringing Israel to the negotiating table and forcing her to make concessions to the Arabs—the Soviet Union should also be involved in the peacemaking process. Its participation, Damascus believed, would help safeguard Arab interests. Needless to say, Assad's basic outlook was applauded by the Kremlin and served as a reasonably stable foundation for the friendship that marked Moscow-Damascus relations prior to the outbreak of the Lebanese war.

From the viewpoint of Syria and the Soviet Union, the war in Lebanon represented a highly unwelcome development. It pitted Damascus against the PLO (until that time its major ally). It provided Israel with a breathing spell (as Arab attention turned from Israel to Lebanon) and an opportunity to meddle in Lebanese affairs. Finally, it led to a serious crisis in relations between Syria and the U.S.S.R., whose sympathies, throughout the conflict, were clearly on the side of the PLO. When it became obvious that Damascus would not rest until the Palestinians had been brought under Syrian control, the Kremlin began questioning the wisdom of Assad's policy, if not his motives. Specifically, the Soviets were aware that Syrian attempts to reduce the effectiveness of the PLO enjoyed the quiet, but

wholehearted, support of Jerusalem because they undermined the Arabs' ability to exert political and military pressure on Israel.

Soviet displeasure with Assad's actions manifested itself in several ways. Thus, the media alerted world public opinion to the Lebanese "bloodbath," which was said to threaten the "very existence" of the Palestinian movement. Since the "plot" had been concocted by Israel and "imperialist and reactionary forces," Assad, by implication, was depicted as their stooge. On a practical level, the Kremlin halted arms shipments to Damascus.

In an attempt to patch up Soviet-Syrian relations, Assad went to Moscow in April, 1977. By that time, except for southern Lebanon, relative peace had been restored in the country by the approximately 30,000 troops of the Arab Peacekeeping Force, composed mostly of Syrian units. As the Kremlin undoubtedly realized by then, Damascus, had no intention of destroying the PLO. Soviet leaders probably still opposed Assad's determination to bring the Palestine Liberation Organization under his effective control; at the same time, they were aware of the fact that Moscow had no adequate way to prevent Syria from imposing her settlement on Lebanon. Therefore, rather than antagonizing Assad further, Soviet leaders decided to mend their fences with him. To do otherwise would have invited the exclusion of the U.S.S.R. from diplomatic efforts to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict.

In any event, given the realities of the Lebanese situation over which Moscow had no control, further deterioration of Soviet-Syrian relations was judged not to be in the Kremlin's interest. Another consideration which must have carried weight with Soviet leaders was the fact that at no time did Syria follow in Egypt's footsteps: she neither threatened to terminate her Soviet connection nor adopted an openly pro-Western policy.

Assad's visit, as judged by his reception in Moscow, the speeches delivered at a Kremlin dinner and, finally, the joint communiqué, reinforced the conclusion that the U.S.S.R. and Syria had agreed to improve their relations. Thus, as stated in the communiqué of April 22, Syria promised to support Soviet participation in the "diplomatic preparations" for the Geneva conference. The provision was of considerable importance to the U.S.S.R. because of an earlier conviction that President Carter's administration had no intention of letting the Kremlin take part in the negotiating process before the convening of the Geneva Conference. In addition, and in sharp contrast to Sadat's and Nimeiry's determination to undermine the Soviet position in Africa, Assad endorsed Moscow's global policy. In return for these "concessions," Syria assured herself of the Kremlin's support in the Arab-Israeli talks and, most significant, of the resumption of Soviet weapons' shipments to restore the arsenals depleted during the Lebanese war. Moreover, the U.S.S.R. agreed to an increase in trade



and in technical and economic assistance to Syria.

At the same time, the Soviet-Syrian summit conference indicated that relations between Moscow and Damascus had a purely utilitarian base. While Brezhnev in his dinner speech of April 18 referred to the "stability" of Soviet-Syrian ties, Assad pointedly spoke of "hard times" and "difficulties" that occasionally marred their relations. Equally significant was his allusion to the "strategic nature" of the relationship (a phrase previously used by Qaddafi) and the continuing "differences of opinion" between Moscow and Damascus. In essence, Assad was telling his Soviet hosts that he reserved the right to make his own decisions. In return, in areas where Soviet and Syrian interests coincide (as they do, by and large, in the Arab-Israeli conflict) or where no vital Syrian interests are involved, Damascus reiterated its readiness to back the Kremlin. In short, Assad and Brezhnev have reconciled many of their differences but, as in the case of Libya, their relationship is strictly pragmatic.

Turning to the Arab-Israeli conflict itself, it is evident that the inauguration of President Jimmy Carter did nothing to ease Soviet apprehensions about United States intentions in the Middle East. It appeared initially that Washington was determined to retain its position as the prime mover as well as the orchestrator of the Arab-Israeli peace efforts. Having discarded the role of

(Continued on page 38)

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*"The principle of pragmatism will be a component of Chinese policy in the Middle East as long as China continues to support strategic contradictions in the area. . . . China supports a low level of people's revolutionary war against Israel, but desires an overall peace settlement to eliminate Soviet influence."*

## Chinese Politics in the Middle East

BY LILLIAN CRAIG HARRIS  
*Former Public Information Officer, UNRWA*

YASIR Arafat, the chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization, has said that the People's Republic of China (PRC) is "the biggest influence in supporting our revolution and strengthening its perseverance."<sup>1</sup> George Habash, the leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, has described China as "our best friend," adding, "China wants Israel erased from the map because as long as Israel exists, there will remain an aggressive imperialist outpost on Arab soil."<sup>2</sup>

The Chinese have been sympathetically aware of the Palestinians since the 1955 Asian-African conference at Bandung, Indonesia, when the Chinese delegation voted for the repatriation of Palestinian refugees. However, China's first contacts with the Middle East were with Israel; although current Chinese rhetoric holds that "from the very beginning we have refused to have any contact with the Israeli Zionists who persist in aggression," China actively sought to establish ties with Israel in the early 1950's.

Despite colorful Chinese pronouncements for the benefit of the Arabs, China probably does not hope for the actual destruction of Israel as a state. Israel's continued existence is very useful to China. As China scholar W. A. C. Adie has pointed out, the existence of Israel

... has enabled China to exploit forces with the object of tying down and embroiling her two main enemies, the superpowers; this, indeed, is the primary aim, not merely the destruction of Israel or "liberation" of the Arabs  
....<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup>"Chairman Arafat Greets National Day," *Peking Review*, vol. 13, no. 42 (October 16, 1970), p. 22.

<sup>2</sup>Joseph D. Ben-Dak, "China in the Arab World," *Current History*, vol. 59 (September, 1970), p. 149.

<sup>3</sup>W.A.C. Adie, "China, Israel and the Arabs," *Conflict Studies*, vol. 12 (May, 1971), p. 1.

<sup>4</sup>Meron Medzini, "Israel and China: A Missed Opportunity?" *Wiener Library Bulletin*, vol. 25, no. 1-2 (1971).

Arab nationalists sometimes have difficulty accepting the fact that China selected "the Arab cause" because it was politically expedient for China to do so, not because the anguish of the Palestinian people appealed to a Chinese sense of justice or a revolutionary conscience.

Chinese interest in Israel stemmed from the new Communist state's desire to gain recognition from as many states as possible and from China's hope that Israel would serve a useful purpose as "a clandestine staging-post for American and European goods ultimately destined for China."<sup>4</sup> Hedged in by the United States trade embargo in the early 1950's, China saw Israel as a possible channel for establishing contact with European, or even American, industries producing items the Chinese needed.

Israel, also interested in gaining global recognition and eager to see herself as a conduit between East and West, was interested in relations with China and, in fact, made the opening gesture by extending recognition to the People's Republic of China on January 9, 1950. Due to United States disapproval, the Israeli approach was cautious.

Despite the Korean War and Israeli participation in the vote that branded China an aggressor, Chou En-lai told the First National People's Congress on September 23, 1954: "Contacts are being made for establishing normal relations between China and Afghanistan, as well as between China and Israel."

After communication between China and Israel through the Israeli diplomatic mission in Burma, an Israeli trade delegation visited China from January 28 to February 24, 1955, signing a five-point trade protocol that expressed the intent of both countries to "develop closer commercial ties" and inviting a Chinese trade delegation to visit Israel. But Israeli tardiness in setting a date for the Chinese visit, combined with the approaching Bandung Conference and a growing

Chinese awareness of the possibility of expanded third world influence through ties with the Arabs, prevented the Chinese visit.

The first major Chinese expression on the Palestine question came in March, 1955, at the New Delhi meeting of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization. It was not favorable to Israel. The Chinese delegation "voted to condemn 'the aggressive policy of the ruling circles of Israel' and expressed sympathy with the plight of the Arab refugees and their right to return to Palestine." Subsequently in April at Bandung, China pledged support for the Arab position on Palestine. The die was cast, although vocal Chinese belligerence toward Israel had yet to come.

Between 1956 and early 1960, Chinese leaders were largely noncommittal in public on the subject of Israel, although for several years China vaguely supported "the Arab cause" and offered to send volunteers to Egypt to combat British/French/Israeli "aggression" in Sinai during the 1956 Suez war. After the 1956 fighting in the Middle East, however, Chinese diplomats broke off all contact, even at diplomatic functions, with Israeli representatives.

The open Sino-Soviet rupture in 1960 contributed to the solidification of China's foreign policy positions, and in 1962, at the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference in Moschi, China denounced Israeli efforts to influence the newly independent African and Asian countries.

After Chou's 1963-1964 goodwill trip through Africa, China's anti-Israel tone became sharper. On January 23, 1964, the *People's Daily* criticized "the Zionist policy of expansion and of serving the forces of imperialism and colonialism." On September 14, 1964, the *People's Daily* called Israel "the tool of American imperialism for aggression against the Arabs."

Meanwhile, China's efforts to achieve influence in the Arab world by means of the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization and by using diplomatic bases in Arab states had failed. The stage was set and the timing fortuitous for China to take advantage of the 1964 establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). China's anti-Israel line hardened still further as China's leaders recognized the existence of a "Palestinian nation" in 1965; China subsequently became the first major power to accord diplomatic recognition to the PLO.

## CHINA AND THE PALESTINIANS: STAGE ONE

Chinese relations with the Palestinian organizations

can be summarized in three periods: the beginning of the relationship in 1965 to the 1970-1971 Palestinian defeat in Jordan; the period of a cooling in Chinese commitment extending from 1971 through late 1974; and the present supportive but less public relationship that began in late 1974. Despite fluctuations in the relationship, Palestinian leaders regard China as their most consistent military and political supporter.

The Sino-Palestinian relationship is based on several principles that complement Chinese foreign policy objectives. First, China is eager to demonstrate to the world, the third world in particular, the viability and applicability of the Chinese revolutionary model. Obviously, the case of Palestine in the Middle East comes closest to the Chinese experience of revolution against an imperialist invader.

China's support for the Palestinians is also directly related to China's major foreign policy objectives: her desire to combat imperialism and her need to counter the influence of the Soviet Union.

For their part, the Palestinians have been flattered by the attention they received from revolutionary China and, in any case, have not been in a position to be selective about their supporters. PLO chairman Ahmad Shukairi was invited to China in 1965, where he announced that a liberation movement would be organized in the Arab world "on the lines of Mao Tse-tung's thought."<sup>5</sup> Subsequently, the PLO delegation was told that China was ready to help "the Arab people of Palestine in their struggle to return to their homeland by all means, political and otherwise."

News of a Chinese arms offer to the Palestinians "caused heavy impact" in the Middle East. As *The Arab World* commented:

The tendency among Palestinian leaders is to accept the Chinese offer because to neglect such a generous and stringless offer would be a crime . . . [China wants to participate in] the destruction of Israel, which is regarded as imperialism's base in the Middle East.<sup>6</sup>

That the Chinese want to use the Palestinians to enhance China's objective of third world leadership is clear from the now famous statement Mao made to that first PLO delegation:

Imperialism is afraid of China and of the Arabs. Israel and Formosa are bases of imperialism in Asia. You are the gate of the great continent and we are the rear. They created Israel for you, and Formosa for us. Their goal is the same.<sup>7</sup>

Despite Chinese preoccupation with the Cultural Revolution, the Sino-Palestinian relationship grew stronger in the late 1960's. The 1967 war occasioned mass Chinese rallies in support of the Palestinians and violent Chinese editorial attacks on Israel. On June 6, 1967, *People's Daily* editorialized:

Israel is a watch-dog safeguarding U.S. imperialism's neo-colonialist interests in the Middle East; it is a tool of aggression in the hands of U.S. imperialism for suppressing the national liberation movement of the Arab countries.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>5</sup>Adie, "China's Middle East Strategy," *The World Today*, vol. 23 (August, 1967), p. 322.

<sup>6</sup>"Chinese Assistance Promised to PLO," *The Arab World* (June 4, 1965).

<sup>7</sup>"Mao Tse-tung Urges Arabs Boycott West," *The Arab World* (April 6, 1965).

<sup>8</sup>"U.S. Imperialism Engineers Israel's Armed Aggression Against the Arab Countries," *People's Daily* (June 6, 1967).

The theme of a United States-Israeli plot against the Arabs runs through Chinese pronouncements on Israel, especially before 1971. *Peking Review* of March 22, 1968, stated the position colorfully: "Obviously, no running dog would bite so brazenly without its master's leave."<sup>9</sup> The Chinese attacked the December, 1969, United States-sponsored plan for a Middle East settlement as "a Middle East Munich" and reiterated their support for the Palestinians in their protracted armed struggle.

Although there were exaggerated and later disproved reports crediting China with the provision of vast quantities of arms and even military advisers to the Palestinians during their open conflict with Jordan, China did provide increasing amounts of arms to the Palestinian organizations between 1965 and 1970. Hani Al-Hassan, Arafat's special political adviser, said in mid-1975 that between 1964 and 1970 the Palestinians fought with Chinese-made weapons.<sup>10</sup> Israeli intelligence values Chinese weapons supplied to the Palestinians between 1965 and 1969 at \$5 million.

Weapons supplied by China in the early days of the Palestinian connection consisted mainly of Soviet-made light weapons, typically rifles previously used by the Chinese, hand grenades, mines and other explosives. However, in mid-1970, the Palestinians announced they "had recently received modern and effective weapons from China."<sup>11</sup> The growing power of the Palestinian movement and, more pointedly, the new weapons supplied to the Palestinians by the Soviet Union probably caused this change in policy.

Palestinian leadership, while giving no figures, reports that a training program for Palestinians in China began in 1966 and expanded considerably after the 1967 war.

The Chinese have not supplied heavy weapons like tanks for political and logistic reasons. Without strong ties to area governments, the Chinese have usually walked carefully in formulating their arms supply policy to the Palestinians, to avoid the displeasure of certain Arab governments. Iraq and Lebanon have on occasion refused entry to Chinese weapons intended for the Palestinians, and Syria has reportedly confiscated some Chinese arms, though usually expediting Chinese

imports intended for the major (and moderate) Palestinian organizations.

Chinese political support for the Palestinians was particularly strong in 1970. Chairman Mao's "solemn statement" of May 20, 1970, titled "People of the World, Unite and Defeat the U.S. Aggressors and All Their Running Dogs," mentioned the Palestinian struggle among those that are "developing vigorously." In a response printed by the Chinese media, Arafat praised Mao for "illuminating the liberation movements in Indo-China, Palestine, Asia, Africa and Latin America and giving a tremendous impetus to them."<sup>12</sup>

Having pledged "the absolute support of the Chinese government and people," the Chinese were plainly disappointed by Palestinian performance during that fateful September, 1970. Outgunned, outdisciplined and politically outmaneuvered by the Jordanians, the Palestinians were forced back into a position of refugees in a host country. The Chinese saw clearly enough what had happened: disunity and overreaching had led to defeat. During these bloody events, China declared that "... the Middle East situation has aroused the close attention and concern of the Chinese people and the people of the whole world," but Chinese leaders never hinted at possible direct intervention. The Chinese position has always been clear: Defense Minister Lin Piao's 1965 essay, "Long Live the Victory of People's War," intended primarily for the North Vietnamese, also served warning to all other revolutionaries that they must rely on their own strength because China would never intervene militarily on their behalf.

Rather, in the manner of a wise parent acknowledging the failed attempts of a child, Chou cabled Arafat on October 22 that China was "pleased to see that the valiant Palestinian people have been victorious" and have "crushed the military attack backed by the reactionary Jordanian military authority which is supported by American imperialism." Chou concluded: "We highly appreciate your revolutionary spirit, and ... offer you warm congratulations."<sup>13</sup>

## CHINA AND THE PALESTINIANS: STAGE TWO

A discernable shift in China's Middle East policy occurred in 1971. Following their defeat in Jordan, the Palestinian guerrilla organizations declined sharply, albeit temporarily, in size and influence. A Western diplomat with several years experience in the Arab East says that it was infighting in the Palestinian movement much more than the defeat by Jordan that caused China to back off on her support: "In 1971 and 1972, the serious dissensions in the Palestinian movement made it apparent to Chinese eyes that the Palestinian guerrilla movement was not a popular movement convertible to a party."<sup>14</sup> Israeli China scholar Yitzak Shichor says that the 1969-1971 period of Defense Minister Lin Piao's apparent control in China is also significant, ascribing the more moderate Chinese policy

<sup>9</sup>"New U.S.-Israeli Plot of Aggression Against Arab Countries," *Peking Review*, vol. 11, no. 12 (March 22, 1968) p. 32.

<sup>10</sup>"Fatah Steps Up Anti-Israel Activity, Seeks Additional Assistance from Communist China," *The Arab World* (July 22, 1975), p. 11-12.

<sup>11</sup>*Arab Report and Record*, no. 16 (August 16-31, 1970), pp. 487-488.

<sup>12</sup>"Statement by Yasser Arafat," *Peking Review*, vol. 13, no. 24 (June 12, 1970), p. 25.

<sup>13</sup>*Arab Report and Record*, no. 20 (October 16-31, 1970), p. 599.

<sup>14</sup>In 1975 conversation with a Western diplomatic observer with academic background in Chinese affairs and many years' experience in the Middle East as a "China watcher."



in the Middle East after 1971 to Lin's fall from power.<sup>15</sup>

But phase two in the Sino-Palestinian relationship is also related to China's domestic unrest, leadership turmoil and foreign policy reformulation after the Cultural Revolution. The Palestinians' "Black September" came during a crucial period when China was attempting to refurbish her world image, live down her reputation for eccentricity and re-emerge on the world stage with the expanded opportunities of United Nations membership. China established diplomatic relations with Lebanon, Kuwait and Libya in 1971.\* *The Arab World* subsequently remarked on China's efforts to strengthen her relationships with Middle East governments:

The Chinese-guerrilla relationship declined for a while after Peking embarked on its policy of seeking international recognition and of détente with the Western world. The Chinese government then, in a policy switch, decided to maintain its relations more with established foreign governments than with revolutionary movements abroad.<sup>16</sup>

Between 1971 and 1974 there were fewer Chinese media references to the Palestinian guerrilla organizations, fewer Palestinian events held in China, and a lowering of the level of delegations of Palestinians invited to China (where they were met by officials of lower rank than had been usual in previous years). *Peking Review*, for example, showed a marked alteration in public interest in the Palestinians. From a total of 17 articles centered on the Palestinians in 1970 and in 1971, *Peking Review* printed only three articles in 1972, four in 1973, and five in 1974. Nor did these few articles always mention the Palestinian guerrilla organizations.

China was reassessing her support for revolutionary groups throughout the Middle East; it is significant that Chinese aid to both the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman in Oman's Dhofar province and the Eritrean Liberation Front in Ethiopia ceased between 1971 and 1973 and was never renewed.

Nonetheless, the Chinese government continued to pay lip service to the goals of "the Palestine revolution."

\*The People's Republic of China now has diplomatic relations with all major Arab states except Saudi Arabia, having established relations with Jordan in April, 1977.

<sup>15</sup>Interview with Dr. Yitzak Shichor, Executive Director, Truman Research Center, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, on August 3, 1976.

<sup>16</sup>"Relations with China," *The Arab World* (July 22, 1975).

<sup>17</sup>*Arab Report and Record*, no. 22 (November 16-30, 1971), p. 616.

<sup>18</sup>"Palestinian Commandos," *The Arab World* (June 22, 1972).

<sup>19</sup>"Israeli Aggression Against Syria and Lebanon Condemned," *Peking Review*, vol. 15, no. 37 (September 15, 1972), p. 13.

*People's Daily* printed a "Map of the World's Excellent Situations" in May 22, 1971, on which Palestine appeared as a place of armed struggle. In November, 1971, Fatah (headed by Yasir Arafat, this is the major guerrilla organization of the PLO) revealed that an undisclosed number of Chinese youths had volunteered to join the Palestinian guerrilla organizations through an offer made to the PLO office in Peking.<sup>17</sup> However, Fatah did not say whether this offer had been accepted, and no Chinese ever showed up in Palestinian fighting units.

By 1972, *The Arab World* reported that "China has made it a condition that an increase in its aid to the Palestinian commandos would depend on their achievement of unity."<sup>18</sup> *Al Horriya*, the outlet for the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP) in Beirut, reported in June, 1971, that PDFLP guerrillas has been told during a Peking visit that from that time on all Chinese assistance would be channeled through the PLO.

China's choice for Palestinian leadership has long been Fatah, despite the availability of two Marxist Palestinian groups, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine. The choice of Fatah fits the Chinese "united front" tactic.

Unlike the PFLP and its even more dogmatic break-away, the PDFLP, Fatah sees itself as a united front of Palestinians of all political doctrines. China has provided arms to both the PFLP and the PDFLP but is realistic enough to see that neither group is politically strong enough to lead the Palestinians. Only Fatah comes close to representing the majority of Palestinians. Only the PLO, which Fatah dominates, provides a potential for unifying the Palestinians and will, the Chinese hope, some day lead the Palestinians in a people's revolutionary war.

But China gives her main support to Fatah for other reasons. Both the PFLP and the PDFLP present serious problems to the Chinese: the PDFLP is pro-Soviet Union, and the PFLP has not renounced the use of international terrorism. The PFLP has staged some of the century's most spectacular acts of terrorism, in cooperation with international revolutionary groups; the massacre at Israel's Lod airport by a Japanese Red Army faction is only one example.

Chinese criticism of international terrorism parallels the position of conservative PLO leadership since early 1974. The PFLP is naturally reluctant to admit Chinese disapproval of acts of international terrorism and China's disapproval is not well documented, because the Chinese seldom criticize the Palestinians publicly. However, in 1972, Huang Hua, then China's representative at the United Nations, told the Security Council that the massacre of Israeli athletes at Munich was "unfortunate" and noted that "we have never been in favor of such adventurist acts of terrorism."<sup>19</sup>

That China maintains separate relationships with various guerrilla organizations can be observed from the composition of Palestinian delegations to China. But evidence supports Fatah's insistence that the Chinese regard Fatah as the backbone of the Palestinian movement.

China may have threatened dissident Palestinian groups with an arms cut-off after 1970, yet it is not clear whether aid to all Palestinian groups including Fatah was suspended during the early 1970's. A PFLP official says that to his knowledge China has never withheld arms in an effort to force unity.<sup>20</sup> However, it seems unlikely that the Chinese would have allowed an obvious decrease in public support for the Palestinians without a corresponding lessening in actual arms promises and delivery.

### CHINA KEEPS THE OPTION OPEN

The temporary eclipse of the Palestinian organizations in 1971-1972 did not indicate a resultant Chinese shift toward closer relations with Israel, although for many years China has apparently maintained sporadic contact with Israel on a non-official basis and after the Cultural Revolution was apparently prepared to move in any direction expediency dictated. For their part, since 1955 the Israelis have blamed themselves for an overcautious attitude and for their failure to make an assertive response during the period of Chinese openness. They have thus persisted in their efforts to establish relations with China.

Before China's admission to the United Nations in late 1971, there were reports of Chinese contacts with Israel on a semi-official level as China attempted to win Israeli support for her admission. A low level of trade between Israel and China (consisting mainly of Israeli industrial diamonds that enter China via Hong Kong) has continued for several years and provides further evidence of Chinese interest in keeping the Israeli option open.

### CHINA AND THE PALESTINIANS: STAGE THREE

By the end of 1974, the Palestinian organizations had demonstrated to Chinese satisfaction that they were not going to fade and were in fact successfully solving many of their problems.

The first high-level PLO delegation in two years arrived in Peking on August 29, 1974, led by Arafat's political adviser, Hani Al-Hassan. Although the invitation came from the Chinese Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries (CAFFC) and not from the Chinese government, Al-Hassan is said to have talked to Premier Chou, delivering a message from

Arafat. In November, 1974, PFLP and PDFLP delegations likewise arrived in China at the invitation of the CAFFC, though these delegates were not received by Chou.

In June, 1975, the Chinese ambassador to Lebanon, Hsu Ming, called on Hani Al-Hassan in Beirut. Al-Hassan said later that he and Hsu Ming reviewed the international and Middle East situations and that Hsu Ming assured him of Peking's desire to increase support to the Palestinian revolution.

In July, 1975, a high-level Fatah delegation, led by Khalil Al Wazir (Abu Jihad), a member of Fatah's "Big Three," arrived in Peking. The delegation included a number of high ranking Al Asifa officers (Fatah's military branch), leading the Arab press to note that military rather than political matters were probably to be discussed. Al-Hassan, a member of the delegation, told the press that Chinese-Palestinian relations were to be raised to a new level. He said that the delegation had gone to China to consult leaders of the Chinese Communist party about an agreement that had been reached in October, 1974, though he did not disclose the nature of that agreement.

One explanation for Chinese caution was the almost total preoccupation of the guerrilla groups with the Lebanese crisis—a preoccupation which by late January, 1976, had brought guerrilla activity in Israel and the occupied territories to its lowest level since 1966.

Faruq Al-Qaddumi, the PLO's political department chief, visited China in late April, 1976, where he was received by Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien and Foreign Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua. According to a high level PLO official, the delegation requested and obtained a considerable increase in financial and military support.<sup>21</sup> In February, 1977, Arafat himself visited Peking. From the outside, the invitation to Arafat appears to have been almost an apology for not providing the Palestinians with convincing verbal support during the preceding months of tribulation.

However, Palestinian leaders never expressed disappointment with the lack of support from China during the Lebanese war, raising the possibility that Chinese military support did in fact continue at a level acceptable to the Palestinians. It would have been relatively simple for the Palestinians to receive Chinese supplies (carried to the Middle East in third-nation ships) through Syria before heavy Syrian involvement began and through southern Lebanon later in the war

*(Continued on page 36)*

<sup>20</sup>Moderately high level Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine member. Conversations in Beirut during summer and fall of 1976.

<sup>21</sup>Conversations in Beirut during 1975 and 1976 with a high level PLO member with Fatah sympathies.

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*"In 1977, . . . Israel seemed increasingly concerned about the nature of specific United States policies and potential United States 'pressures,' and the United States seemed afraid that a propitious moment for peace and a movement toward a settlement would be lost."*

## Israel's Year of Decision

BY BERNARD REICH

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THE time of tranquility<sup>1</sup> that followed the Sinai II agreement of September, 1975, and gave Israel a respite from crucial pressures and decisions came to an end in 1977. The resignation of the government of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in December, 1976, and the inauguration of President Jimmy Carter in January, 1977, ushered in a period of substantial turmoil for the Jewish state. The elections of May, 1977, and the movement toward an Arab-Israeli settlement, highlighted by the historic visit of Egypt's President Anwar Sadat to Jerusalem in November, made 1977 a year of crucial decision.

Under the terms of Israel's electoral laws, her population was scheduled to go to the polls in the fall of 1977 to elect a 120-member Knesset. This would have been at the prescribed four-year maximum interval between elections (the previous election was held in December, 1973, rather than October because of the Yom Kippur war). This 1977 scheduling was upset by a significant political crisis.

On Friday, December 10, 1976, the first three F-15 jet fighter aircraft purchased from the United States arrived at a military airfield in central Israel and were welcomed in a public ceremony. Two days later, the Minister of Religious Affairs raised the issue of the ceremony in the Cabinet, and it was subsequently the focus of a debate on the floor of the Knesset. The orthodox Aguda Torah Front introduced a no-confidence motion based on the charge that the government-organized ceremony welcoming the aircraft violated the Sabbath, because those attending would be forced to travel on the

Sabbath to return to their homes after the event.<sup>2</sup> On December 14, the Knesset voted 55 to 48, with 9 abstentions, to support the government. The Knesset members belonging to the National Religious party (NRP) abstained, with the exception of Interior Minister Yosef Burg, who voted—with the permission of his party—to support the government. The other members of the NRP, a coalition partner, abstained on the grounds that it was a matter of conscience, not of politics. In the no-confidence vote, the Torah Front was joined by political groups on the right and the left, including some who were opposed to the role of the religious parties in Israeli politics.

On December 19, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin informed the NRP members of the Cabinet that he regarded their abstention in the Knesset as a vote of no-confidence in the government. With Cabinet approval, he removed the three NRP ministers (Minister of Interior Yosef Burg; Minister of Welfare Zevulun Hammer; Minister of Religious Affairs Yitzhak Raphael) from the government and thereby gave up his Knesset majority, because the ruling coalition was then assured of only 57 votes.<sup>3</sup>

The following day, December 20, Prime Minister Rabin resigned, after calling for the dissolution of the Knesset and new elections. His resignation preceded a no-confidence vote in the Knesset which, it was generally believed, he would lose, because the government no longer commanded a majority. Rabin was appointed head of a caretaker government that would serve until the elections. This set the stage for early elections for a new Knesset.

In preparation for the elections, Israel's dominant Labor party met in convention in February, 1977. For the first time in Israel's history, a ruling Prime Minister was openly challenged for the party's leadership. Minister of Defense Shimon Peres decided to seek the nomination for Prime Minister and argued that a change of leadership was essential. The clash between Peres and

<sup>1</sup>See Bernard Reich, "Israel's Time of Tranquility," *Current History* (January, 1977), pp. 35-36.

<sup>2</sup>According to Jewish religious law travel on the Sabbath, which begins at sundown Friday, is prohibited.

<sup>3</sup>In ousting the NRP Rabin invoked a law permitting a Prime Minister to dismiss representatives of a coalition government from the Cabinet if they vote against the government or abstain in a vote of confidence.



Rabin did not reflect major ideological differences, despite their reputations as hawk and dove, but was primarily a personality clash. After substantial debate and maneuvering, the convention selected Rabin as the party's leader by a vote of 1,445 to 1,404 (for Peres) with 16 abstentions.<sup>4</sup>

Rabin's renomination and the election campaign took place at a time of national unrest. Israel's faltering economy was characterized by a high inflation rate, a heavy and increasing tax burden, and a wave of labor strikes. Scandals and corruption further tarnished Labor's image. Asher Yadlin, Rabin's nominee as governor of the Bank of Israel, was sentenced to five years in prison for taking bribes and claimed that some of the kickbacks were funneled into Labor party coffers for the 1973 election campaign.<sup>5</sup> There was also the suicide of Housing Minister Avraham Ofer, who had been accused by the press of embezzlement and corruption.

A clamor for change initiated a search for "new faces" and a suggestion that the spirit of the "founders" had apparently been lost. In partial response to this concern, Professor (and former General) Yigal Yadin launched a new political party—the Democratic Movement for Change—whose basic focus was the reform of the electoral process. Yadin, a political outsider and an amateur, was a relatively "clean" figure, untainted by general perceptions of political corruption. The party soon became a refuge for Israelis who were disillusioned with old-style politics and who sought reform, and yet were relatively mainstream in their foreign and domestic policy views. The party began to erode the traditional bases of Labor support. Yadin seemed to gain support because of his honesty, idealism and commitment to change.

Labor's problems were compounded in late March when the Rabin financial scandal erupted. Rabin had maintained bank accounts in Washington, D.C., in violation of Israeli currency regulations, and on April 8 he withdrew as the Labor party's candidate for Prime Minister because, he said, he did not wish to bring further grief to the party.<sup>6</sup>

Shimon Peres was chosen by the Labor party central committee to replace Rabin as the leading candidate on the election list (thus becoming its nominee as Prime Minister). This followed a round of intraparty political maneuvering and an agreement in which Peres and Yigal Allon decided that Peres would head the Labor and Alignment list and Allon would be number two and

would have the choice of any Cabinet portfolio (including that of Minister of Defense). Abba Eban would become foreign minister in the event of a Labor-Alignment victory. Rabin agreed to rejoin the election list and party leaders sought to achieve unity in the wake of the scandal.<sup>7</sup> His withdrawal from the race and his replacement by Peres had not presaged significant change in Israel's foreign policy or in her domestic posture.

The problems of the Labor Alignment became issues in the campaign and seemed to generate increased stress on the proposals for change and an invigorated leadership. Nevertheless, the polls and pundits appeared to believe that Labor would reemerge as the leading party, albeit with reduced electoral and parliamentary strength, and that Likud would remain at its previous strength. There was some feeling that Yadin's Democratic Movement for Change would be pivotal in the postelection efforts to form a government. But Israel's public opinion polls did not provide any real indication of the extent and nature of the pressure for change, and analysts in Israel and elsewhere were unprepared for the shifts that took place on election day.

On May 17, 1977, Israel's electorate went to the polls and cast their ballots (see Table 1).

Israel thus chose a new regime, with the Likud bloc and Menahem Begin emerging as the leading political force. The basic question of voter motivation remains. To a substantial degree, the results suggest that Labor lost more than Likud won. Voters were concerned with the lack of leadership and the weakness of the government in dealing with a wide variety of issues ranging from labor unrest to social problems. The vacillation of the government in dealing with the Gush Emunim settlers in the West Bank, especially at Kaddum, seemed to confirm general impressions of government weakness. The several major scandals contributed to this negative image. Domestic problems for which the Labor party was deemed responsible, directly or indirectly, combined with the emergence of a new and respected alternative in the form of the DMC provided a basis for voting shifts.

Israel's 1977 elections were a political earthquake, reflecting and foreshadowing substantial change, with a new group, formerly in opposition, in control.

The parties comprising the Likud bloc had been serving as an opposition group, joining the government during the 1967 war for a three-year period to form the "wall-to-wall" government of national unity which effectively excluded only the Communist parties. It withdrew from that coalition in a dispute over Israel's acceptance of United States Secretary of State William Rogers' June, 1970, initiative (often referred to as Rogers Plan B). Thereafter, the parties were vocal opponents of the government criticizing its programs, policies, efforts and leadership. As a result of the 1977 election, Likud became the ruling coalition charged with the task of establishing the programs of govern-

<sup>4</sup>This was the second time that Rabin beat Peres for the nomination. In 1974 he did so in the smaller forum of the central committee which also chose Rabin by a narrow margin.

<sup>5</sup>For details see *The New York Times*, February 15, 1977.

<sup>6</sup>On April 17, Lea Rabin was fined approximately \$27,000 for her role in the financial matter. Rabin himself earlier paid a fine of about \$1,500 in an out-of-court settlement.

<sup>7</sup>Later Peres, Allon and Eban sought to convince Mapam to remain with Labor in an election alignment and eventually the Mapam Central Committee voted 159 to 115 to do so.

**TABLE 1: FINAL OFFICIAL ELECTION RESULTS 1977**

Number of Eligible Voters	2,236,293		
Number of Votes Cast	1,771,726		
Percentage of Voter Participation	79.2%		
Invalid Votes (1.3%)	23,906		
Number of Valid Votes	1,747,820		

Party	Votes	%	Knesset Seats
Likud	583,075	33.4	43
Labor Alignment	430,023	24.6	32
Democratic Movement for Change	202,265	11.6	15
National Religious Party	160,787	9.2	12
Agudat Yisrael	58,652	3.4	4
Poalei Agudat Yisrael	23,956	1.4	1
Democratic Front for Peace and Equality	79,733	4.6	5
Shelli	27,281	1.6	2
Shlomzion	33,947	1.9	2
Flatto-Sharon	35,049	2.0	1
Independent Liberals	21,277	1.2	1
Citizens Rights	20,621	1.2	1
United Arab List	24,185	1.4	1
Others (9 Lists)	46,969	2.5	—
Total	1,747,820	100	120

Source: Embassy of Israel, Washington, D.C.

ment and the machinery to implement them. Likud was not prepared for this task and it may not have expected to incur this obligation. With relatively few exceptions, its personnel lacked the experience of high-level government service that would have prepared them for the effective operation of a government bureaucracy or for service in Cabinet posts. This inexperience may account for the initial practice of retaining Labor people in various government positions.

Among the earliest problems facing Begin was the establishment of a functioning administration and its adaptation to the ideals and personalities of Likud rather than Labor. But beyond this there were the policies and programs of the new government. On domestic issues, these included the problems of inflation, strikes and job actions and the desire for more government control over the labor sector. Crucial change in foreign policy seemed certain; Begin had earned a reputation as a hardliner (a "hawk") because his pre-independence leadership of the Irgun had generated an image (emphasized in the press after the election) as a "terrorist." But Begin was also regarded as

<sup>8</sup>In October, DMC joined the government coalition after Yadin argued that "grave political issues" at home and abroad provided the impetus for the decision. This substantially strengthened the coalition's majority in the Knesset.

<sup>9</sup>The 63 votes included: Likud, NRP, Agudat Yisrael, Poalei Agudat Yisrael, and Moshe Dayan—*The Jerusalem Post Weekly*, June 21, 1977.

<sup>10</sup>In part, the DMC decision to join the government facilitated the enactment of the policy since it gave the government a far stronger parliamentary base.

<sup>11</sup>Begin's victory seemed to increase the probability for a clash.

honest and decisive and an articulate advocate of strongly held views.

After the election, at a feverish pace, Begin started to constitute the new government and to delineate its policies. At first, he suggested the creation of a government of national unity, but Labor rejected this approach and, after initial discussions, the DMC also decided not to join the government coalition.<sup>8</sup> Eventually, Begin formed a coalition, consisting primarily of Likud, NRP and Agudat Yisrael, which was approved by the Knesset by a vote of 63 to 53 on June 21, 1977.<sup>9</sup>

The overriding domestic issue was that of the economy. By October, the government was ready to propose its new economic plan that sought to end the socialist system and to replace it with a free enterprise approach.<sup>10</sup> Finance Minister Simcha Ehrlich declared that the program would check inflation, cut the foreign trade deficit, raise the growth rate and promote foreign investment. The new economic policy would also remove some of the vast bureaucratic holds on the economy. It eliminated most government-imposed economic controls instituted over the three decades of Labor party administration. Arbitrary exchange rates for the pound were abandoned, and the pound was left to float to its own level on international exchanges. Virtually all foreign currency regulations were also eliminated. The devaluation of the pound was expected to promote a flow of dollars and other foreign currency into the country. A new value-added tax of twelve percent, instead of eight percent, was imposed. It was hoped that the new policy would increase exports by making Israeli products less expensive and would decrease imports (and consumption generally) by leaving less money in the hands of the Israeli consumer and by encouraging greater productivity. The administration's overall goal was to eliminate the government from the economy and to apply free market principles, like the laws of profit and loss, supply and demand.

Yet despite the importance of the new economic policy and the problems it sought to confront, the dominant issue initially facing Begin was the Arab-Israeli conflict, whose centrality was reemphasized by the Carter administration's initiative and by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's visit in November.

The Carter administration began its Arab-Israeli initiative in January, 1977, on the assumption that the time was propitious for such an effort. In the succeeding months, as the specifics of the Carter conception of a settlement became clearer, these specifics seemed to conflict with Israeli perceptions and policies.<sup>11</sup> By the time of the Israeli elections, the Carter initiative was well under way; Secretary of State Cyrus Vance had visited the Middle East, and regional leaders had met with President Carter. Elements of the President's concept of a settlement—including the definition and assurance of permanent peace, territory and borders, and the Palestinian issue—had already been made public.

The Carter administration was dismayed by the Begin victory, which appeared to slow the timetable for reconvening a Geneva Conference and working toward a settlement. Nonetheless, the United States sought to put the best face on the victory and declared optimistically that the election would not be "a step backward." Begin's initial statements after the election suggested areas of possible contention. In an impromptu news conference, he spoke of good relations with the United States and invited Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian leaders to meet with him and negotiate peace. But when asked about occupied territories, Begin said: "What occupied territories? If you mean Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip, these are liberated territories and an integral part of the land of Israel." This position contrasted sharply with the United States view. Other statements in this vein and their conflict with United States positions portended problems in the United States-Israeli relationship.

A crucial step was taken in mid-July with the visit of Prime Minister Begin to Washington, D.C. The purposes of the visit were complex, and the agenda included the establishment of personal rapport between Menachem Begin and Jimmy Carter and a discussion of the elements of a settlement. Their meetings occasioned no substantive policy changes, but a foundation for personal rapport and mutual confidence seems to have developed. Begin was able to get along well with President Carter and projected an image of a reasonable man, rather than a fanatic and terrorist. Both leaders appeared optimistic. During the visit, Begin presented a "peace plan" that dealt with the various elements essential to a settlement, and he restated Israel's opposition to a Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) role in the peace talks although he noted that Palestinians could be part of a Jordanian delegation. But few observers thought that the prospects for peace were enhanced. The Arabs rejected the Begin "peace plan," labeling it a tactic for avoiding peace and retaining territories.

Israelis viewed the Carter-Begin meetings with a sense of relief. There had been talk of a possible hostile confrontation, given the differences between the United States and Israel on some specifics of a settlement. But the relief was short-lived, and United States and Israeli

positions soon came into public conflict. After Begin's return to Israel, the government (on July 26) recognized three previously illegal Israeli settlements on the West Bank (Kadum, Ofra and Maale Adumim) as permanent, legal entities. The United States reacted sharply. Secretary of State Vance noted:

We have consistently stated and reiterated during our discussions here in Washington that we are of the opinion that the placing of these settlements is contrary to international law and presents an obstacle toward peace.<sup>12</sup>

Begin rejected Vance's criticism and defended the government decision in these terms:

We left no doubt in our talks [in Washington] about our position. Jews have the right to live anywhere in Judea and Samaria [on the West Bank] and the Gaza Strip.<sup>13</sup>

United States-Israeli differences on the settlement process reached a crucial point in the early fall. In September and October, 1977, the United States concentrated on finding a mechanism to deal with the question of Palestinian representation at Geneva. Several alternatives were considered. The United States pressed its view that "Palestinians must be involved in the peace-making process. Their representatives will have to be at Geneva . . ."<sup>14</sup>

On September 25, 1977, Israel's Cabinet formally agreed to a United States proposal that Palestinian representatives constitute part of a unified Arab delegation at the opening session of a reconvened Geneva Conference. Although this represented a shift in Israel's position, Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan made it clear that this did not alter her view of the PLO. Israel insisted that Palestinians could participate in the unified Arab delegation as part of a Jordanian delegation, provided that they were not known members of the PLO. No negotiations would take place with the Arab delegation. After the opening ceremonial session, the Arab grouping would split up into delegations representing the various Arab states (like Egypt, Syria, Jordan) for negotiations. There would also be no change in United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 (1967).

However, on October 1, 1977, the United States joined the Soviet Union in a statement that brought Soviet leaders back to the forefront of the negotiating process and enhanced their role. The statement en-

(Continued on page 39)

<sup>12</sup>Quoted in the *Washington Post*, July 27, 1977. See also President Carter's press conference of August 23, 1977. Similar criticism was voiced in other official statements. On October 28, the United Nations General Assembly voted 131 to 1 to censure Israel for her settlements in the occupied territories. It called the actions illegal and an obstacle to peace. The United States and six other states abstained; ten states were absent.

<sup>13</sup>Quoted in *Washington Star*, July 27, 1977. See also Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan's statement to the Knesset, September 1, 1977.

<sup>14</sup>Department of State Statement, September 12, 1977, text in *The New York Times*, September 13, 1977.

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*"Most war goals of the domestic parties to the Lebanese civil war have not been reached. The Christians have not regained the security and power in Lebanon they desire; the Muslims have not obtained serious social or political reform; the Palestinians are now restricted and have lost an environment in which they were relatively free to develop and operate as they wished."*

## Lebanon's Continuing Crisis

BY CHARLES E. WATERMAN\*

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ON July 21, 1977, Lebanese Prime Minister Salim al Hus told his Chamber of Deputies:

Lebanon emerged from the events as no other country has emerged from a devastating war. Throughout history, the countries that waged wars emerged from these wars united and in solidarity, determined to rebuild and reconstruct. Lebanon was divided before the events and it emerged from these events more divided.<sup>1</sup>

The Prime Minister's remarks form a suitable backdrop to Lebanon's attempt to recover from the devastating tragedy of 1975-1976. They do not encourage an optimistic prognosis of recovery from a civil conflict that took the lives of at least 40,000 persons, destroyed Lebanon at least temporarily as the commercial crossroads of the Middle East, and carried that small, tortured country to the brink of annihilation.

A basic agreement underpinning the quasi-peace of 1977 was formulated in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on October 18, 1976, when Arab leaders signed a plan calling for a cease-fire and the creation of a 30,000-man Arab force to supervise the truce. On November 10, Syrian peacekeeping troops and tanks entered Beirut proper, marking an effective end to the unrestrained and suicidal violence of a civil war that threatened the security of all states in the region.

The Riyadh conference ushered in a period characterized by an Israeli-Christian mutuality of interests; a continuing Syrian policy of maintaining a balance between major internal factions that has, with notable exceptions in south Lebanon, worked mostly to Christian advantage; and the compressing of the Palestinian fedayeen (commando and sabotage groups) into adverse military and political positions.

The year 1977 was further punctuated by the still

unsolved assassination of leftist Druze leader Kamal Jumblat on March 17, an event that threatened, but did not precipitate, a resurgence of an intolerable level of violence. A hopeful note was struck with the Shtura Agreement of July 25, which marked yet another attempt to prescribe the limitations of Palestinian armed presence in Lebanon. Despite some attempts to enforce this agreement, the fall of 1977 witnessed a resurgence of tension and the specter of large-scale Israeli intervention in south Lebanon.

The government of Elias Sarkis retains the essential ingredient of acceptability to most factions but has been criticized for passivity. Nevertheless, the beginnings of a tentative economic recovery can be perceived. Commercial activity, gross domestic product and Arab aid have increased, but all remain well below prewar levels. The two essential elements that could bring about meaningful economic recovery—massive Arab aid and confidence in the ability of Lebanon once again to serve as a secure financial and business entrepot—have not returned.

It is not clear whether the immediate future of Lebanon is limited to the two patterns of events in 1976 and 1977—i.e., outright civil war or imposed quasi-peace with a limited political and economic recovery. Nor is it clear whether a sufficient number of the basic demands of the warring factions—and of the intervening powers—have been satisfied.

The late Kamal Jumblat, the leader of the Muslim and leftist coalition, was credited with coining the slogan, "The Lebanese Army is the Christian's army, and the Palestinian resistance is the Muslim's army."<sup>2</sup> Regardless of accuracy, in this statement lie the seeds of the fedayeen dilemma and near downfall in Lebanon.

The fedayeen have the very mixed blessing of having replaced Nasser's Egypt as the primary military supporter of Lebanon's numerically large but militarily weak Muslim population. This entangled relationship has dragged them into battles in support of Muslim and

\*The views expressed here are those of Charles Waterman and do not express those of the State Department.

<sup>1</sup>*Beirut Domestic Service*, in Arabic, July 21, 1977.

<sup>2</sup>*Events* (London), February 11, 1977.

leftist political demands first against Christian and later against Syrian forces. The timing and location of these battles have seldom been to Palestinian advantage and have invariably lent credence to charges of gross interference by the Palestinians in internal Lebanese affairs. The fact that the fedayeen leadership, particularly the supposedly wily Fatah hierarchy, permitted the Palestinian movement to risk its existence in such battles must be due to arrogance or to miscalculation. Witness the Palestinian decision militarily to oppose Syrian entry into Lebanon in the spring of 1976.

As a result, the fedayeen have satisfied the fewest wartime goals of any faction in the war. They remain intact as an organization with roughly the same leadership as they had before April, 1975, when the first serious clashes occurred, and they have actually enhanced their international acceptability. But:

- They have lost the open operating environment of prewar Lebanon.
- They are largely restricted to prescribed areas of southern Lebanon without direct access to Israel.
- They lost actual trained manpower during the war.
- Arab countries that were formerly relatively uncritical supporters outside their own national borders now attempt either to control the fedayeen or to embroil them in intra-Arab disputes.

Paradoxically, the fedayeen thrived in prewar Lebanon better than in any other environment since their creation. They understood and exploited for their own purposes the weaknesses of the Christian-dominated government. There are few indications, however, that the Palestinians ever considered taking over the Lebanese state, although their support of the Muslim leftist coalition in its internal power struggle created that impression. As if to salt open wounds, the Palestinians themselves overplayed their hand and committed unwarranted violations of Lebanese sovereignty.

But the Palestinian movement is not monolithic. It runs a spectrum between pragmatic elements of Fatah, who usually preach compromise, and extremist members of the so-called Rejection Front organizations, who do not. Nonetheless, to most of their Christian Lebanese enemies, the extreme and moderate meld into one aggressive and illegal entity, which has long since crossed the line between "refugee" and "usurper." In an interview published in Beirut's Phalangist *Al 'Amal* on December 10, 1976, the Maronite leader of the Guardians of the Cedars organization, Abu Arz, typically and bitterly referred to

half a million Palestinians still on Lebanon's territory after perpetrating all the crimes of murder, destruction and devastation in the country that has given them shelter for 30 years.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup>Interview with Abu Arz, *Al 'Amal* (Beirut), December 10, 1976.

<sup>4</sup>Interview with Bashir al Jumayyil, *Monday Morning* (Beirut), April 18-24, 1977.

How to merge Lebanese sovereignty with a transient Palestinian populace sporting a guerrilla army more cohesive and powerful than their own regular military has been a dilemma for successive Lebanese Presidents for nearly a decade. The traditional Palestinian behavior pattern has been to give lip service to each Lebanese-Palestinian accord as it emerged, but under no circumstances seriously to observe provisions, like arms limitations, that would place them at the mercy of any outsider. It remains to be seen if the most recent agreement reached at Shtura on July 25, 1977, will enjoy a more serious application.

Over the years, the principal accords designed to control the armed Palestinian presence in Lebanon are the Cairo Agreement of 1969, with its later corollary Melkart Agreement, and the above-mentioned Shtura Agreement. All these agreements deal in one way or another with the following key issues:

- Stipulation of the type and quantity of weapons allowed the fedayeen.
- Control over the number of armed Palestinian elements and their movement outside prescribed areas.
- Lebanese protection of, and sovereignty over, Palestinian camps.
- The right, or lack of it, of fedayeen to attack Israel from Lebanon.

Some Christian leaders are now adding a demand for the reduction of the total number of Palestinians allowed in Lebanon. Phalange leader Bashir Jumayyil has articulated this new element as follows:

Lebanon, in the person of President Elias Sarkis, is saying that the Cairo Agreement applies only to the Palestinian refugees who came to Lebanon in 1948—a total of around 176,000, no more—and not to the Palestinians who have been coming into the country since then. The PLO, on the other hand, wants all the Palestinians—the original refugees and the others who joined them with each Arab-Israeli war (a total of around 400,000)—to be given the same status, the same privileges.<sup>4</sup>

Press reports indicate that the latest agreement—the Shtura accord of July 25—initially witnessed limited and imperfect progress toward the collecting of heavy weapons from the fedayeen, the limitation of arms and armed personnel in the Palestinian camps, the stationing of Arab Deterrent Force units around the camps, and the isolation of larger Palestinian military units to the south of the country. Operations from Lebanon into Israel, permitted under the earlier Cairo Agreement, are now interdicted in the practical sense by strong Israeli defenses and the existence of a partial Christian buffer zone between the Palestinians and Israel.

A provision in the agreement for Palestinians to disengage partially from the southern line of confrontation will hopefully be honored, if only because the interests of all parties are equally served by it. However, rejectionist Palestinian groups like the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine have rejected disengagement in the south (as of late 1977), and the balance of

forces in that area precludes vigorous enforcement of this aspect of the understanding at present.

The Palestinians were a reluctant but primary cause of the Lebanese war. In a pro-Palestinian article published in Qatar in May, 1977, the writer comments:

The only reason the Palestinians became embroiled in the Lebanese civil war was to defend the Arab nature of Lebanon and their own existence. Furthermore, after a series of Arab mediation attempts, their involvement in the peace efforts was greater than their involvement in escalation of the war.<sup>5</sup>

For the very pragmatic reason that the fedayeen had little to gain by radically changing the prewar state of affairs, this comment is ironically accurate. "To defend the Arab nature of Lebanon," of course, is a euphemism for support of the Muslim and leftist factions in the conflict. This alliance, the provocative effect of the fedayeen on Israel and their uncontrolled existence inside a sovereign country kindled the flames of civil war.


Thus the Palestinians in Lebanon constitute a mistrusted but potent force that has not satisfied its war aims. A relaxation of deterrent Syrian control would probably result in a resurgence of Palestinian activity unacceptable to Lebanese Christians, who have by no means accepted the status quo as final.

Violence is not new to south Lebanon, an area natively populated by Shi'a Muslim villages, punctuated by strategically placed Christian enclaves. Supporting no particular group and receiving aid from no one, the Shi'as, a largely neutral and poor native populace, became pawns in the southern sector fighting. Between 1972 and 1975, as Palestinian activity into Israel and consequent Israeli retaliation accelerated, many Shi'as left for Beirut. Before the outbreak of serious fighting in the south, many had returned from the severe northern battlegrounds of 1976 in pitiful disarray, their few remaining household effects loaded on taxi roofs.

To the north of the Shi'a villages lies a belt of fedayeen strongholds imposed on native populations like the town of Nabatiye. Surrounding Sidon and just south of Tyre are Lebanon's largest Palestinian population concentrations, the 1948 refugee camps of 'Ayn al Hilwah and Rashidiyyah, both of which spawn fedayeen activity. To the far south, below the so-called "good fence," which, for Israeli purposes, permits Lebanese citizens to secure medical and commercial facilities in Israel, lies the Israeli Defense Force.

All the combatants in the area are within artillery range of one another. Christian and Palestinian-held areas are regularly targeted by each other and by their

#### PALESTINIAN REFUGEE CAMPS IN LEBANON



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respective patrons, the war serving to polarize Palestinian and Christian area militias against one another and to push the Christians into a natural alliance with their Israeli neighbor to the south.

During late 1976 through 1977, Israeli artillery and logistical support for the Christian militias in the south was a key factor in the continuing fighting. The openness and intensity of this symbiotic relationship was emphasized in July, 1977, when Jerusalem domestic radio quoted Prime Minister Menahem Begin:

Israel was defending the Christians in the south from terrorist artillery attacks. Every night at 8 or 9 o'clock an artillery shelling begins, and then we come to help. Otherwise, he said, the Christians in the area wouldn't continue to exist.<sup>6</sup>

The importance of south Lebanon to Israel was again highlighted on August 2, 1977, when Jerusalem television announced the establishment by a Knesset committee of a special subcommittee for southern Lebanese affairs. The broadcast noted that, "this is the first time that the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee has set up a committee for a particular political problem."<sup>7</sup>

Earlier in the war, there was even a certain de facto and unplanned Israeli-Syrian mutuality of interests in regard to gaining control over the Palestinian fedayeen and ending the state of anarchy in Lebanon. That this mutuality of interests stopped abruptly after the anarchy ended is made clear by an article of February 8, 1977, in Tel Aviv's *Ha'arev*, which dealt with Israel's protest over the movement of an apparently minor number of Syrian troops into the town of Nabatiye:

Even if this incident ends quietly, the lesson of the Nabatiye exercise is that at the Geneva Conference, or in any debate on a settlement in the Middle East, one of Israel's important demands should be the evacuation of the Syrian army from all Lebanon.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>5</sup>Abdallah Husayn Ni'ma, "What Happens after the Cairo Agreement is Implemented," *Al 'Arab* (Doha), May 10, 1977.

<sup>6</sup>*Jerusalem Domestic Service*, in Hebrew, July 22, 1977.

<sup>7</sup>*Jerusalem Domestic Television Service*, in Hebrew, August 2, 1977.

<sup>8</sup>*Ze'ev Shif*, "The IDF is Waiting for Vance," *Ha'arev* (Tel Aviv), February 8, 1977.

The Syrian army cannot directly pacify the south, because Israel has made known her unwillingness to tolerate a Syrian military presence in Lebanon south of a hypothetical "Red Line," which, while never specifically delineated, has been generally regarded by the press to lie slightly north of the Litani River just above Tyre. Other candidates for the role of pacifier in the region are for one reason or other impractical. A unified Lebanese army does not yet exist in requisite strength, and non-Syrian Arab Deterrent Force units are either unacceptable to the Israelis or not present in sufficient numbers.

Syria's view of Israeli intentions in south Lebanon is equally suspicious. A Syrian official is quoted as maintaining that Israel wants to maintain the south as a "constantly bleeding wound to perpetrate the Lebanese crisis or to be available for exploitation when the time is ripe."<sup>9</sup>

It is probable that of all parties involved in the Lebanese war the Israelis have lost the least from the present constellation of power. The specter of Palestinians and Syrians eyeing one another, Lebanese Christians increasingly dependent upon Israel, and the existence of a Christian buffer zone between Israel and Palestinian guerrillas are all obviously favorable to Israel's defense.

However, should either the Israeli vision of a total Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon or the Syrian fear of a large-scale Israeli ground incursion prove accurate, the results would be equally undesirable. In the latter case, the Syrian army, on the side of the fedayeen, might enter into direct conflict with Israeli troops.

An Israeli incursion might also reignite other fronts of the Lebanese war that have been relatively quiet since 1976. If there were a Syrian withdrawal, on the other hand, the delicate internal Lebanese balance of forces would again have to find its own natural level. Recent history teaches that this is a painful and bloody process.

### THE LEBANESE ARMY

When he was appointed Lebanese Army commander on March 18, 1977, Brigadier General Victor Kuri's first statement was: "We realize the critical circumstances through which the country is passing at present, but nevertheless we will have an army, God willing."<sup>10</sup>

God has not yet been willing: the task of rebuilding the fragmented Lebanese army remains formidable, because of the polarization of political forces in Lebanon and the resultant identification of the legitimate

Lebanese army as a military arm of the Christian authorities.

Lebanon's army has historically been officered by Christians in the majority of its important positions. It was utilized by Christian Lebanese Presidents in previous confrontations with Palestinian guerrillas, particularly in 1973, and remained loyal. In November, 1975, rightist Christian pressure prevailed on moderate Muslim Premier Rashid Karami to commit the army to quell the escalating conflict. This time, sectarian loyalties proved overwhelming. When it was finally committed to the conflict in the winter of 1976, the Lebanese army disintegrated.

Christians threw in their lot with Christian units and continued to call themselves the Lebanese army. The army command at Yarze near Beirut remained Christian. Muslims deserted en masse and some ultimately formed a new fedayeen-sponsored "Lebanese Arab Army." Many from both sides, particularly in the middle-level officer corps, merely went home and tried to sit out the war.

Ultimately, after the Syrian entry into the war in the spring of 1976, still another organization, initially calling itself the "Vanguards of the Lebanese Arab Army," came into being. This organization featured a pro-Syrian orientation with a primarily Shi'a Muslim makeup. All these units, and particularly the first two, engaged in combat with one another and with other participants. It is this bitter conflict that renders so arduous the task of recreating a unified Lebanese army.

Obviously, the Arab Deterrent Forces (ADF) cannot be expected to remain forever, nor can the ADF pacify the last remaining area of violent conflict—the extreme south. There is only one Arab army acceptable to the Israelis in this area and that is the legitimate Lebanese army. To Muslims, Palestinians and Syrians, however, an exclusively Christian unit will not be acceptable; it would merely serve as an adjunct to the southern Christian militias.

The issue of the reconstitution of the Lebanese army gained urgency in mid-1977. International efforts are under way to finance and assist an effective, non-sectarian army. In a press conference in Beirut on August 3, 1977, United States Secretary of State Cyrus Vance said:

We have allocated \$25 million for this purpose [rebuilding of the army] in the 1977 budget. We hope that other countries will contribute to these efforts, which we consider to be of extreme importance. We also indicated that we hope to allocate \$75 million over the next two years, thus bringing the total to \$100 million.<sup>11</sup>

Cairo's Middle East News Agency previously reported that the United States effort "will not include heavy arms, such as tanks or artillery, but will be confined to light weapons."<sup>12</sup> It is reasonable to anticipate that assistance from petroleum-rich Arab states will ultimately complement the United States action.

<sup>9</sup>David Hirst, Manchester Guardian, "Rivalries Spur Fear of War in Lebanon," *Washington Post*, August 29, 1977.

<sup>10</sup>*Beirut Domestic Service* in Arabic, March 19, 1977.

<sup>11</sup>*Beirut Domestic Service* in Arabic, August 3, 1977.

<sup>12</sup>MENA (Cairo), in Arabic, July 8, 1977.



Thus, despite all obstacles, a rebuilding has begun. The National Defense Ministry announced on July 28, 1977, that it was accepting volunteers for the new army.<sup>13</sup> The problem, however, remains more serious than finding volunteers or aid. It entails the creation of unified military units from a disparate, warring population whose wounds are fresh and still being aggravated.

It is possible that a recreated Lebanese army contingent based largely on the former Vanguard of the Lebanese Arab Army could be committed in the south. Reasonably combat-effective and largely Shi'a Muslim in composition, these units are acceptable to the primarily Shi'a native population in the area. Weaker than the rival factions in south Lebanon, they could not be a truly credible pacifying force, but they could play a restraining and symbolic role as the army is rebuilt.

### THE ECONOMY

During a lull in the violence-filled winter of 1975-1976, an American businessman who had long since moved his office to Cairo visited Beirut for one night. Asked why, he said that he had been unable to contact his home office for several days from Cairo and could still do so nearly instantaneously from Beirut.

Beirut retains a built-in infrastructure, including international communications facilities, that is fundamentally attractive to international business and finance. It has a commercially aware populace, fluent in essential languages, and in normal times is a most attractive environment. Unfortunately, elements required for full economic recovery have not yet been induced to return. To exacerbate the problem, other centers for financial and business services, in part stimulated by the Lebanese war, have emerged. Bahrain, Dubai, and Amman are notable examples. In short, Lebanon no longer has an exclusive claim to being the hub of Middle East commerce.

During the war, the economy suffered to a staggering extent. 1974 gross domestic product (GDP) was cited by the Beirut Chamber of Commerce as \$3.2 billion. That was the last year unaffected by the war. GDP for 1976 was \$1 billion. 1977 GDP, not yet finally calculated, is running at a level which is only somewhat more than half that of 1974. The stability-sensitive services sector accounted for 70 percent of the 1974 figure, a fact that explains the lethargic recovery in a still unpredictable political/military environment. A firm statistical fix on direct material losses suffered by the economy from the war is lacking. Most estimates by various Lebanese officials place them between \$1 billion

and \$2 billion, although sometimes higher figures are given. Finally, there remained an estimated 300,000 unemployed as of the spring of 1977, rounding out the picture of continuing economic difficulty.

Two processes must be set into motion before there is a genuine recovery. One is the return of international business, and the second is a large inflow of capital earmarked for reconstruction. Neither process has yet begun, and both depend on a confidence in Lebanon's stability yet to emerge. The *Middle East Economic Digest* noted in mid-1977 that:

The political future is still in doubt, and this is reflected in businessmen's reluctance to take on long-term commitments, or to make investments which will produce long-term benefits. The traders and merchants, rather than the industrialists or manufacturers, are setting the slow pace.<sup>14</sup>

On March 18, 1977, Saudi Arabia, which is paying the lion's share of the expenses of keeping the Arab Deterrent Force in Lebanon, donated 50 million Lebanese pounds "as a contribution to the social plan related to the relief of the evacuees and people who have sustained damage."<sup>15</sup> On March 28, Kuwait donated 30 million pounds "as its contribution to the solution of the problems of people who were evacuated from their houses during the events in Lebanon."<sup>16</sup>

These sums are only stopgap measures, and much more will be required from the oil-rich states if genuine reconstruction is to occur. Until the political/military situation has definitely stabilized, however, these states may continue to hold back. Additionally, they shy away from blanket financing of the reconstruction effort, and insist on specifically planned project-tied aid that can be monitored by the donors. Lebanon has yet to formulate such projects.

An effort is being made to meld the reconstruction effort with long-term development planning. The focal point for resolution of these sometimes conflicting priorities is the recently created Reconstruction and Development Council, which is reportedly staffed by competent administrators and technicians. One scheme being studied is the decentralization of industrial centers by placing them in rural areas where there is abundant labor.<sup>17</sup>

In summary, Lebanon's economy awaits the resolution of the overall security question. Free movement of labor between religious sectors is still inhibited by instability; Arab construction aid remains in abeyance; and international business is hesitant. The excellent Lebanese service infrastructure remains, but as yet it

(Continued on page 40)

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<sup>13</sup>Beirut Domestic Service in Arabic, July 28, 1977.

<sup>14</sup>"Reconstruction Must Tie In with Long-Term Planning," *Middle East Economic Digest*, June 10, 1977.

<sup>15</sup>Saudi News Agency (Riyadh) in Arabic, March 18, 1977.

<sup>16</sup>Beirut Domestic Service in Arabic, March 28, 1977.

<sup>17</sup>"Reconstruction Must Tie in with Long-Term Planning," *Middle East Economic Digest*, June 10, 1977.

Conclusion

"Whether the PLO approves or not, Israel is in the Middle East to stay. While peace may be negotiated with or without the PLO, no peace can be negotiated without Israel and the Palestinian people. This is the crux of the whole problem. . . . Israel and the Palestinians are the central components in the Middle East dilemma, neither of whom can benefit from a lasting peace if it is achieved at the expense of the other."

## The Arab Palestinians

BY ALON BEN-MEIR

Author, *The Middle East: Imperatives and Choices*

FOR an understanding of the Palestinian issue, it is necessary to distinguish between the Palestinians as a people and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as a political organization whose means (including the use of terror) and objectives have not always coincided with the human needs and national aspirations of the Palestinian people. The fact that the Arab states and the international community have sought to bundle these groups together and treat them as one entity has not served the Arab Palestinians' cause, nor has it brought their problem closer to any solution.

In order to understand this decades-long drama, therefore, one must not accept the notion that the Palestinians and the PLO are one and the same merely because the international community through the vehicle of the United Nations has given the PLO its "seal of approval."

It is the contention of this writer that even today, after three decades of Arab-Israeli confrontation, the Palestinians' problem remains undefined and not clearly portrayed by either side. All the parties who are closely or remotely connected with the Arab-Israeli crisis, namely Israel, the Arab states, the PLO, the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Nations, have directly and indirectly contributed to the prolongation of the Palestinians' dilemma, and they continue to this date to use the Palestinians as pawns in pursuit of their own interests. A historical survey of the last three decades will show clearly:

- that the Arab states have consistently manipulated the Palestinians to further their own political goals;
- that for years Israel has ignored and failed to recognize that the Palestinians as a people are a major focal point in the Arab-Israeli crisis;
- that the United Nations has utterly failed to find a workable solution to the Palestinian problem and has allowed itself to be used as a propaganda tool in the hands of the Arab states, third world countries and the

Communist bloc—all to the detriment of the Palestinian people;

- that the United States has never taken a firm position on the issue of the Palestinians, and continues to confuse the Palestinians as a people with the PLO as a political organization;
- that the Soviet Union, with the rest of the international community, accepted the controversial United Nations and Rabat resolutions (October, 1974) naming the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinians, thereby indirectly encouraging further destruction and adding to the uncertainty;
- and, finally, that the PLO undertook to represent the Palestinian people without concern for their future and, in the course of its terrorist activities, has actually killed more Palestinians than Israelis, all in the name of and on behalf of the Palestinian people.

### THE CREATION OF THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM

Who is to blame for the dilemma of the Palestinians is no longer a relevant question. Both Israel and the Arab states continue to hold one another responsible. But while the Israelis and the Arabs differ about ultimate causality in this matter, there is no doubt that the Palestinian problem was created as a direct result of the 1948 war. Regardless of who encouraged the Palestinians to flee, three decades later their dilemma continues to haunt both the Arab states and Israel. To the extent that Israel and the Arab states continue to differ as to what constitutes the "legitimate" rights of the Palestinians and what role, if any, the Palestinians should play in any peace conference, no lasting solution to the Arab-Israeli crisis is in sight.

1) *The Arab States and the Palestinians.* Over the past three decades, the Palestinians have consistently insisted that the only solution to their problem is repatriation (i.e., to the land Israel now occupies), a demand that is still totally unacceptable to Israel. The policy of most Arab states has been to keep the issue of the Palestinians alive as a refugee problem in order to

capitalize on its emotional aspect and to generate as much sympathy as possible from the international community.

The representatives of the Arab states at the United Nations and in various world capitals have consistently advocated only one solution to the Palestinian problem: repatriation. Ahmed Shukairy, a former PLO official and a representative of Saudi Arabia, has repeatedly stated: "It is repatriation and nothing but repatriation. It is the only solution that does not dishonor but certainly does honor the United Nations Charter."

The Arab host countries placed many obstacles in the way of the Palestinian refugees so that no solution could be found. For example, the Arab host countries restricted the physical movement and economic opportunities of the refugees. Even though some Arab oil-producing countries, like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, lacked manpower, they have been under pressure from other Arab countries to refuse to accept Palestinian refugees.

In his report to the eighth session of the General Assembly, the director of UNRWA\* described the Arab policies on the free movement of the Palestinians:

The full benefit of the spread of this large capital investment [in Arab countries] will be felt only if restrictions on the movement of the refugees are withdrawn. This is a measure which was proposed in the original three-year plan, but little has been done so far to give effect to it. Such freedom of movement would enable refugees to take full advantage of the opportunities for work arising in countries such as Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the Persian Gulf sheikdoms where economic development has already taken place.

Fawaz Turki, in his book *The Disinherited*, sheds further light on the plight of the Palestinians.

To cross the border between Lebanon, Jordan and Syria and sometimes even from one town to another in the same country, to visit a relative or conduct business, a Palestinian was required to wait for a *Laissez-passer* from the authorities. The issuance of this document was left to the discretion of local bureaucrats who obliged only when they saw fit—in a few weeks, a few months, or never. Socially, Palestinians were despised, persecuted, or at best ignored.<sup>1</sup>

Simply stated, the refugees have been used by the various Arab nations to promote their own interests. More specifically, the Arab states found in the refugee problem an excellent pretext for masking their domestic social and economic problems and their inability to coordinate their policies or military action against Israel. The Palestinian refugees were a constant reminder of Arab weaknesses, shortsightedness and inability to deal with the tiny Jewish state. The refugee cause was accorded subordinate or superordinate attention, depending on what seemed to serve the best interests of the host country at the time. The fluctuating policy

of the Arab states has actually only perpetuated the problem.

## THE PLO

From the time the PLO emerged in Cairo in 1964 as an umbrella organization representing a dozen different fedayeen groups, the dispute between the PLO and the Arab states has been persistent. Any Arab state that sought to exploit the PLO as a weapon in the struggle against Israel soon realized that the PLO was not always willing to cooperate if cooperation did not serve the PLO's interests. The PLO's terrorist activities inside Israel resulted in an intensification of Israeli retaliation against every Arab state from which the terrorist activities were launched. The Arab governments that tried to control and contain PLO activities in Israel were confronted by a PLO determined to run its own affairs.

In Jordan, for example, the Jordanian government was finally compelled to turn its army against the PLO. The result was a civil war in Jordan in September, 1970, which forced the PLO out of the country with the loss of more than 10,000 lives. In Lebanon, too, from mid-1975 through mid-1977, a confusing civil war was waged among the PLO, the Christian Maronites, the Muslim leftists and the Syrians.

Although both Jordan and Syria could have liquidated the PLO altogether, they chose instead to settle for a weaker PLO that would be easier to manipulate. The Arab states wanted to maintain the PLO as a viable force in case of a new round of fighting against Israel; at the same time, without risking their own security, they could insist that PLO activities be directed against Israel. In addition, when the PLO developed as an important political force, the Arab states continued to argue that the PLO must be invited to participate in any peace conference with Israel. This Arab demand has so far been flatly turned down by Israel, although the administration of United States President Jimmy Carter is pressuring Israel to take a more flexible position.

A brief examination of the individual "confrontation states"—Egypt, Jordan, Syria—reveals that each of these states continues to pursue its own national self interest. To this end, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat visited Israel in November, 1977, despite intense opposition in the Arab world. Egypt, which has serious economic, social and political problems, would prefer to see a Palestinian solution somehow connected with Jordan, provided that Israel relinquishes all the territory she occupied in 1967 and vetoes any Syrian hopes of expansion. Jordan would still like to repossess at least part of the West Bank and continues to support a solution that would link any newly created Palestinian state to her territory. The Syrians, who have even greater national ambitions, continue to insist on an independent Palestinian state, so that they may domi-

\*United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees.

<sup>1</sup>Fawaz Turki, *The Disinherited* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972), p. 40.

nate it as they have dominated Lebanon. This would bring them one step closer to the realization of their dream of a Greater Syria. Saudi Arabia, the banker of all the confrontation states, supports Egypt in general, but remains skeptical about the PLO's ultimate intentions and the future of the monarchy in Jordan.

In sum, notwithstanding the resolutions of unity which the Arab League Foreign Ministers' conference adopted in Egypt in September, 1977, the Arab states are far from agreeing on a single approach to the Palestinian problem.

W 5  
ISR ( In addition, the Arab states maintain officially that the question of the Palestinians is the crux of the Arab-Israeli crisis, an argument that has been receiving more and more acceptance from the international community. At this writing all countries, excepting Israel but including the United States, share this view. On the other hand, Israel insists that the focal point of the Arab-Israeli crisis is Arab nonacceptance of Israel's existence, and that every other issue, including the Palestinian problem, is secondary and would have been resolved had the Arab states accepted Israel in the first place.

Between 1948 and 1967, the Israeli attitude toward the Palestinians was based primarily on Israel's perception of the cause of the original mass exodus of Palestinians after the war of 1948. Abba Eban, a former Israeli Foreign Minister, stated Israel's position at the United Nations on November 17, 1958:

The Arab refugee problem was caused by a war of aggression, launched by the Arab states against Israel in 1947 and 1948. Let there be no mistake. If there had been no war against Israel with its consequent harvest of bloodshed, misery, panic and flight, there would be no problem of Arab refugees today. Once you determine the responsibility for that war, you have determined the responsibility for that problem. Nothing in the history of our generation is clearer or less controversial than the initiative of the Arab governments for the conflict out of which the refugee tragedy emerged. Since these governments have, by acts of policy, created this tragic problem, does it not follow that the world community has the unimpeachable right to claim their full assistance in its solution? How can governments create a vast humanitarian problem by their action, then wash their hands of all responsibility?

Although Arab governments have consistently defended the right of the Palestinians to return to their "homeland," Israel rejects this concept of repatriation (apart from occasional family reunions) for three inter-related reasons:

1) Israel's Labor government believed that the return of all the Palestinians to Israel would not be repatriation, but alienation from Arab society. Differences of language, cultural heritage, national identity and loyalty would not permit easy assimilation of the Palestinian refugees with the Jews.

2) Over 600,000 Oriental Jews (from the Arab Middle East and North Africa) emigrated to Israel, mostly between 1948 and 1955. The number of Palestinian refugees who left their homes after 1948 more or less equals the number of Oriental Jews who emigrated from Arab countries in the same time span. Some of these Jews came of their own will, especially before 1948, but the vast majority left their countries of birth to escape the domestic persecution that was expected to escalate after Israel's independence, leaving behind most if not all of their tangible assets.

3) Repatriation of huge numbers of Palestinian refugees to Israel, it was argued, would create a social crisis that might lead to the disintegration of Israel's identity as a Jewish state. Even Arab spokesmen recognize that physical acceptance of the Palestinians would dilute the Jewish identity of the state. The population would eventually be dominated numerically by Arabs, if only because of the natural birth rate.

Thus the eloquent Arab spokesman, Cecil Hourani, speaking of the Palestinians on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip, found the total annexation and extension of equal citizenship to the Palestinians in the occupied territories a not undesirable prospect. From the Arab point of view, Hourani stated:

If the Israeli government accepts the Arabs within the territories she controls as full Israeli citizens, with equal civil and political rights, the concept of Israel which has hitherto been incorporated into her laws will have to be changed. Israel will no longer be a Jewish state. It will become a Jewish-Arab state in which nationality will be a function of residence or citizenship. Israel, in other words, as she has been since 1948, will no longer exist, and Palestine with Arabs and Jews living together will have been restored.<sup>2</sup>

Israel did not adopt Hourani's line of thinking, nor did she follow any particular policy toward the Palestinians. In fact, Israel's lack of a definite policy after 1967 helped to nourish the Palestine Liberation Organization and gave impetus to its re-emergence as an important element in the Arab-Israeli crisis.

After the civil war in Jordan in September, 1970, when by all responsible accounts the PLO ceased to be a viable element in the anti-Israel struggle, Israel's consistent refusal to consider the Palestinians as a separate entity deserving special attention brought Palestinian nationalism once again to the fore. (History repeated itself in Lebanon in 1976: another civil war, another defeat for the Palestinians, another refusal by Israel to recognize an opportunity for a breakthrough in the deadlock.) Many Israelis, Arabs and Western observers believe that if Israel had been prepared to deal with the Palestinian problem, particularly after 1967 when Israel became logistically capable of doing so, the international upsurge during 1974-76 in favor of the Palestinians and the widespread and increasing recognition of the PLO might have been avoided.

<sup>2</sup>Encounter (Beirut), November, 1967.



One other aspect that must be noted in considering the Israeli position is the emergence of the PLO as the "sole representative" of the Palestinians and its acceptance by the Arab states and the United Nations. On the one hand, Israel tacitly accepted the new status bestowed upon the PLO; for only by assuming that the PLO and the Palestinians were one entity could Israel justify her refusal to negotiate with the Palestinians altogether. After all, so the argument goes, Israel could not be expected to negotiate with any party that has sworn to liquidate her. On the other hand, Israel maintained her policies of social and economic integration with the Palestinians throughout the occupied territories because, in effect, Israel sought to separate the interests of the PLO from those of the Palestinian people. Here again is evidence of a contradictory policy.

While Israel may not have been in a position to do much about the Palestinians before the Six Day War of 1967, she could indeed have taken the initiative afterward. Yet the Labor government failed to devise a workable solution, partly because of shortsightedness on the part of its political leaders, and partly because of the inherent weakness in a coalition government that has not commanded wide support since 1967. No Israeli government has been able to commit itself to any far-reaching solution to the Palestinian problem without facing a virtual collapse.

As a result, since 1967 Israeli authorities have elected to let time take its course. After the 1967 war, Israel failed to take any creative initiative, choosing instead to try to create harmonious relations with the Palestinians in the occupied territories in the hope of eventually reconciling their differences. This accommodating attitude, it was thought, would defuse the national aspirations of the Palestinians. Although Israel has been partially successful in improving Israeli-Arab interaction at the social and economic levels by providing jobs, social services and housing, her success has been insufficient to subdue or eliminate the deeper Palestinian nationalism.

Yet it is possible that the overwhelming support the PLO gained in the 1976 municipal elections in the West Bank can be turned around to benefit Israel as well as the Palestinians. Although the result of the election may seem undesirable to some Israeli officials, the fact remains that Israel was able to carry out a democratic election in the West Bank in sharp contrast to the lack of similar free elections in almost every other part of the Arab world.

The outcome of the election must have been anticipated and it cannot be ignored. A dialogue between the two sides should begin, although the beginning may prove difficult. To paraphrase Israel's former Defense

Minister, Shimon Peres, the results of the election are a national challenge. Israel must open a dialogue with the new representatives in the West Bank and regain the measure of goodwill built up in the early years of the occupation.

## THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

One can speak of the "international community" as having one voice only insofar as the voice emerges from the halls of the United Nations. Yet in reviewing the attitude of the United Nations toward the Palestinians, one sees an international community immobilized by many strident voices. During the first two decades of the Arab-Israeli crisis, the United Nations position toward the Palestinians mirrored the narrow self-interests of its member states. Year after year, the General Assembly went through the pain of allocating funds for the Palestinian "refugees," a label the international community continues to use to characterize the Palestinians.

What the Arabs realized in the early 1950's [remarked Eugene V. Rostow] was that they could defy mandatory decisions of the Security Council without penalty. They were told in 1951 that they could not shut the Suez Canal to the Israelis. But they did, and nothing happened. They were told they had to make peace with Israel. They refused to do so, insisting that they were still at war with Israel and had "belligerent rights"; again, the Security Council did nothing to enforce its rulings. But the Western powers showed no appetite for the task of requiring the Arab nations to make peace with Israel. As a result, the deep-seated Arab conviction that the existence of Israel is an aggression against Arab rights became a political force.<sup>3</sup>

As is true in most cases involving the interests of the major powers, the United Nations has lacked the initiative and the power to take meaningful steps to bring the Palestinian refugee problem to a settlement acceptable to all parties. The Arabs, supported by the leadership and the veto power of the Soviet Union in the Security Council, have successfully stopped any attempt by the United States, Israel, or West European countries to promote their solutions to the problem of the refugees. Thus, resolutions in the United Nations calling for resettlement of or full compensation to the Palestinians have been consistently opposed by the Arab states. In fact, any resolution falling short of repatriation and the establishment of a homeland has been immediately rejected.

Only with the compliance of the countries playing "host" to the Palestinians could the United Nations act effectively on behalf of the refugees. Although in effect the vast majority of the Palestinians ceased to be refugees under the Israeli occupation after 1967, the United Nations relief program continued as if there had been no change in political status. UNRWA has not adapted to changing times; it has remained unaffected by political change. The refugees have grown

<sup>3</sup>"The American Stake in Israel," *Commentary*, vol. 63, p. 32, April, 1977.

accustomed to the permanent condition of living hand-to-mouth, sustained by international largesse.

After the Yom Kippur War of October, 1973, both the General Assembly and the Security Council of the United Nations took a more and more offensive position pointing an accusing finger at Israel and her policies. At the same time, Arab political and economic power began to make itself felt in 1973-1974 as a result of the oil embargo and the fourfold hike in oil prices set by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). In Africa, Asia, Latin America and finally in West Europe, country after country was affected by Arab economic pressure. With newfound strength, the Arab states began to reemphasize their demand for a homeland for the Palestinians, and the issue of repatriation slowly began to fade away. After the United Nations General Assembly designated the PLO as the official representative of the Palestinians in October, 1974, the PLO became first a permanent observer to the United Nations, and, later in 1976, received the status of a "regular member state."

While these diplomatic developments were meant to improve the status of the Palestinians, a bloody civil war was being waged in Lebanon among the PLO, the Christian Maronites, the Syrians and the Muslim leftists, with the Palestinian people caught in the cross-fire. The United Nations did not or could not lift a finger to stop the fighting, because no resolution demanding such a cease-fire would have passed in the General Assembly or in the Security Council.

In the fall of 1977, the new United Nations session continued the same policies. Anti-Israel resolutions were presented one after another. And yet although most of the parties to the crisis had previously agreed to United Nations Resolution 242 in principle, the resolution remains unimplemented because neither the Arab states nor the PLO nor the United States nor Israel agree on the exact interpretation of certain key phrases of that resolution. Thus the United Nations is effectively immobilized.

### THE U.S. AND THE PALESTINIANS

The attitude of the United States toward the Palestinians has been sympathetic; for the last 30 years the United States has paid the lion's share of UNRWA appropriations. But the United States has been unable to take decisive action toward solving the Palestinian problem for fear of alienating either key Arab states or Israel. To be sure, United States relations with the

Palestinians have also been influenced by concern about Soviet penetration in the Middle East. The tacit and later overt support that the Soviet Union extended to the PLO further encouraged the United States to adopt a noncommittal stance toward the Palestinians.

When the PLO emerged from the Arab summit meeting at Rabat in October, 1974, as the "official and sole representative of the Palestinians," a new dilemma was posed for United States policymakers. On the one hand, the United States recognized that an equitable solution to the Palestinian problem must be found. On the other hand, dealing with the PLO would not be consistent with official United States policy on the Middle East, which was primarily based on Resolution 242,<sup>4</sup> in which the Palestinians were referred to as "refugees" and in which no references were made to the PLO.

In a news conference in Brussels on December 10, 1976, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger remarked:

The United States has stated repeatedly its attitude toward the PLO, which is that until the PLO accepts the existence of the state of Israel and the resolutions on which the present negotiations are being conducted—Resolutions 242 and 338—the United States cannot accept the PLO as a party to any negotiations.

Kissinger's statement reflected the official position of the administrations of Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford. The administration of President Jimmy Carter sought at first to adopt precisely the same position. Soon, however, President Carter shifted toward a policy of accepting the PLO as a negotiating partner if and when the PLO accepted Resolution 242 in principle.

At the moment, the United States faces a dead end. Israel continues to refuse to deal with the PLO under any circumstances, and the PLO continues to refuse to accept Resolution 242 as a basis for negotiations (with or without the provision giving the Palestinians status beyond that of "refugees"). However, the United States, which has refused to have any official contact with the PLO before the PLO's recognition of Israel, has initiated some communication with the PLO through a third party, a development that Israel protested.

Although the Carter administration maintains that it has not fundamentally changed its position on the Palestinian problem, there are clear indications that President Carter has moved closer to the view of the "moderate" Arab states (Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia) of how peace might eventually be restored in the Middle East. In this view, one of the requisites of

(Continued on page 41)

<sup>4</sup>U.N. Resolution 242, adopted in November, 1967, sets out the basis for an Arab-Israeli settlement, involving Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in the 1967 war in return for an end to the state of war and acknowledgment of the "sovereignty . . . of every state in the area."

U.N. Resolution 338, adopted October 23, 1973, as an outgrowth of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, calls for a cease-fire, implementation of Resolution 242, and peace negotiations.

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*"The Israeli military is now superior to the Arab militaries, but the extent of that superiority is totally dependent on the ability of the Arab armies to correct qualitative deficiencies and to implement new strategies to meet the altered situation."*

# The Military Balance of Power in the Middle East

BY W. SETH CARUS

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**T**HERE has always been an undercurrent of violence in the Middle East; war and the threat of war between the Arabs and Israel affect virtually all aspects of life. The struggle for military superiority between Israel and the Arabs has continued, with only brief respites, for 30 years. Since the 1973 October War this struggle has dramatically intensified.

Military superiority has usually been achieved not only on the battlefield but also as a result of peacetime improvements and planning. Standard measures of military power are of limited value for an assessment of the balance of military power between the Arab countries and Israel. Comparisons of equipment inventories are unrevealing and often confuse more than they clarify. Even the consideration of qualitative differences scarcely makes such analyses more useful. The only way to understand the balance of power is to examine the strategic doctrines of the participants and to determine the nature of the latent capabilities that their equipment provides. Weapons are useful for specific strategic purposes. Attempts to use weapons for purposes for which they are not suited can make them useless.

On the Arab side only the three powers directly adjacent to Israel—Egypt, Syria, and Jordan—will be considered. Other countries may also participate, but their importance is limited. This may not always hold true, but today only the front-line countries have military forces with sufficient size, quality and sophistication to affect the outcome of a war in the immediate future.

## ISRAEL

The Israeli military of 1978 scarcely resembles that of 1973. There has been an enormous increase in weapons inventories, accompanied by qualitative improvements

of a similar magnitude. The result of these changes is a far more capable military force, with greater depth and sophistication. Most important, changes in Israeli strategic doctrine will greatly improve Israel's utilization of this military force.

Three major changes in strategic doctrine are worth mentioning. The first reflects a fundamental shift in policy, with far-reaching consequences. Through 1973, Israel relied on a strategy that is best described as an economy of force. Israeli military planners wanted military forces to place as little financial burden as possible on Israel's economy while remaining able to deter Arab attacks. This was an attempt to reduce Israeli defense costs to manageable proportions. Such a doctrine required an investment in highly visible and flexible weapons systems: fighter aircraft but not anti-aircraft missiles and guns; tanks but not anti-tank missiles.

The dangers inherent in this strategy were exposed in 1973. An economy of force doctrine could succeed only if a war were fought under conditions favorable to Israel. An Arab surprise attack, the Egyptian development of effective anti-tank and anti-aircraft tactics, and relatively static battle situations contributed to the failure of the economy of force doctrine.

## A NEW STRATEGIC DOCTRINE

Immediately after the 1973 war, Israel adopted a new strategic doctrine, which might be described as maximum deployable force. This new doctrine demanded the creation and deployment of the largest possible number of combat units. Larger defense budgets, massive United States military aid and a refined reserve structure made possible large increases in the number of Israeli combat and combat support units.

Israel's adoption of the maximum deployable force doctrine resulted from two specific conditions. First,

Israeli defense planners learned in 1973 that quantity creates a kind of quality. This belief, now often expressed, seems to reflect a realization that beyond a certain point quantitative inferiority can make it impossible to benefit from qualitative superiority. Second, it was learned that alternate tactical capabilities were needed: anti-aircraft missiles and guns and anti-tank missiles were just as necessary as fighter aircraft and tanks, to meet the variety of tactical situations that can be encountered in war. Both considerations required increased force size.

To effect the second major change in strategic doctrine Israel had to be independent of external supply sources in wartime. In a sense, this was not a change. Israeli defense planners have tried, with little success, to fight without wartime deliveries from other countries. What has changed is implementation. Enormous inventories of ammunition and spare parts now make it possible for Israel to fight an intense war lasting at least 30 days. Similarly, spare part inventories are sufficiently large to make Israel independent for an extended period (allegedly for a year and a half). As a result, Israel is effectively independent of external supplies in the short term.

Virtually all Israeli arms now come from either the United States or Israel. The United States is Israel's most important supplier of arms. Israeli orders of American military equipment since October, 1973, now exceed \$4.5 billion.<sup>1</sup> Most of the equipment is paid for by foreign military sales credits. Repayment of a substantial portion of the credits has already been "forgiven," meaning that no repayment is required.

It should not be supposed that all the credits to Israel go for military equipment orders. Often the credits have been used for indirect costs, including the costs of the October, 1973, airlift to Israel (costing at least \$42 million, including charges for depreciation of the participating C-5A's) and payments to finance expansion of American tank production facilities (about \$44 million). At other times, the costs for certain types of equipment are far greater than their military importance. For example, the order for 25 F-15 fighters (representing

about one-twentieth of the current inventory of combat aircraft) was worth \$653 million (including \$40 million to cover United States research and development costs).

Israeli-produced arms are becoming increasingly important. The air force relies upon the Kfir fighter-bomber and the Shafrir air-to-air missile. The navy uses the Gabriel anti-ship missiles launched from Israeli-built vessels and guided by Israeli-built electronics. The army obtains virtually all its ammunition from domestic production. United States officials claim that four-fifths of Israeli arms are imported from the United States; Israeli officials claim that domestic production accounts for one-third of all acquisitions. Whatever the correct figure, domestic production is extremely important and accounts for a large portion of vitally needed items.<sup>2</sup>

A third major change in strategic doctrine has passed almost unnoticed. Since 1973, Israel has created strategic mobility forces. The 1976 Entebbe raid revealed many interesting features of Israeli defense forces, including the existence of a matured strategic mobility capability. All the equipment and tactics necessary for transportation of combat units far from Israel under combat conditions existed before the Entebbe raid. The air force, with about 25 C-130 and 10 Boeing 707 transports, is fully capable of transporting and supplying any of Israel's three paratroop brigades far from Israel.<sup>3</sup>

The Israeli military has also made substantial improvements in tactical capabilities through the acquisition of new equipment and the development of new tactical concepts. Manpower and inventory levels have been increased substantially. New types of equipment further extend combat capabilities. The army has increased the number of tanks from 2,000 to 3,000, the number of artillery pieces from about 800 to over 1,500, the full-tracked armored personnel carriers from 500 to several thousand. Anti-tank missiles have been purchased in large numbers, including many thousand TOW anti-tank missiles from the United States. More infantry units have been created. The navy has increased the number of missile boats from 14 to 21, with at least five more on order—including at least two Super Flagstaff hydrofoils. Harpoon anti-ship missiles with a range of 110 kilometers have been ordered from the United States. Allegedly some will be air-launched versions. Finally, three Israeli-produced 1124N Westwind maritime reconnaissance aircraft are now in service.

The air force has increased its inventory of combat aircraft from 370 to about 550. Most of the new aircraft are American F-4E and A-4N jets, but about 100 are Israeli-built Nesher and Kfir fighter-bombers. The effectiveness of the newer aircraft is far greater than earlier aircraft. Large quantities of American-produced precision-guided munitions have been purchased, and the Israeli-designed Luz long-range air-to-surface

<sup>1</sup>Defense Security Assistance Agency, *Foreign Military Sales and Military Assistance Facts*, December, 1976, provides official data on foreign military and commercial sales programs and on credits provided.

<sup>2</sup>Israel's domestic arms industry has been well covered by the American press. See for example William Farrell, *The New York Times*, February 15, 1977, p. 3. Unfortunately, most of these reports are sensational as a result of the efforts of American diplomats and defense officials. For a blatant example, see Clarence Robinson, *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, vol. 103 (December 13, 1975), pp. 14-17.

<sup>3</sup>All hard data for Israel and the Arab countries is based on compilations from numerous sources. Unfortunately, the standard source for such information, *The Military Balance 1976-77* by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, is inaccurate and incomplete. The best source for aviation data is *Flight International*, vol. 112 (July 20, 1977), pp. 325-341.



missile is now in production. Electronic countermeasures have been substantially improved, using American and Israeli equipment. Acquisition of six Improved Hawk batteries, Chaparral anti-aircraft missile launchers, and anti-aircraft guns will improve air defenses. The E-2C airborne early warning aircraft will be operational in 1978.

## EGYPT

After 1973, Egypt embarked on a carefully defined military improvement program. This program has two main purposes. First, the Egyptians would like to reduce dependence on Soviet arms by the acquisition of Western equipment. Second, the Egyptians are trying to improve their equipment quality by the replacement or modernization of obsolescent weapons. For financial reasons, this program has proceeded very slowly. By judicious selection of equipment, however, it has proved possible to make substantial improvements at relatively little cost.

The effects of this improvement program have become increasingly apparent. The Egyptian army has acquired British Swingfire and French HOT anti-tank missiles (the former for the infantry, the latter for 42 newly acquired French Gazelle helicopters). Both missiles are far superior to the Soviet Sagger anti-tank missiles Egypt previously used. Egypt's navy has been rebuilding Soviet-supplied missile boats for over a year. The rebuilt boats receive new engines obtained in West Europe (from Italy or Britain), electronics from Britain (new radar and an electronic warfare system), and missiles from Italy (30 OTOMAT's have reportedly been ordered). Six new KOMAR-class missile boats have been built in Egypt and will probably be equipped with the Italian missile.<sup>4</sup> In addition, six Westland Sea King Mk. 37 helicopters delivered in 1976 and 1977 provide sophisticated anti-submarine capabilities.

The Egyptian air force has benefited most from the improvement program. While the inventory of combat aircraft has decreased somewhat, the number operational has probably increased. In 1973, possibly one-third of Egypt's combat aircraft were in storage. Today, all aircraft in inventory are operational. The quality of the average aircraft has improved considerably. Advanced model MiG-21, MiG-23/27, and Su-20 fighters from the Soviet Union have replaced less sophisticated equipment. French aircraft are used in significant numbers; a total of 52 Mirage III fighters have been delivered or are on order. Soviet aircraft are

being improved using Western electronics. In addition, negotiations are under way with a group of United States and British companies to provide logistics and maintenance support for Egypt's 200 to 250 MiG-21 fighters.<sup>5</sup>

These qualitative improvements have had a significant impact on the force capabilities of the Egyptian military. At relatively little cost, many serious weaknesses have been corrected. Often improvements are dramatic: with fewer available aircraft, Egypt's inventory of combat aircraft can carry more ordnance over longer ranges than the 1973 inventory (even including all the aircraft then in storage). The naval improvement program has yielded far more benefits than could have been gained by buying large numbers of additional Soviet missile boats, as the Syrians have done. These improvements have made the Egyptian military far stronger. As additional Western equipment is received (especially in the electronics field), capabilities will increase further. Egypt's efforts comprise what should be considered a classic demonstration of intelligent defense planning.

Egypt, almost totally dependent upon Soviet arms five years ago, now relies increasingly on Western equipment. Britain, France and Italy are important suppliers of armaments. The United States provides a variety of non-lethal equipment: jeeps, electronic reconnaissance gear, C-130 transports and reconnaissance drones. Present plans call for a reduction of Egypt's dependence on Western suppliers. For the past several years, the Egyptians have been negotiating with French and British armament firms for the purchase of arms production facilities. At various times, discussions have focused on aircraft production facilities for French F-1 fighters, jet trainers and helicopters, and on missile production facilities for the British Swingfire anti-tank missile and for the French Crotale anti-aircraft missile. So far, nothing has come of these negotiations. The reasons for the failure have not been disclosed.

These developments should not be construed as an indication that Egypt has become independent of Soviet arms and logistic support, or as an indication of Egyptian independence in the immediate future. However, Egypt's shift toward the West is an important trend that, eventually, could lead to Egypt's independence.

Mention should be made of Egypt's unconventional warfare capabilities. Since the early 1960's, the Egyptians have had inventories of biological, chemical and radiological substances.<sup>6</sup> The acquisition of the Soviet SCUD surface-to-surface missile could provide a means of delivery for these substances, with sufficient range to reach deep into Israel.

Egypt's strategic problems are far more important than any material deficiencies. The crucial problem, simply put, is how to force battle on Israel. The Egyptians believe that Israel's great weakness is her

<sup>4</sup>*Aviation and Marine International*, vol. 4 (June, 1976), p. 21, and subsequent issues.

<sup>5</sup>On the MiG-21 overhaul proposal see *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, vol. 107 (September 26, 1977), pp. 22-3.

<sup>6</sup>Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare* (New York: Humanities Press, 1973) is the major source. See especially volume 2: *CB Weapons Today*, pp. 240-242.

inability to sustain heavy military casualties. Egyptian strategy therefore aims at inflicting heavy losses on the Israeli military, even at the cost of temporary Egyptian defeats. In 1973, the implementation of this strategy was fairly simple: merely by crossing the Suez Canal, it was possible to force battle on the Israeli forces. Political and strategic considerations forced Israel to attack Egypt's bridgehead across the canal.

This may not be possible today. As a result of the 1975 disengagement agreement between Egypt and Israel negotiated by United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Israel's forward positions are now deep in Sinai. Any attack on these positions would expose the attacking units to the full force of Israel's superior tank units. Undoubtedly, these Israeli units will be much more effective deep in the Sinai desert than they were in 1973, when the proximity of the Suez Canal allowed Egypt's army to penetrate Israeli defenses merely by crossing the Suez Canal. The Egyptians have built the defenses needed to protect the canal; a large defense zone capable of supporting five infantry divisions now exists on the east bank in the Sinai. It is, however, unlikely that Egypt can afford to let Israel come very close to the canal. The political risks of allowing Israeli troops to come within artillery range of the new developments along the canal (built at enormous cost) would be substantial. And the political consequences of another Israeli penetration across the canal would be devastating. Any aggressive Egyptian advances into Sinai would mean acceptance of these extremely high risks; risks that the Egyptians could accept only after serious deliberation. On the other hand, Egypt's adoption of a passive or defensive posture would also have serious consequences. The Egyptian attempt to solve this strategic dilemma will play a crucial role in determining the outcome of a future war.<sup>7</sup>

## SYRIA

The 1973 war revealed important Syrian weaknesses. First, while Syria's air defense system provided excellent coverage of the Damascus/Golan Heights area, it left the remainder of the country undefended. Second, serious command difficulties impeded the effective use of the Syrian army. This was especially true at the divisional level. Third, air force and army tactics were often abominable. Fourth, most Soviet-supplied equipment was unreliable and was highly susceptible to countermeasures.

Syria's air defense system has been expanded from 35 batteries in 1973 to almost 50 today, to permit the Syrians to defend important targets away from the front lines. In addition, more SA-6 missile batteries and the

new SA-9 system (an improved version of the man-portable SA-7 mounted on an armored car) will improve front-line defenses. The command problems experienced in 1973 do not seem to have recurred during the fighting in Lebanon, where the Syrians seem to have controlled their units effectively. Since control was exercised directly from Damascus, it is still uncertain to what extent command control of Syria's five divisions has improved. Efforts have also been made to improve tactics, although Syria's performance in Lebanon does not indicate any significant improvement. Because of the political constraints placed on the use of Syrian forces, this may mean very little. In a future war, Syrian tactics should be more effective than those employed in 1973.

Efforts have also been made to rectify Syrian equipment deficiencies. No specifics are available, but it is likely that improved versions of the Soviet SS-N-2 anti-ship missile (perhaps the new SS-N-2C variant?) will reduce Syrian vulnerability to Israeli countermeasures. The Soviet Atoll AAM-2 air-to-air missile (totally ineffective in 1973) will probably be replaced by a more effective missile. Many important quantitative increases have also been made in Syrian arms. The tank inventory has been increased from 2,000 in 1973 to 2,600 today (including 1,000 T-62 tanks and possibly a few T-72's—the most modern tanks in the Soviet arsenal). The number of combat aircraft is now about 420, compared with the 1973 strength of 330. Most new aircraft are significantly more capable. The number of MiG-21's has increased from 200 to 250. The inventory now includes about 50 MiG-23 and MiG-27 Flogger fighter-bombers. Finally, the navy has increased the number of missile boats from 9 to 12, supplementing them with a small frigate (two more are on order) and 9 Ka-25 Hormone anti-submarine helicopters—the type used on the new Soviet Kiev class aircraft carriers. The Soviet Union currently supplies most of Syrian weaponry. The only important exceptions are the few helicopters recently ordered from Italy and France, the all-terrain trucks supplied by the Germans, and Austrian ordnance and ordnance production equipment.

Unlike the Egyptians, the Syrians do not appear to have unconventional weapons. However, like the Egyptians, they have a full range of defensive equipment for protection against chemical, biological, or radiological attack. Syria's large inventory of Soviet FROG short-range and SCUD medium-range surface-to-surface missiles with high explosive warheads are intended for use against targets in Israel.

With improved tactics, training, and command, Syrian equipment acquisitions could have significant

(Continued on page 35)

<sup>7</sup>William Beecher, *The Boston Globe*, June 7, 1976, discusses these problems in some detail. The first of many reports on Egypt's new defenses appeared in the *Evening Sun* (Baltimore), August 27, 1974, p. A3.

**W. Seth Carus** has specialized in the study of military power, concentrating on the Middle East. He is now researching Israeli arms acquisitions, past and present.

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# BOOK REVIEWS

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## ON THE MIDDLE EAST

**ISRAEL—THE EMBATTLED ALLY.** *By Nadav Safran.* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978. 613 pages, maps and index, \$18.50.)

Nadav Safran states in his preface to this study of Israel that "seldom in the history of international relations has such a world power [the United States] been involved so intensely for so long with such a small power [Israel]." In the light of rapid changes in the Middle East today, including the historic November visit of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat to Israel, Safran's analysis of the American-Israeli relationship offers excellent background material for an understanding of Middle East politics. Safran gives the reader an interesting history of the Jewish state and its relations with the other nations of the Middle East and details the very difficult role of the United States as the "peacebroker between Israel and the Arabs."

The United States has always maintained a special relationship with Israel, partly because of the "attachment to it and concern for its welfare on the part of the near totality of America's 6 million Jews. This special connection has secured for Israel a modicum of American support even when that [support] seemed to be a burden on the perceived American political-strategic interests and has encouraged a higher level of support when Israel seemed to be playing a useful role in the context of the perceived American 'real interest.'"

Whatever the ultimate result of November's meeting between Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menahem Begin, imperatives for the Middle East still remain; "the United States and Israel must strive to advance a settlement in every possible way; United States policy must have a dual orientation, on Israel as well as on the Arab states; and the United States must be prepared to inject major 'inputs' to make an Arab-Israeli agreement."

Safran writes in an interesting and readable style unusual in a book on international politics. In language that appears to foretell the November, 1977, Israeli-Egyptian rapprochement, Safran describes the resolution of the 1975 crisis in the Sinai (Sinai II).

Writing of that period, the author notes: "the resolution of the crisis became possible after the United States succeeded in inducing Egypt to take another step forward and then induced Israel to close the remaining gap. . . ."

O.E.S.

**THE BROTHERHOOD OF OIL: ENERGY POLICY AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST.** *By Robert Engler.* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1977. 337 pages and index, \$12.50.)

This study traces the evolution, operation and power of the major oil companies, especially as they function within the American political system. The author is primarily concerned with domestic political and economic effects of the oil companies, yet he also appraises the links between domestic policies and OPEC and the Middle East, as well as some foreign policy implications. *The Brotherhood of Oil* is well-documented, effectively presented and timely reading.

Alvin Z. Rubinstein  
University of Pennsylvania

**IRAN: AN ECONOMIC PROFILE.** *By Jahangir Amuzegar.* (Washington, D.C.: The Middle East Institute, 1977. 280 pages, selected bibliography and index, \$12.95.)

Iran's emergence as a major oil producer and important power in the Middle East calls attention to her massive effort to turn herself into a modernized industrial state within the next generation. In this study, a distinguished Iranian economist has collected a great deal of information about the economy of Iran and her problems and potential. Twenty chapters treat subjects like farming, petroleum, transportation, banking and monetary policy. This is a useful reference work.

A.Z.R.

**THE ARMS BAZAAR: FROM LEBANON TO LOCKHEED.** *By Anthony Sampson* (New York: The Viking Press, 1977. 352 pages and index, \$12.95.)

Arms races are not new, but the speed of technological innovation and the destructive capability of modern weapons lend them understandable drama. The first half of this journalism-in-depth study examines the rise of the modern munitions-makers like Vickers, Krupp and Lockheed. The second half examines various regional conflicts and attempts to assess the impact of arms transfers from industrially developed countries to the recipient third world countries.

A.Z.R.

**ISRAEL SPEAKS.** *Edited by Larry L. Fabian and Ze'ev Schiff.* (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1977. 258 pages and maps, \$10.00 cloth, \$5.00 paper.) ■

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## CURRENT DOCUMENTS

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On November 19, 1977, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat flew to Israel for a historic two-day visit, signaling Egypt's first recognition of Israel since Israel declared her independence in 1948. Excerpts from Sadat's November 20 speech to the Israeli Knesset and Israeli Prime Minister Menahem Begin's response are reprinted here:

### EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT SADAT SPEAKS TO THE KNESSET

I come to you today on solid ground to shape a new life and to establish peace. We all love this land, the land of God, we all, Muslims, Christians and Jews, all worship God.

Ladies and gentlemen, there are moments in the lives of nations and peoples when it is incumbent upon those known for their wisdom and clarity of vision to survey the problem, with all its complexities and vain memories, in a bold drive towards new horizons:

How can we achieve a durable peace based on justice? In my opinion, and I declare it to the whole world, from this forum, the answer is neither difficult nor is it impossible despite long years of feuds, blood, faction, strife, hatreds and deep-rooted animosity.

You want to live with us, part of the world.

In all sincerity I tell you we welcome you among us with full security and safety. This in itself is a tremendous turning point, one of the landmarks of a decisive historical change. We used to reject you. We had our reasons and our fears, yes.

Yet today I tell you, and I declare it to the whole world, that we accept to live with you in permanent peace based on justice.

Ladies and gentlemen, to tell you the truth, peace cannot be worth its name unless it is based on justice and not on the occupation of the land of others. It would not be right for you to demand for yourselves what you deny to others. With all frankness and in the spirit that has prompted me to come to you today, I tell you you have to give up once and for all the dreams of conquest and give up the belief that force is the best method for dealing with the Arabs.

We cannot accept any attempt to take away . . . one inch of [our land] nor can we accept the principle of debating or bargaining over it.

What is peace for Israel? It means that Israel lives in the region with her Arab neighbors in security and safety. Is that logical? I say yes. It means that Israel lives within its borders, secure against any aggression. Is that logical? And I say yes. It means that Israel obtains all kinds of guarantees that will ensure these two factors. To this demand, I say yes.

In short then, when we ask what is peace for Israel, the answer would be that Israel lives within her borders, among her Arab neighbors in safety and security, within the framework of all the guarantees which are offered to her.

Let me tell you without the slightest hesitation that I have not come to you under this roof to make a request that your troops evacuate the occupied territories. Complete withdrawal from the Arab territories occupied after 1967 is a logical and undisputed fact.

Conceive with me a peace agreement in Geneva that we would herald to a world thirsting for peace. A peace agreement based on the following points:

Ending the occupation of the Arab territories occupied in 1967.

As for the Palestine cause—nobody could deny that it is the

crux of the entire problem.

In all sincerity I tell you that there can be no peace without the Palestinians. It is a grave error of unpredictable consequences to overlook or brush aside this cause.

Achievement of the fundamental rights of the Palestinian people and their right to self-determination, including their right to establish their own state.

The right of all states in the area to live in peace within their boundaries, their secure boundaries, which will be secured and guaranteed through procedures to be agreed upon, which will provide appropriate security to international boundaries in addition to appropriate international guarantees.

Commitment of all states in the region to administer the relations among them in accordance with the objectives and principles of the United Nations Charter. Particularly the principles concerning the nonuse of force and a solution of differences among them by peaceful means.

Ending the state of belligerence in the region.

I have chosen to set aside all precedents and traditions known by warring countries. In spite of the fact that occupation of Arab territories is still there, the declaration of my readiness to proceed to Israel came as a great surprise that stirred many feelings and confounded many minds. Some of them even doubted its intent.

Despite all that, the decision was inspired by all the clarity and purity of belief and with all the true passions of my people's will and intentions. . . .

### PRIME MINISTER BEGIN RESPONDS

Mr. President of Egypt, ladies and gentlemen, members of the Knesset.

. . . permit me today to indicate what is the schedule for peace according to our understanding.

We seek peace, a full peace, true peace, with true reconciliation between the Jewish nation and the Arab nations.

The first wisdom in the schedule of peace is the ending of the state of war.

Israel does not wish to rule and does not want to disturb or divide. We are looking for peace with all our neighbors, with Egypt, with Jordan, with Syria, with Lebanon.

We wish to have negotiations for a peace treaty. . . .

We wish to establish normal relations between us, as they exist between all the nations, even after many wars.

Let us sign a treaty of peace and establish such a situation forever also in Jerusalem and also in Cairo. And I hope and pray that the day will come when the Egyptian children will also be waving the Israeli and Egyptian flags as the children of Israel were waving in Jerusalem these two flags today.

We propose joint economic cooperation to develop our countries. In the Middle East there are many wonderful countries. The Lord so created them. There are oases and deserts, and it is possible to change the deserts. Let us cooperate together in this area. Let us develop our countries. Let us abolish poverty.

*(Continued on page 37)*



## THE MILITARY BALANCE OF POWER

(Continued from page 32)

impact. It will be the quality of the Syrian solutions to qualitative deficiencies, however, that will largely determine the effectiveness of the Syrian military.

### JORDAN

In a future war, Jordanian participation will be greater than it was in 1973. At that time, only two Jordanian tank brigades sent to aid Syria in the Golan Heights saw any action. That Jordan can now seriously contemplate fighting a major war against Israel is a consequence of a military modernization program started soon after the 1967 Six Day War. Limited Jordanian resources have made implementation long drawn out. Through 1973, most improvements were organizational, limited to the reformation of shattered combat brigades and their incorporation into two tank and three infantry divisions. The tank divisions were strengthened during 1973 and 1974 by the receipt of 184 tanks from the United States (including 52 newly built M-60A1's, the mainstay of both the United States and the Israeli tank forces). Construction of a tank rebuilding facility will permit the modernization of older tanks—again copying the United States and Israeli armies.<sup>8</sup> The quality of the infantry divisions has also been much improved. One division has been mechanized, with a second soon to follow.<sup>9</sup> This was made possible by the purchase from the United States of new M-113A1 armored personnel carriers, M-109 self-propelled artillery and TOW and DRAGON anti-tank missiles. The most important improvement, however, was the creation of a comprehensive Jordanian air defense system. Costing at least \$540 million, this system will eventually comprise 14 Improved Hawk surface-to-air missile batteries, self-propelled anti-aircraft guns, and man-portable Redeye surface-to-air missiles. Though the full system will not be completed until 1979, a substantial portion is now operational. Three Hawk batteries are currently operational and three more will be delivered during the first three months of 1978. Along with other equipment now in service these weapons give Jordan an effective air defense system.

Currently, the Jordanians are almost totally dependent on United States-supplied weapons. The small quantities of equipment obtained elsewhere have come from Spain (4 light transport aircraft), Great Britain

(Bulldog training aircraft), and Iran (F-5A/B jet fighters surplus to Iranian requirements). However, it should be noted that 26 of the 42 F-5A/B's sent by Iran to Jordan in 1975 were transferred to Morocco that same year, leaving only 16 in Jordan.<sup>10</sup>

### OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES

In 1973, a number of other Arab countries sent forces to support the front-line countries, including Algeria, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Tunisia. In general, these forces had little impact. Currently, only Iraq can provide a significant number of units, and they are of doubtful quality. Both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have undertaken major improvement programs. It will be at least two or three more years before either country could be of any strategic importance. But in the context of the current military balance, all these forces are relatively unimportant. The Libyans have purchased several billion dollars worth of military equipment. There is, however, no indication that more than a fraction of this equipment is usable. For the foreseeable future, Libya will be important only as a possible source of arms for the front-line countries.

### CONCLUSIONS

It is evident that all the front-line countries have effected major improvements in their military forces. Unfortunately, the impact of these improvements on the balance of military power is not so discernable. The difficulty is largely a consequence of the fact that military forces are usually optimized for particular kinds of wars. For this reason, the balance of military power is determined by the conditions under which a war is fought.

Military superiority can result from two related developments. The organization of military forces with a multiplicity of potentially usable capabilities ensures that latent capabilities will be available no matter what the nature of a war. Alternatively, decisive superiority in one or more crucial areas can make it possible to force an opponent to fight under unfavorable conditions.

In this context, an examination of the forces currently available to the Arabs and to Israel reveals a number of important facts. The Arab countries have made intensive efforts to develop new capabilities and to enhance existing capabilities. However, a comparison of these improvements with Israeli advances indicates that the improvements made by the Arabs have resulted in little, if any, relative improvement. More significant, the Israeli military now has the capability to meet a variety of highly unfavorable contingencies. The opposing Arab forces in general lack such a capability. Therefore, it will be almost impossible for the Arabs to repeat the early Egyptian successes in the 1973 October War. Equally important, Israel seems to have decisive superiority in a number of areas that could be important in a future war.

<sup>8</sup>The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is responsible for the construction of this \$33-million facility. See Stephen Klaidman, *Washington Post*, May 15, 1975, p. A12.

<sup>9</sup>These supplement 26 F-5E and 4F-5F delivered 1975-76. The U.S. press seems to have largely ignored this transaction.

<sup>10</sup>Plans to convert the third infantry division have been dropped.

Only if they can rectify the deficiencies resulting from the 1973 October War and only if they solve new strategic problems will the Arabs be able to overcome these Israeli advantages. The Israeli military is now superior to the Arab militaries, but the extent of that superiority is totally dependent on the ability of the Arab armies to correct qualitative deficiencies and to implement new strategies to meet the altered situation. Arab ineffectiveness in either area could lead to overwhelming Israeli superiority. But if the Arab states correct their deficiencies and develop new strategies, they might virtually eliminate Israel's superiority. ■

## CHINESE POLITICS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

(Continued from page 14)

when Syria found herself fighting the Palestinians. The arms supply picture is further complicated by a Chinese practice of copying Soviet and East European weapons, making it impossible to determine whether a particular weapon is of Chinese manufacture until it is actually handled and found to have Chinese markings.

### CONCLUSION

During and after the October, 1973, war China made clear her opposition to a cease-fire, denouncing United Nations resolution 338 and calling on the Arabs "to break through the situation of 'no war, no peace,' persist in their unswerving struggle, strengthen unity, and carry their just struggle against aggression and hegemonism through to the end."<sup>22</sup> However, the war provided a clear illustration of the shift in emphasis of Chinese policy after the Cultural Revolution. Although China urged the Arabs to fight on, denouncing any cease-fire regardless of consequences (as she had in 1967), no mass protest demonstrations were organized in China, and the Chinese media did not devote much time and space to the war.

A more recent evidence of "the decline of the armed struggle tactic" is China's lack of public involvement in the Lebanese war—in contrast to her much publicized involvement in Jordan in 1970.

However, Chinese foreign policy has a dual nature: the export of China's concept of armed struggle and diplomatic enterprise, neither of which are ever wholly

neglected. China continues to praise armed struggle within the Israeli-occupied territories, and the emergence of more frequent violence against Israeli occupation authorities after 1974 earned vocal Chinese support. Israel is seen as a legitimate target, one of the "cities" of the world that can be surrounded by guerrillas in rural revolutionary bases. Thus China has on occasion gained ill-will from Arab states like Lebanon and Jordan for her position that "it is entirely just for the Palestinian people to fight on other Arab territory for the restoration of their natural right."<sup>23</sup>

In keeping with a Chinese predisposition for guidance through praise, a NCNA commentator spoke in 1974 of "massive struggle against Israeli occupationists . . . launched among the Palestinian people on the west bank of the Jordan river," and in June, 1975, *Peking Review* saw Palestinian guerrilla activities growing stronger and stronger in the occupied territories and praised the Palestinians for "striking more often and with greater success."

China would once have thought that the Palestinians had sold out if they accepted a West Bank state with an agreement against attacks on Israel. But Chinese pragmatism may well stretch to swallow even a non-revolutionary Palestine, if China might gain a "land base," which she would then seek to mold in her own image. Despite Chinese support for a people's war and her noisy denunciations of the cease-fires of 1967 and 1973, behind the scenes China is now known to be willing to support the moderate Palestinians in efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement, particularly in reference to a West Bank/Gaza state.

One indication of a present Chinese emphasis on a political as opposed to a military solution is China's modified response to the Geneva peace conference on Palestine, a position in keeping with that of moderate Palestinian leadership, Fatah in particular. In 1973, China "dissociated herself from" the Geneva conference saying that "the Chinese delegation is firmly opposed to any attempt by the two superpowers to make behind-the-scenes deals at the expense of the interests of the Arab and Palestinian people."<sup>24</sup> However, in January, 1977, *Peking Review* gave favorable publicity to a joint Egyptian/Syrian communiqué calling for the reconvening of a Geneva conference on the Middle East "with the participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization as an independent party on an equal footing with other participants."<sup>25</sup>

The principle of pragmatism will be a component of Chinese policy in the Middle East as long as China continues to support strategic "contradictions" in the area. One example of Chinese pragmatism is China's continuing effort to keep the door open to future relations with Israel. China's Middle East policy has been characterized by major shifts: in 1971, China's leaders told the Palestinians they would treat their enemy, the Jordanian Hashemite regime, "on the same footing as

<sup>22</sup>"Israel's Four Wars of Aggression," *Peking Review*, vol. 16, no. 46 (November 16, 1973), p. 14.

<sup>23</sup>"Israeli Aggressors' Barbarous Crime," *Peking Review* no. 16 (April 20, 1973), p. 19.

<sup>24</sup>"U.N. Security Council Discusses Peace Conference on Middle East," *Survey of Peoples Republic of China Press*, nos. 5522-5524 (December 26-28, 1973), p. 97 (quoting NCNA of December 17, 1973).

<sup>25</sup>"Egypt and Syria: Establishing a Unified Political Leadership," *Peking Review*, vol. 20, no. 1 (January 1, 1977), p. 48.

the Zionist state.”<sup>26</sup> Yet in April, 1977, China and Jordan established diplomatic relations.

The current Chinese position in the Middle East emphasizes strengthening ties with traditional governments instead of emphasizing support for revolutionary or opposition groups. Whether China will emphasize the diplomatic or revolutionary aspects of her foreign policy of “walking on two legs” depends on how Chinese officials view the local options and the overall world situation. “What renders the concept especially important [for the Middle East] at the present juncture is the Chinese decision to stress the ‘right foot’ or diplomatic element.”<sup>27</sup>

What this Chinese posture means to the future of Sino-Palestinian relations depends on the ability of the moderate Palestinian leadership to participate in and persuade its constituency to accept a political solution. China supports a low level of “people’s revolutionary war” against Israel, but desires an overall peace settlement to eliminate Soviet influence. Both all-out war and a state of “no war, no peace” allow the Soviet Union far too much influence for China’s liking. On the other hand, if a political solution fails and the major Palestinian groups revert to terrorism, there is likely to be a serious rupture in the close ties between China and the Palestinians. ■

excluded every organized independent Palestinian group; none could demonstrate organizational strength within any territories considered to be potentially part of a Palestinian homeland—the West Bank, Jordan, or Gaza. Using the same formula, the Begin government rejected Syrian President Hafez al-Assad’s suggestion that Arab League representatives go to Geneva on behalf of the Palestinians.

At this writing in late November, United States reaction to the Egyptian-Israeli détente has been generally favorable. Nonetheless, Egypt, Israel and the other Arab states may not be able to reach any compromise on the basic issues—the future of the Palestinian Arabs and the Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab lands. President Sadat’s November 20 address to the Knesset unequivocally demanded the establishment of an independent Palestinian state; Prime Minister Begin, in turn, reiterated his willingness to negotiate only with “the legitimate spokesmen of the Arabs of Israel.” President Sadat followed almost painstakingly the injunction of the Saudi regime that “any Arab initiative . . . must come from a united position.” His advocacy of a unified Arab stand was intended to reemphasize the limitations of the moderate Arab bloc.\*\* Thus the future is still unpredictable. ■

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## CURRENT DOCUMENTS

(Continued from page 34)

Let us open our countries to free passage. Come you to us and we shall visit with you. I am prepared to announce, Mr. Chairman, today that our country is open for all citizens of Egypt.

And, therefore, I renew my invitation to the President of Syria to follow in your footsteps, Mr. President, to come to us in order to open negotiations for purposes of peace between Israel and Syria and the signing of a peace agreement between them.

I invite King Hussein to visit us and to discuss with us on all the problems that require discussions between him and us.

And also the legitimate spokesmen of the Arabs of Israel, I invite them to come and meet with us for discussions on our joint policies, on justice, on social justice, on peace, on joint mutual respect.

Mr. Chairman, it is my obligation today to tell our guest, and the ears of all those nations who are watching and listening to us today, of our ties between our Jewish nation and this land. The President referred to the Balfour Declaration. No, my Mr. President, we did not take strange land, we returned to our homeland. The tie between our nation and this land is eternal.

I propose, according to the accepted majority of this Parliament, that everything is open to negotiation.

And let us conduct the negotiations as equals. There are no victors, there are no losers.

With all of the accepted ability to convince one another, let us conduct the negotiations, as I ask and propose, to continue until we arrive at a treaty of peace between us.

We are not only prepared to sit with the representatives of Egypt but with the representatives of Jordan and Syria and Lebanon in a peace conference in Geneva. We have suggested to reconstitute the Geneva conference on the basis of the two decisions of the Security Council—242 and 338. ■

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## U.S. POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

(Continued from page 4)

whelming bulk of the arms transfers to Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Israel have already been accomplished; some of the congressional opposition to arms transfers is simply safe rhetoric, after the decisions have been made. In other words, the President’s proposals to limit arms transfers were already outdated as far as Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Israel were concerned, and congressional objections to the arms trade are also outdated. Remaining arms contracts refer primarily to the maintenance of weapons already transferred. More probable than significant across-the-board limitations is a compromise that will restrict the sales of complex weapons systems, as was the case with the proposed sale of the AWACS (airborne radar systems) to Iran, defeated by Congress in July.

After Egyptian President Sadat’s historic visit to Jerusalem in November, 1977, United States strategic interests and policies in the Middle East remained in delicate balance. The Israeli Cabinet has consistently rejected the notion that any group (like the PLO) without a territorial power base can serve as a spokesman for the Palestinians at Geneva. Their formula has

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\*\*For excerpts from the speeches by Sadat and Begin, see page 34 of this issue.

## SOVIET POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

*(Continued from page 9)*

mediator, the United States produced an outline of the substantive problems separating the antagonists and a set of proposals that, in Washington's opinion, were to form the backbone of the peace settlement. Many of the new ideas were tested during extended diplomatic contacts between United States officials and the representatives of the Arab and Israeli governments. Since the U.S.S.R. had not been invited to participate in Washington's diplomatic efforts, it proceeded to protect its interests by announcing its determination to remain in the Middle East "game" and by attempting to shore up its remaining positions in the Arab-Israeli sector.

The seriousness with which Moscow viewed the situation is indicated by the fact that Brezhnev himself delivered a major policy statement on the Arab-Israeli conflict. On March 21, 1977, the Secretary-General addressed the Sixteenth Congress of the Soviet Trade Unions, reaffirming the Kremlin's conviction that peace in the Middle East was the joint responsibility of both superpowers. Specifically, Brezhnev held that the U.S.S.R. was entitled to participate in the peace-making process on an equal footing with the United States because of its official status as a cochairman of the Geneva Conference and because the Soviet Union is "situated in direct proximity" to the Middle East.

As for peace in the area, Brezhnev stated that it should be codified in a document formalizing Israeli withdrawal from all the territories she occupied in 1967. Once completed (in several stages and in accord with a precise timetable), the evacuation would signal the termination of war and the arrival of peace. Within its context, the parties to the conflict would undertake to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of all states in the area. The final agreement would also recognize the right of the Palestinians to form their own independent state. The former antagonists would be separated by demilitarized zones on both sides of the border and the general settlement would be guaranteed by the Security Council and/or the major powers. The region's major international waterways, the Suez Canal, the Gulf of Aqaba, and the Straits of Tiran, would be open to ships of all countries.

Substantively, the speech contained nothing new (on the questions of peace, borders and the Palestinians, the Soviet position has remained virtually unchanged since 1969); yet it was important because it was presented by Brezhnev himself and because it was timed to precede the arrival in Moscow of United States Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. Since it was presented in a factual manner, was devoid of propaganda-type accusations usually leveled against the United States and Israel on such occasions and was explicit on the protection of some basic Israeli interests, the address was clearly

intended to remind the United States that the U.S.S.R. refused to accept American supremacy in the Middle East but would cooperate on the basis of equality.

Brezhnev's efforts were crowned with some success. As stated in the joint communiqué issued at the conclusion of Vance's visit to Moscow on March 31, "special attention was given to the situation in the Middle East," with both sides agreeing that "cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union, as cochairmen of the Geneva Conference, is essential to bringing about a just and lasting peace in the area." The next step formalizing United States-Soviet cooperation was taken during the Vance-Gromyko meeting in Geneva (May 18-21, 1977). The joint communiqué contained a lengthy reference to the Middle East and, in addition to the sentiments expressed in the earlier Moscow document, included a provision for regular machinery for bilateral consultations and a timetable for the convening of the Geneva Conference. Finally, in early October, the superpowers issued another call for the resumption of the conference before the end of 1977.

The Vance-Gromyko statements and the October declaration indicated that Washington is not averse to seeking Soviet cooperation in efforts to break the current Arab-Israeli impasse. At the same time, basic differences separate the superpowers and will probably lead to future frictions. Among them are the problems of the borders and the Palestinian question.

Indicative of Moscow's realization of the relative weakness of its Middle East position have been Soviet attempts to improve relations with the Arab "confrontation states" and the PLO. The Kremlin's efforts in Egypt and Syria have already been mentioned; while drawing a blank in Cairo, Soviet leaders reestablished a semblance of normalcy in their dealings with Damascus. All in all, however, the U.S.S.R. is clearly less than pleased with the current state of affairs; thus, in 1977, Soviet leaders made a concerted effort to upgrade their relations with the PLO.

The most dramatic manifestation of this trend was PLO leader Yasir Arafat's April 6 meeting with Brezhnev. In the past, the Kremlin extended the Palestine Liberation Organization vigorous political support, supplemented with occasional military aid, but there were few direct high-level contacts between them. (For example, during eight visits to Moscow since 1970, Arafat reportedly had not met Brezhnev.) Moreover, the Kremlin carefully avoided giving any appearance of formal recognition of the PLO. For his part, Arafat was incensed at the Soviet's failure to aid the Palestinians during the Lebanese war and refused to go to the U.S.S.R. while hostilities were in progress.

In 1977, as a result of President Carter's diplomatic offensive, Moscow and the PLO concluded that they needed each other more than ever. The Kremlin had attempted to use the Palestinians to compensate for the



erosion of its positions in Cairo and, to a lesser degree, Damascus, while Arafat needed Moscow's support to ensure that the PLO's interests would be protected at Geneva and that any United States-Soviet rapprochement would not be made at the expense of the Palestinians. Moreover, the Soviet connection would strengthen Arafat's hand vis-a-vis the United States and some of his wavering Arab "brothers." The April meeting with Brezhnev seems to have reassured the Palestinian leader.

A similar atmosphere prevailed during Arafat's late August, 1977, visit to Moscow. The communique, published on September 1, stated that

much attention was given to the problem of ensuring the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine, including their right to establish their independent state and [to effect] the return of the Arab Palestinian refugees to their homes in accordance with the UN resolutions.

This statement underscored the fact that the U.S.S.R., unlike the United States, supported the Palestinian right to return without any extraneous conditions. In addition, the communiqué referred to the Geneva Conference as the only legitimate forum for conducting negotiations on the Arab-Israeli conflict and declared that PLO participation at Geneva was indispensable.

Whether the conference will meet in December, 1977, and whether the PLO will be represented there are questions that cannot be answered at this writing. But even if all the procedural problems are resolved and the conference convenes in the near future, the road to peace is clearly an obstacle course that no ingenuity or good intentions may be able to overcome. It is equally unlikely that meaningful peace can be established in the Middle East without Soviet cooperation—the mere availability of a superpower hostile to the peace settlement will prove an almost irresistible temptation to those Arabs who, for whatever reason, believe that their interests are not being adequately considered.

In his perceptive article in the October, 1977, issue of *Current History*, John C. Campbell observed that, having hit an all-time low, Soviet fortunes in the Middle East have nowhere to go but up. In light of the fact that the United States may face an impossible task in its self-imposed efforts to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict, a reversal in the current situation—which is still favorable to the West—is likely. How the United States and the Soviet Union will act in the face of these immense problems remains to be seen. One thing appears certain: the decisions they make in the near future will affect not only the Middle East but the rest of the world as well. ■

## ISRAEL'S YEAR OF DECISION

(Continued from page 18)

dorsed the "legitimate rights of the Palestinians," which the United States had not previously endorsed. The

joint statement generated substantial concern in Israel and among Israel's supporters in the United States. Israel focused her attention on the increased involvement of the Soviet Union in the settlement process and on the reference to the "rights" of the Palestinians. In Israel's view, this set the stage for a Palestinian state. The United States seemed to be moving toward accepting the idea of a separate Palestinian state; it seemed to be leaning toward an imposed solution; and it fostered the impression that it might recognize and deal with the PLO.

Efforts to reduce the strain and tension caused by the statement followed. In his address to the United Nations General Assembly on October 4, President Carter focused on the need for a "true peace" based on Resolutions 242 and 338; he spoke of secure and recognized borders; and he noted that "the commitment of the United States to Israel's security is unquestionable." He also declared again that the United States did not intend to impose a settlement.

There were also meetings in New York between Cyrus Vance and Moshe Dayan (and also between President Carter and Dayan) that served to reduce the level of anxiety and to fashion a procedure that might facilitate the effort to reach Geneva. A "working paper" that dealt with reconvening the Geneva Conference was devised by the President, Vance and Dayan at a meeting in New York. Although substantive differences between Israel and the United States remained, the working paper had as its basic aims the avoidance of a United States-Israeli confrontation and an effort to clear procedural obstacles on the path to Geneva. Israel's Cabinet unanimously approved the "working paper."<sup>15</sup> In part, Israeli approval was intended to demonstrate Israel's flexibility in cooperating with the Carter administration. Nonetheless, Israel and the United States did not agree on the role of the Palestinians (especially the PLO) in the settlement process, the concept of a Palestinian homeland, the extent of Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories and the shape of Israel's final borders.

The Arab-Israeli conflict remains the central issue for Israel. The quest for peace and the crucial role of the United States in that effort are thus major foreign policy concerns.<sup>16</sup> The enduring United States-Israeli relationship has traditionally been characterized by a general consensus on the principles of the relationship and the elements of the Arab-Israeli conflict. (The achievement of an Arab-Israeli peace settlement and

<sup>15</sup>For the text see *The New York Times*, October 14, 1977. The working paper was approved by the Israeli Cabinet on October 11, 1977.

<sup>16</sup>For a detailed examination of the effort to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict and of the United States-Israeli relationship see Bernard Reich, *Quest for Peace: United States-Israel Relations and the Arab-Israeli Conflict* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1977).

United States support for Israel's survival, security and well-being remain basic elements of United States policy. Although this support has been restated on numerous occasions by President Carter and other members of his administration, a divergence on many specific policies has developed. This is not unexpected; over the years there have been many problems and controversies on specific aspects of the relationship within the broader parameters established by the United States-Israeli consensus.

In 1977, the areas of concord and discord became more obvious. Israel seemed increasingly concerned about the nature of specific United States policies and potential United States "pressures," and the United States seemed afraid that a propitious moment for peace and a movement toward a settlement would be lost. The new administration moved toward reconvening Geneva and articulated some of the specifics of its conception of peace; and the new Begin administration defined its positions and policies. Increasingly, the clashes between the two powers became more vocal and more obvious. The election earthquake in Israel, the Sadat visit, the Carter initiative to reconvene the Geneva conference and to seek a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict thus marked the end of the "time of tranquility" and inaugurated a period of crucial decision for Israel on domestic and foreign policy issues that appeared likely to continue for some time. ■

## LEBANON'S CRISIS

(Continued from page 23)

is not sufficient to overcome risks to investment and to the renewed utilization of Lebanon as a center for finance and business.

### THE FUTURE LEBANESE "FORMULA"

The covenant of 1943, the year in which Lebanon gained independence from the French mandate, established Lebanon's unique confessional system. It provided for an essentially unitary state, with a strict apportionment of powers and positions among various religious sects. Essentially, the covenant favored Lebanon's Maronite Christians by granting them the presidency, control of Parliament; tradition allotted them other key positions including that of army commander. The Sunni Muslims were assigned the prime ministry, the Shi'as, the speaker of Parliament, and so on. Christian economic predominance reinforced the favored political position of that community, and the result was a uniquely Western-oriented state in the midst of oriental culture and growing Arab socialism.

Although many put it more gently and less simplis-

<sup>18</sup>Charles Malik, "Lebanon: Between Hope and Despair," *Monday Morning*, May 16-22, 1977.

<sup>19</sup>Yvonne Surssock Cochrane, "Draft of a Constitution of a Federal System," *Al 'Amal*, March, 1977.

tically, essentially Lebanon's times of travail began when its Muslim community was reinforced by outside assistance to the extent that the unique and favored position of the Christians was threatened. The outside powers that have upset the balance were Syria in the 1958 revolutionary period, Egypt during the years of President Gamal 'Abd-ul Nasser, and currently, the Palestinian fedayeen. The difference is that the fedayeen not only reinforce the Muslims indirectly, but are also physically present in Lebanon and thus pose their own direct threat to the Christian-dominated state.

The upshot, a basic cause of the civil war, is that the Christian community feels severely threatened, not only as a dominant force but as a separate entity at all. Fedayeen leader Abu Iyad's gratuitous statement during the winter of 1976 that "the road to Tel Aviv leads through Juniyah" (the de facto Christian capital), provided Christian groups with "evidence" of "true" Palestinian intentions.

Charles Malik, Christian intellectual leader and former president of the United Nations General Assembly, put the Christian dilemma eloquently:

Whoever wishes to see Lebanon not free, not open, not pluralist; whoever aims at assimilating Lebanon to something other than its identical self; whoever craves to see Lebanon monolithic and uniform; and whoever intends to destroy or undermine or reduce, immediately or protractedly, the plenary freedom, security and self-mastery of Lebanon's Christian community; whoever entertains these things must reckon on the opposition of the Lebanese Front (Christian).<sup>18</sup>

Lebanon's Christians saw their predominance and even their independent cultural existence threatened in 1975 and 1976. Their reaction was to fortify that predominance. The danger that this effort might not succeed has led to an undercurrent of largely Christian-inspired proposals for revision of Lebanon's traditional formula to allow greater administrative autonomy for its various component religio-geographic sectors.

Most of these proposals include a Christian-dominated central government. During the days of Christian reverses, however, various formulas providing for the outright partition of the country and the declaration of an independent Christian state were proposed. The discussion has evolved since then, with "partition" being replaced by slightly milder words like "decentralization," "cantonization," "regionalism," or "confederation." A "Draft of a Constitution of a Federal System," largely inspired by the Swiss constitution, appeared in the Phalangist organ *Al 'Amal* in March, 1977.<sup>19</sup>

A probably authoritative statement made by Phalange Political Bureau member Karim Pakradouni in May, 1977, presents current mainline Christian thinking on the institutional future of the state:

I think the essence of the 1943 formula will remain unchanged. What needs to be changed in the formula is not its essence, but its institutional expression, i.e., the

Lebanese regime. The said change should involve added administrative decentralization coupled with increased political centralization. This is because administrative decentralization will lead to economic, social and cultural development. . . . We should move from obsolete parliamentarianism to a presidential regime. For this to take place, we need three fundamental reforms in our institutions—namely, the creation of a socio-economic national council, a bicameral system of representation (with the Senate representing the communities and Parliament, the parties), and extension of the President's prerogatives.<sup>20</sup>

The practical thrust of this plan may be to reinforce the division of the country into separate and distinct cultural and political units, while creating a strong centralized presidency for foreign policy and national defense, presumably under effective Christian control.

The reaction of Sunni and Shi'a Muslims to these statements by Christian leaders is inevitably one of suspicion. Shi'a leader Musa al Sadr commented derogatorily on what he perceived as the Christian trend toward a "multilateral society" by describing it as follows:

The [Christian] Front began to insist and work for the establishment of new universities and colleges, other than those already established in Lebanon, especially in the area under its control. The Front founded the Research and Studies Center and provided it with electronic computers. It established the so-called Palace of Culture. It published and promoted a number of books including a book entitled "The Maronite Nation," discussing the traditions, main features and characteristics of the Maronites. If such a nation—the Maronite state—is created in the Arab world, what will the situation be? How could Lebanon survive with these entities or with the Maronite state? Such a situation would lead to fragmentation.<sup>21</sup>

The partition of Lebanon would create unviable economic units that could exist only with massive external aid. In addition, it is not in the specific economic interest of the Muslim sector to lose the economically more advanced Christian element of the nation. Finally, outright partition would, in effect, create another sectarian state based on religious identity in the area—a second Israel.

## CONCLUSION

While it is not possible to forecast the future based on trends in Lebanon during 1977, several problems remain evident.

- The Syrian-imposed peace remains firm, but cannot by itself resolve the major underlying issues.
- The future structure of the state remains undecided, and potentially violent debate looms over the degree of decentralization, if any, which should occur.
- The Palestinian issue is not resolved and the Shtura agreement of the summer of 1977, as yet not fully imple-

mented, apparently faces serious resistance by some parties to the conflict. The battle of south Lebanon seems incapable of rapid solution despite slow and sporadic progress toward resolution.

- The Lebanese army exists only in inchoate form, and the outline of a future reunified army including Muslims and Christians is as yet unclear.

- The economy has made the kind of tentative advance a relatively more stable environment would automatically produce, but has not received the infusions of capital and investment that could revitalize it meaningfully.

- Most war goals of the domestic parties to the Lebanese civil war have not been reached. The Christians have not regained the security and power in Lebanon they desire; the Muslims have not obtained serious social or political reform; the Palestinians are now restricted and have lost an environment in which they were relatively free to develop and operate as they wished.

An optimistic prognosis for Lebanon's future must await progress towards the resolution of her long-term problems. As yet, this process has been imperfect indeed. Meanwhile, the Pax Syriana remains in effect, but it cannot last forever nor can it by itself resolve Lebanon's agony. ■

## THE ARAB PALESTINIANS

(Continued from page 28)

an Arab-Israeli peace is a so-called "homeland" for the Palestinians, some sort of separate national entity to be established in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Having adopted this position in principle, the Carter administration has begun to put more and more emphasis on the issue of Israel's building settlements (or as the Israelis euphemistically put it, "creating facts") in the West Bank. Since these settlements are being established where a homeland for the Palestinians might eventually be created, following this line of reasoning no further Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip should be allowed.

Furthermore, President Carter has personally made it known to the PLO that PLO participation in any future peace conference will depend on PLO recognition of Israel and adherence "more or less" to United Nations Resolution 242. In the past, the PLO has refused to accept this resolution because it is viewed as implying that the Palestinians have no status other than "refugees." This departure from the previous United States stance (which ruled out any participation short of recognition of the PLO by the state of Israel) has raised serious misgivings in the minds of many Americans about United States intentions to negotiate with the PLO.

President Jimmy Carter was also a target of the former Prime Minister of Israel, Yitzhak Rabin, who held him partly responsible for the Israeli Labor party's election defeat at the hands of the Likud bloc in the spring of 1977. Rabin and other Israeli officials have also expressed dismay at the joint United States-Soviet policy statement of October 1, 1977, which affirmed

<sup>20</sup>"Interview with Karim Pakradouni," *Monday Morning*, May 23-29, 1977.

<sup>21</sup>"Interview with Shi'ite Leader Musa al Sadr," *Al Musawwar* (Cairo), May 27, 1977.

that the "legitimate rights of the Palestinian people" are a fundamental part of any contemplated settlement. The United States spoke for the first time of the Palestinians' rights, rather than interests.

Although most Arab states were pleased with the evolution of United States policy on the Palestinian question, the PLO continued to seek the destruction of Israel. The PLO Council that met late in August, 1977, in Damascus to discuss President Carter's proposal that the PLO accept Resolution 242 decided to turn down the President's proposal.

It is difficult to see [contended Secretary of State Cyrus Vance] how progress can be made on the Palestine question, since the PLO up to this point has refused the right of Israel to exist or to recognize the framework of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

There is no doubt that the United States will remain entangled with the Palestine problem for some time to come. Apparently Israel will not negotiate with the PLO. The PLO does not seem ready as yet to modify its charter and accept Israel as a sovereign Jewish state.

In order to resolve the Arab-Israeli crisis, one must understand several unchanging realities, key elements that directly contribute to the crisis. The Palestinian people are one such indisputable element. They exist. They have their own national aspirations. To a degree, they have their own culture and their own history.

Israel is another element without which peace is unattainable. Whether the PLO approves or not, Israel is in the Middle East to stay. While peace may be negotiated with or without the PLO, no peace can be negotiated without Israel and the Palestinian people. This is the crux of the whole problem. Israel must accept the Palestinians as an entity separate from the PLO and begin a dialogue with them. These efforts must be supported by the United States and must eventually receive the endorsement of Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

The American people must not show any special leniency toward the PLO, for it is not in the interest of Israel or the Palestinians as a people for the United States to recognize the PLO, even by implication, without allowing the Palestinians to elect their own representatives. The extremists and the "hardliners" among the Arab states, like Syria and Algeria, are helping to perpetuate the stalemate by insisting that the PLO is the sole representative of the Palestinian cause. The United States must not adopt a similar stance. Realistically, the United States cannot expect Israel to deal with a terrorist group that is committed by its own charter to the dismantlement of Israel. The United States may, however, persuade Israel to deal realistically with the Palestine problem—a problem that Israel will, by the force of events, have to recognize, if she has not already done so. Here the United States has some leverage.

The gradual shift by the United States toward meeting Arab negotiating demands has not improved the

prospects for peace. As long as the extremist Arab states and the PLO continue to sense a possible United States-Israeli schism, they will have every incentive to remain intransigent. This argument should not be regarded as "pro" or "con" any particular side, but is on the side of progress toward peace. Israel and the Palestinians are the central components in the Middle East dilemma, neither of whom can benefit from a lasting peace if it is achieved at the expense of the other.

If the United States continues to view United Nations Resolution 242 as the basis for a negotiated settlement between Israel and the Arab states, then the United States must agree with Israel and the moderate Arab states, namely Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, on an exact interpretation of that resolution. If the United States begins to dilute the resolution by introducing new elements, neither Israel nor the Arab states will have any incentive to adhere to what substance is left.

The reference to "refugees" in Resolution 242 could indeed be debated; it is possible, for example, not to view the Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as refugees. But introducing a change in the Palestinians' status does not mean that an outside body, like the PLO should be recognized to speak on their behalf. The Palestinian population is capable of producing its own representatives. The new generation of Palestinian leaders may be subjected to harassment and hardship by PLO members or other leftist groups, but these new leaders should be prepared to take the risk, knowing that the PLO has, after 20 years, failed to produce what it has promised.

The United States and Israel must cooperate to find a solution to the Palestine problem. United States equivocation will only force Israel to take an even harder stance. It will also further strengthen the hands of the extremist Arab elements and the PLO, who believe not only that time is working to their advantage but also that, considering the new petro-political realities of the Middle East, the United States will eventually be compelled to compromise her commitment toward Israel. It is clear that lack of progress toward solving the Palestine problem within the context of an overall Arab-Israeli peace agreement will set the stage for another war—a war in which there will be no victors in the real sense, a war that will serve the Palestinians' interests the least of all.

A joint Arab delegation to a Geneva peace conference that would include some Palestinian representatives might prove to be a valuable forward step. However, it is naive to assume that the makeup of the Geneva conference will necessarily determine its final outcome. Israeli acceptance of the Arab Palestinians as an independent entity and the acceptance of Israel by the Arab states and the Palestinians as an independent sovereign Jewish state with the right to exist are the real prerequisites to the success of a Geneva peace conference.



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# THE MONTH IN REVIEW

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*A Current History chronology covering the most important events of November, 1977, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.*

## INTERNATIONAL

### International Labor Organization (ILO)

Nov. 1—U.S. President Jimmy Carter withdraws the U.S. from membership in the International Labor Organization (ILO).

### International Terrorism

(See also *Germany, West*)

Nov. 2—Dutch millionaire Maurits Caransa is freed by his kidnappers upon payment of a \$4 million ransom; his abductors are apparently not connected with any terrorist organization.

### Middle East

(See also *Intl, U.N.*)

Nov. 15—Via U.S. diplomats in Jerusalem and Cairo, Israeli Prime Minister Begin transmits a formal invitation to Egyptian President Sadat to visit Israel and address the Knesset.

Nov. 16—Iraq, Libya and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine condemn Sadat's projected trip to Israel. President Sadat flies to Syria to confer with Syrian President Hafez al-Assad.

Nov. 17—Egyptian President Sadat formally accepts the invitation of Israeli Prime Minister Menahem Begin to make a 36-hour visit to Israel.

Nov. 18—60 Egyptian officials arrive in Israel to aid in preparations for Sadat's arrival.

Tunisia, Morocco and the Sudan indicate their approval of Sadat's visit.

Nov. 19—Sadat arrives in Jerusalem. He is the first Arab leader to visit Israel since her founding and is met by Israeli Prime Minister Menahem Begin and Israeli President Ephraim Katzir.

Nov. 20—Sadat addresses the Israeli Knesset in Jerusalem; among other things he tells the Israelis that "If you want to live with us in this part of the world, in sincerity I tell you we welcome you among us with all security and safety." Sadat also emphasizes that the Arabs expect the return of all Israeli-occupied territory.

In his reply to Sadat, Israeli Prime Minister Begin ignores the question of the Palestinians but says that all questions and problems are negotiable.

Egyptian President Sadat returns to Cairo to an enthusiastic welcome.

In a joint communiqué, Sadat and Begin pledge "no more war" and agree to talk further.

Nov. 22—In an interview in Jerusalem, Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Yigael Yadin says that Israel is now "convinced" that Egypt really wants peace.

Syrian President Assad meets with Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) leaders in Damascus to consider reprisals against Egypt for President Sadat's "capitulation" to Israel.

Nov. 24—The Egyptian Arab Socialist Union, the ruling party, invites Palestinian leaders from both Israel and the Israeli-occupied West Bank of the Jordan to Cairo to discuss the results of President Sadat's trip to Israel.

Nov. 25—Syrian Minister of Information Ahmed Iskandar charges that Egyptian President Sadat's trip to Israel has damaged the chances for a Geneva parley by dividing the Arab world although he says Syria is not prepared to join a "rejectionist" group.

Officials in Amman, Jordan, report that Jordanian King Hussein is maintaining a neutral attitude toward Sadat's trip.

Nov. 26—Egyptian President Sadat invites all parties in the Middle East conflict including Israel, the United States and the Soviet Union to send representatives to Cairo for talks preliminary to a Geneva conference.

Syrian Foreign Minister Abdel Halim Khaddam says Syria "will not go to Geneva and we all are going to a refusal summit in Tripoli on Thursday."

Nov. 27—Egypt's Acting Foreign Minister Butros Ghali issues official invitations to interested parties to meet in Cairo in preliminary meetings to prepare for a Geneva conference.

According to spokesman Mahmoud Labadi, the PLO will not take part in the Cairo talks, but instead will go to Tripoli where the Arab rejectionists will be meeting.

Nov. 28—Israeli Prime Minister Begin tells the Knesset that Eliahu Ben-Elissar and Meir Rosenne will go to Cairo to take part in informal talks called by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat.

President Assad of Syria says that Sadat's efforts at negotiating peace are a "new obstacle to peace and [have] lessened the prospects of a Geneva conference."

A Jordanian government spokesman says that Jordan's representative can attend a Cairo meeting "provided all parties to the Middle East conflict also attend."

Nov. 29—The U.S. formally accepts Sadat's invitation to attend a conference in Cairo on the Middle East.

Nov. 30—An Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesman rejects U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim's proposal of November 29 that preparatory talks be held on U.N. "neutral ground" before the Geneva conference.

After talks in Moscow between Soviet President Leonid I. Brezhnev and Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam a communiqué is issued saying that the Soviet Union will support Middle East talks at Geneva but will not take part in the Cairo peace talks.

## United Nations

(See also *Middle East*)

Nov. 3—By consensus, the General Assembly adopts a resolution condemning airplane hijacking and asking all countries to increase security measures and agree to prosecute or extradite hijackers.

Nov. 4—By a unanimous vote, the 15 members of the Security Council approve a resolution embargoing military supplies for South Africa because of South Africa's racial policies.

Nov. 25—The General Assembly votes 102 to 4, with 29 abstentions, to condemn the Israeli occupation of Arab territories held since the 1967 war.

## AFGHANISTAN

Nov. 16—In Kabul, Minister of Planning Avi Ahmad Khoram is assassinated by gunmen.

## ANGOLA

(See *Cuba*)

## ARGENTINA

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Nov. 21—In Buenos Aires, U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance meets with President Jorge Rafael Videla to discuss Argentina's development of nuclear energy plants.

## AUSTRALIA

Nov. 18—In Sydney, Treasurer Phillip R. Lynch resigns following charges of corruption by members of the opposition in Parliament.

## BRAZIL

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Nov. 16—In Washington, D.C., U.S. State Department spokesman Hodding Carter 3d announces the Department's approval of the export of 54 tons of low-enriched uranium to Brazil.

Nov. 22—In Brasilia, U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance meets with Foreign Minister Antônio Azeredo da Silveira and President Ernesto Geisel to discuss limiting the spread of nuclear weapons. Vance says that the West German plan to build a reprocessing plant in Brazil to recover plutonium could end further U.S. exports of uranium or nuclear technology to Brazil.

## BURMA

(See *Cambodia*)

## CAMBODIA

(See also *U.K.; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Nov. 28—In Bangkok, President Khien Samphan confers with Burmese President Ne Win; Win is the first head of state to visit Cambodia since the Communist takeover in 1975.

## CANADA

Nov. 2—Quebec Premier René Lévesque begins an official visit to France to garner support for his separatist movement.

Nov. 3—In Paris, French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing awards Lévesque the Grand Order of the Legion of Honor and affirms France's "understanding, confidence and support" for any direction the separatist movement may take.

Nov. 4—At the end of his 3-day visit to France, Lévesque and Giscard issue a joint communiqué in which they agree to meet annually.

Nov. 9—Solicitor General Francis Fox tells the House of Commons that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police have opened and copied personal mail since 1954 to monitor subversive activities.

Nov. 10—In testimony before the House of Commons in Ottawa, Fox admits that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police have been raiding and bugging private homes when subversion was suspected since the 1950's.

## CHINA

(See also *U.S.S.R.; Vietnam*)

Nov. 4—In Peking, Deputy Prime Minister Wang Chen tells visiting British businessmen that China intends

to purchase Britain's Hawker Harrier vertical takeoff fighter planes.

## CUBA

(See also *Somalia*)

Nov. 4—In Washington, D.C., a U.S. State Department spokesman estimates that there are almost 150 Cuban military advisers in Ethiopia, a threefold increase since May, 1977.

Nov. 11—In Washington, D.C., U.S. President Jimmy Carter claims that there are nearly 20,000 Cuban troops now stationed in Angola. He says that Cuban troops "are now spreading into other countries in Africa, like Mozambique, [and] recently building up their so-called advisers in Ethiopia. We consider this to be a threat to the permanent peace in Africa."

Nov. 14—U.S. State Department spokesman Hodding Carter 3d revises the estimate of Cuban troops in Ethiopia to 550 men, 150 of whom are nonmilitary.

## CYPRUS

Nov. 12—The Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus elects Bishop Chrysostomos of Paphos to replace the late Archbishop Makarios as Archbishop of Cyprus.

## EGYPT

(See also *Intl, Middle East; Greece*)

Nov. 17—President Anwar Sadat returns from talks in Damascus with Syrian President Hafez al-Assad.

In Cairo, in apparent opposition to Sadat's proposed trip to Israel, Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmy resigns his post; President Sadat names Mohammed Riad to replace him. Riad resigns and Sadat appoints Butros Ghali as Foreign Minister.

Nov. 20—In Jerusalem, President Sadat addresses the Israeli Knesset.

Nov. 23—In Cairo, 3 Palestinian officials, Gamal Sourani, head of the Cairo Palestine Liberation Organization office, Haroun Rashid, Sourani's deputy, and Rabbi Awad, Cairo representative of Al Fatah, are deported for criticizing President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem.

Nov. 27—Acting Foreign Minister Ghali issues formal invitations to any interested parties to meet in Cairo to prepare for a Geneva conference.

## EL SALVADOR

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

## ETHIOPIA

(See also *Cuba; Somalia; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Nov. 2—In Addis Ababa, Lieutenant Gizew Temesgen, chief of information in the Military Council, and Guta Sernesa, a member of the General Urban Dwellers Association Assembly, are shot and killed by assassins.

Nov. 14—The government confirms reports that Lieutenant Colonel Atnafu Abate, the 2d highest ranking official in the Military Council, was executed yesterday for anti-revolutionary crimes.

Nov. 23—In the northern Ogaden region, Somali forces assault Harar, one of two remaining Ethiopian strongholds.

## FRANCE

(See *Canada; Mauritania*)

## GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)

(See also *Intl, Intl Terrorism*)

Nov. 5—The Commando Red Army Faction B.E.R., a German terrorist group, threatens to blow up three Lufthansa airliners in flight some time after November 15 to avenge the deaths of 3 convicted terrorists in a Stuttgart prison on October 18.

Nov. 21—Chancellor Helmut Schmidt arrives in Warsaw, Poland, for a 5-day official visit; the first official visit by a West German Chancellor since the 2 countries established diplomatic relations in 1972.

## GREECE

Nov. 20—Nationwide parliamentary elections are held.

Nov. 21—With more than 90 percent of yesterday's vote counted, the New Democracy party of Prime Minister Constantine Caramanlis wins 42.2 percent of the vote, or 174 seats; the Panhellenic Socialist Movement led by Andreas Papandreo wins 25.2 percent of the vote, or 91 seats; the Democratic Center Union led by George Mavros wins 12.2 percent of the vote, or 15 seats; and the Communist Party of the Exterior wins 8.9 percent of the vote, or 11 seats. For the first time in 30 years, the left wins more than 35 percent of the vote.

## GUATEMALA

(See U.S., *Foreign Policy*)

## HUNGARY

(See U.S., *Foreign Policy*)

## INDIA

Nov. 5—The governments of India and Pakistan sign an agreement to regulate the flow of the Ganges River at the Farakka Barrage.

Nov. 22—The death toll from a cyclone that hit Andhra Pradesh November 19 is estimated at 10,000.

## IRAN

(See also U.S., *Foreign Policy*)

Nov. 16—In Washington, D.C., at the end of 2 days of meetings with U.S. President Jimmy Carter, Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlevi says he will actively work to keep oil prices at this year's level at the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) meeting in Caracas in December.

## ISRAEL

(See also *Intl, Middle East, U.N.*)

Nov. 1—Members of the General Federation of Labor stage a 3d day of strikes to protest the government's recently announced economic programs.

Nov. 6—The unions call a halt to the week-long series of strikes in order to present their demands to the government.

At the request of the Vatican, the government commutes the sentence of Archbishop Hilarion Capucci, a Roman Catholic priest who was convicted of smuggling arms into the Israeli-occupied West Bank area for Palestinian guerrillas. Capucci is put on a plane for Rome.

Nov. 9—Egyptian President Anwar Sadat offers to come to Israel to address the Knesset.

Nov. 20—President Sadat addresses the Knesset; his speech and that of Prime Minister Begin are broadcast worldwide by satellite.

Nov. 25—Energy Minister Yitzhak Modai announces that Israel has found oil in the occupied Sinai desert along the Gulf of Suez.

Nov. 27—In Bonn, Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan arrives

for a 4-day official visit to discuss Israeli-West German relations and Israeli-European Economic Community relations.

## ITALY

(See also *Poland*)

Nov. 15—Under a new program to end civil disorder, the authorities issue arrest warrants for 89 left-wing militants who are accused of encouraging sedition in the military.

## JAPAN

Nov. 24—On the Tokyo foreign exchange market, the yen rises to 240 yen to the U.S. dollar. The yen is at its highest ratio to the dollar since World War II; it has appreciated 22 percent in 1977.

Nov. 28—Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda shuffles his Cabinet; he names Nobuihiko Ushiba, former Ambassador to the U.S., to the newly created post of Minister for External Affairs; Kiichi Miyazawa is named Director General for Economic Planning; Toshio Komoto is named Minister of International Trade and Industry; Tatsuo Murayama is named Finance Minister; and Sunao Sonoda is named Foreign Minister.

Nov. 30—30 years after the U.S. took possession of the base following World War II, the U.S. officially returns the Tachikawa Air Base to Japan.

## JORDAN

(See *Intl, Middle East*)

## KOREA, REPUBLIC OF (South)

(See U.S., *Political Scandal*)

## LAOS

(See U.S., *Foreign Policy*)

## LEBANON

(See also *Intl, Middle East*)

Nov. 5—In Damascus, Lebanese President Elias Sarkis and Syrian President Hafez al-Assad fail to reach agreement on a peaceful settlement of the fighting in southern Lebanon.

Nov. 9—In retaliation for a rocket attack on Tyre by Palestinian guerrillas, Israeli bombers attack two farm villages in southern Lebanon; the death toll is expected to reach 110.

Nov. 12—The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), under pressure from Syrian and Lebanese officials, says it will effect a limited withdrawal of troops from southern Lebanon but not under fire from Israeli guns.

## MAURITANIA

Nov. 2—French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing sends an additional 300 troops to Dakar, Senegal, in an attempt to effect the release of 8 French technicians kidnapped by guerrillas belonging to the Polisario Front. 6 of the technicians were kidnapped in May and 2 were seized last week.

## MEXICO

Nov. 16—President José Lopez Portillo effects his 1st Cabinet change since he took office in December, 1976; he dismisses Finance Minister Julio Rodolfo Moctezuma Cid and Planning and Budget Minister Carlos Tello because they could not agree on an economic policy. David Ibarra Munoz is appointed Finance Minister and Ricardo Garcia Sainz is named Planning and Budget Minister.

## MOZAMBIQUE

(See *Cuba; Rhodesia*)

## NETHERLANDS

(See also *Intl, Intl Terrorism*)

- Nov. 4—Caretaker Prime Minister Joop den Uyl fails to form a coalition government among the Labor party, the Christian Democrats, and the Democrats '66.

## NEW ZEALAND

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

## PHILIPPINES

- Nov. 19—President Ferdinand E. Marcos announces the capture of chairman of the Communist party of the Philippines Jose Maria Sison on November 10.
- Nov. 25—Former Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., the main political foe of President Marcos, is sentenced to death by firing squad by a military court for subversive activities, murder, and illegal possession of firearms.
- Nov. 28—Following criticism by U.S. State Department officials, President Marcos orders the military court that sentenced Aquino to reopen its hearings and allow Aquino to present additional evidence.

## POLAND

- Nov. 28—Polish leader Edward Gierek arrives in Rome for talks with Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti and President Giovanni Leone.

## RHODESIA

- Nov. 6—At the conclusion of talks between Prime Minister Ian Smith, Britain's Commissioner designate Lord Carver and United Nations representative General Prem Chand in Salisbury, Ian Smith says there is "no measure of agreement," specifically on the issue of the composition of Rhodesia's security forces during the transition to black majority rule.
- Nov. 11—For the 12th year, the British Parliament in London votes to continue economic sanctions against Rhodesia.
- Nov. 18—In Umtali in a speech to the Rhodesian Front party, Prime Minister Smith says that he has undertaken new peace initiatives in light of the "lamentable failure" of Commissioner designate Lord Carver's recent mission.
- Nov. 24—In Bulawayo, Prime Minister Smith agrees to begin negotiations with black Rhodesian nationalist leaders; he agrees to their demands for universal adult suffrage, as long as certain guarantees for the safety of whites are maintained.
- Nov. 25—The Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, leader of the African National Council, and Chief Jeremiah Chirau of the Zimbabwe United Peoples Organization agree to negotiate with Smith on the basis of one man, one vote.
- Nov. 26—Bishop Abel Muzorewa of the United African National Council agrees to negotiate with Smith. Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe, leaders of the powerful Patriotic Front, announce that they will not negotiate but will continue fighting.
- Nov. 28—The government announces that during last week its troops fought nationalist guerrillas in Mozambique, killing 1,200 people and destroying 2 guerrilla bases.

## SENEGAL

(See *Mauritania*)

## SOMALIA

(See also *Ethiopia*)

- Nov. 13—On Mogadishu radio, Minister of Information Abdulkassim Salad Hasan announces the Central Committee's decision to expel "all Soviet experts" within a week, curtail the Soviet's use of strategic naval facilities and order all Cuban embassy officials to leave the country. The government also abrogates the 1974 treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union. The surprise move comes as a result of recent Soviet support of Ethiopia in the 4-month-old war in the Ogaden, Ethiopia.

- Nov. 15—All Cuban officials, military and civilian, leave the country.

- Nov. 17—In Mogadishu, an 8-member congressional committee from the U.S. meets with Somali President Siad Barre.

## SOUTH AFRICA

(See also *Intl, U.N.*)

- Nov. 3—A government spokesman announces a change in the black pass system; blacks wishing to move to "white" areas will no longer be required to carry a "reference" book issued by white authorities; instead, blacks must acquire the documents from their homeland leaders.
- Nov. 4—In reaction to the U.N.-imposed arms embargo voted today by the Security Council, Foreign Minister Roelof F. Botha says that the embargo will stiffen South Africans' resolve to defend their country.
- Nov. 10—In Pretoria, police round up 626 blacks who allegedly violated the passbook requirements; among the blacks arrested are 198 schoolchildren who have allegedly been detained to see if they are "children in need of care."
- Nov. 11—Economic Affairs Minister J. Christiaan Heunis invokes special government powers under the National Supplies and Procurement Act. Under the Act, the government may compel foreign-owned companies to produce military equipment.
- Nov. 14—In Pretoria, an official inquiry begins into the cause of the death of young black leader Stephen Biko, who died in police custody in September.
- Nov. 25—The Supreme Court upholds a lower court ruling that Donald J. Woods, a banned newspaper editor, was illegally convicted and sentenced to 6 months in jail.
- Nov. 30—Nationwide general elections are held.

## SPAIN

- Nov. 14—Communist party leader Santiago Carrillo and 1st Secretary of the Socialist Workers party Felipe González depart for an 11-day visit to the United States.
- Nov. 19—In Washington, D.C., González meets with government officials but Carrillo is virtually ignored.

## SURINAM

- Nov. 1—In yesterday's general election, Prime Minister Henck Arron's National Party Combination wins a majority of seats in Parliament; this is the first general election since the country achieved independence 2 years ago.

## SYRIA

(See *Intl, Middle East; U.S.S.R.*)

## THAILAND

- Nov. 10—An interim constitution is announced; elections are scheduled for 1978 or 1979.
- Nov. 11—General Kriangsak Chamanad is appointed Prime Minister to replace Thanin Kraivichien, who was deposed in a coup on October 20.



## UGANDA

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Nov. 12—In Kampala, church and diplomatic sources report that in a new purge against Christians during the last 3 weeks, 20 people have been killed and nearly 400 have been arrested.

## U.S.S.R.

(See also *Somalia; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Nov. 1—A Soviet TU-144 supersonic airliner makes its 1st official passenger flight; it carries passengers 2,025 miles from Moscow to Alma Alta, Siberia, in two hours.

Nov. 2—President Leonid I. Brezhnev announces that the grain harvest for 1977 will be nearly 20 million tons under the anticipated level.

Nov. 5—To commemorate the 60th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution on November 7, Brezhnev grants limited amnesty; the amnesty does not include political prisoners.

Nov. 7—In Moscow, China's Foreign Minister Huang Hua attends the 60th anniversary celebration; he is the highest ranking Chinese official to visit the Soviet embassy in more than 10 years.

## UNITED KINGDOM

### GREAT BRITAIN

(See also *China; Rhodesia*)

Nov. 3—Queen Elizabeth II addresses the opening session of Parliament; she assigns the "highest priority" to reducing the rate of inflation.

Nov. 8—British customs and immigration officials stage a 4-hour strike to protest the government's anti-inflationary policy.

Nov. 9—Under Secretary of State Evan Luard announces that the government will not appoint an ambassador to Cambodia because of Cambodia's human rights policy.

Nov. 14—32,000 firemen go on strike to protest the government's wage restrictions.

Nov. 15—Princess Anne, daughter of Queen Elizabeth, gives birth to a son, who is 5th in line to the throne.

Nov. 16—On a key victory for the government, which favors home rule for Scotland and Wales, the House of Commons votes 313 to 287 to limit debate on a bill granting Scotland partial self-government. The House votes 314 to 287 to limit debate on a similar bill covering Wales. Final passage of the bills is viewed as a matter of routine.

### Northern Ireland

Nov. 24—British Minister for Northern Ireland Roy Mason proposes to Northern Ireland's 4 main political parties the establishment of a 78-seat assembly with limited powers to govern Northern Ireland.

## UNITED STATES

### Administration

Nov. 3—The White House press office reveals that President Jimmy Carter has ordered the 1st change in the military Code of Conduct in over 20 years; American servicemen who are prisoners of war are to be permitted to give more than minimal information to their captors when coerced by torture.

Nov. 4—President Carter postpones his projected foreign tour to 9 countries, which was scheduled to start November 22, in order to remain in Washington, D.C., to work with congressional leaders on his energy program. State Department sources report that the tour will be officially canceled next week.

Former CIA director Richard Helms is fined \$2,000 and given a 2-year suspended prison sentence on 2 misdemeanor counts in U.S. district court.

Nov. 9—Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Joseph Califano, Jr., reports that in a spot check of 20 states and the District of Columbia, 26,334 federal employees or recently retired federal employees were receiving welfare subsidies under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program.

Nov. 11—Acting director of the Office of Management and Budget James McIntyre, Jr., says that the budget for fiscal 1979 will total about \$459.8 billion, with a deficit "in the neighborhood of \$40 billion."

Nov. 16—President Carter signs an \$80 million authorization bill for urban mass transit that provides subsidies for commuter trains.

Nov. 27—The Federal Bureau of Investigation releases 53,000 pages of heavily edited secret files; the 15-year collection contains the records of the Bureau's programs against domestic dissidents.

Nov. 29—U.S. district court Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr., tells the President he cannot continue to be a candidate for the directorship of the Federal Bureau of Investigation because of ill health.

Nov. 30—President Carter says he will press for "substantial tax reductions" in 1978 and postpone other tax proposals.

FBI director Clarence Kelley agrees to postpone his retirement until February 15.

### Civil Rights

Nov. 14—4 young black students and a teacher are attacked and injured by club-swinging whites on a school trip to Bunker Hill Monument, Massachusetts, from Pennsylvania.

Nov. 18—Robert Chambliss is convicted and given a life-term because he was responsible for the 1963 dynamiting of a black Birmingham, Alabama, church in which 4 young black girls were killed.

Nov. 21—The National Women's Conference ends its national convention in Houston, Texas, after adopting a platform calling for national political action by women on behalf of women and children.

### Economy

Nov. 3—The Labor Department reports that the wholesale price index rose 0.8 percent in October.

Nov. 4—The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that the nation's unemployment rate rose to 7 percent in October.

Nov. 17—The Commerce Department reports a revised gross national product rate of 4.7 percent for the 3d quarter.

Nov. 22—The Department of Labor reports that the consumer price index rose 0.3 percent in October.

Nov. 28—The Commerce Department reports a record \$3.1 billion balance of trade deficit for October.

### Foreign Policy

(See also *Intl, Middle East; Cuba; Rhodesia*)

Nov. 1—President Jimmy Carter signs a \$6.7-billion foreign assistance appropriation bill; because of human rights violations, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Uganda will receive no aid; military aid is banned for Ethiopia and Uruguay and military credit sales to Argentina, Brazil, El Salvador and Guatemala are also banned.

Nov. 3—White House sources say that the U.S. plans to return the 1,000-year-old Hungarian Crown of Saint

Stephen to Hungary in the near future; the crown has been in U.S. custody since 1945.

Nov. 9—President Carter meets with New Zealand Prime Minister Robert Muldoon at the White House.

Nov. 15—President Carter welcomes Iran's Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlavi to Washington, D.C.; supporters and opponents of the Shah clash outside the White House grounds; guests and rioters are hit by police tear gas.

Nov. 19—Secretary of State Cyrus Vance leaves to visit Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela.

Nov. 23—Secretary Vance reports from Venezuela that he could not persuade Venezuelan President Carlos Andres Perez to agree to an oil price freeze for 1978.

Nov. 29—The White House announces that the President's trip originally scheduled for November will begin December 29 in Warsaw, Poland. The President will visit Poland, Iran, India, Saudi Arabia, France and Belgium. He will return to Washington, D.C., January 7, 1978.

Nov. 30—At a press conference, President Carter says he "is pleased" at the initiative taken by President Sadat to relax tensions in the Middle East.

At a press conference in Washington, D.C., President Carter announces that the U.S. will be represented at the Cairo conference by Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Alfred Atherton, Jr.

### Labor and Industry

Nov. 13—A settlement between North Atlantic shipping owners and striking longshoremen is expected to end the 44-day strike that has tied up container shipping on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts; the membership of the International Longshoremen's Association must ratify the pact, which provides a job security program and benefits totaling \$3.31 an hour.

Nov. 29—Striking dockworkers agree to a new master contract, ending the 60-day strike.

### Legislation

(See also *Foreign Policy*)

Nov. 1—At a ceremony in the White House rose garden, President Carter signs a minimum wage bill that raises the U.S. minimum wage to \$2.65 in January, 1978, and in yearly increments to \$3.35 in January, 1981.

Testifying before a House Judiciary Committee subcommittee, Assistant Attorney General John Harmon and various private legal experts say that Congress has the authority to extend for an additional 7 years the time period in which states must ratify the Equal Rights Amendment.

Nov. 2—The Senate by a 87-2 vote and the House by a voice vote approve the agreement with Canada for the Alcan gas pipeline, which will carry natural gas from Alaska across Canada to the rest of the U.S.

Nov. 4—By a voice vote, the Senate approves a House measure that continues funds for payrolls for some 200,000 employees of the Departments of Labor and Health, Education and Welfare through November 30. A \$601 billion appropriations bill for the 2 departments for fiscal 1979 has been tied up in the Senate and House because of debate over a rider that provides strict curbs on the use of federal funds for abortions.

Nov. 5—Exercising his 1st veto, President Carter rejects an \$8 billion supplemental appropriations bill that contains an \$80-million appropriation for the Clinch River breeder reactor program.

Nov. 9—President Carter signs a bill deregulating the air cargo industry; in effect, air cargo lines are permitted to fly anywhere in the United States.

### Military

(See also *Administration*)

Nov. 11—Defense Department officials say that in fiscal 1977 the U.S. sold \$11.3 billion worth of arms overseas, \$1.4 billion more than the estimate given to Congress earlier.

Nov. 15—The Defense Department reports that over 40 percent of its volunteer recruits in the armed forces drop out before they complete their 1st enlistment period.

### Political Scandal

Nov. 5—In a report to Congress, President Carter says "that the Korean government's failure to persuade Mr. Park to return to the United States . . . is impeding the course of justice in the United States."

Nov. 29—The House Subcommittee on International Organizations releases a detailed document describing a \$750,000-South Korean plan to influence American diplomats, and congressional, political and academic leaders in about 170 different operations in the U.S. in 1976.

### Politics

Nov. 8—U.S. elections are held, including mayoralty elections in the 38 largest U.S. cities.

### Protectorates

#### AMERICAN SAMOA

Nov. 22—Peter T. Coleman is elected Governor of American Samoa, defeating A. P. Lutali 2,980 to 2,401 in a run-off election. Coleman will serve a 3-year term, taking office as the 1st elected governor in January, 1978. The U.S. has appointed Samoan leaders for the last 77 years.

### Science and Space

Nov. 2—A research team at the University of Illinois at Urbana reports the discovery of a most primitive form of life, a primitive microorganism that digests carbon dioxide and produces methane; a spokesman for the 5-year research program says that the organism probably evolved 3.5 billion to 4 billion years ago and is a form of life more primitive and older than bacteria and genetically distinct.

### Supreme Court

Nov. 7—The Supreme Court declines to review a lower district court decision that upholds the validity of the 1974 Commodity Exchange Act.

Nov. 8—In a unanimous decision, the Court rules that a man disabled from birth and receiving Social Security children's benefits forfeits his benefits on marriage to a disabled woman who is not eligible for the same type of benefits.

#### URUGUAY

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

#### VIETNAM


(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Nov. 21—In Peking, Communist party leader Le Duan meets with China's Communist party Chairman Hua Kuo-feng; this is their first official meeting.

#### YUGOSLAVIA

Nov. 25—A Foreign Ministry spokesman announces an amnesty for 723 prisoners, including dissident writer Mihajlo Mihajlov.

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 FEB 25 '80  
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